


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PSYCHOLOGY
OF
POLITICS AND HISTORY

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BY

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FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE PROGRESS AND FALL OF NATIONS.

It is an undoubtable fact that states do not remain in a state of equilibrium.

ERRATA.

Page 11, l. 7, *for* further *read* future.

„ 12, l. 21, „ Gens „ Chiefs.

„ 138, l. 6, „ ranked in different phases *read* needed in different places.

„ 15, l. 11, „ Persian *read* Punic.

The condition and external relations of nations. The result of all this general movement is the progress or decay of the nation, its greater strength or weakness.

It is the purpose of this volume to show what are the general and fundamental laws and tendencies that govern this movement. Undoubtedly, geographical surroundings and other external elements all play a very important part in starting and individualising the life of a nation. A state, like

FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE PROGRESS AND FALL OF NATIONS.

It is an undoubtable fact that states do not remain in the same condition. Even apart from outside influences, they are subject to internal movements whose ultimate goal is destruction or perfection. The general happiness of individuals constituting society, the laws that are passed, the alterations in the distribution of wealth, the diffusion of culture, the interest taken in one branch of energy rather than in another, and perhaps, more than anything else, the ever changing aims and aspirations of so many individuals and sections, are ever affecting the internal condition and external relations of nations. The result of all this general movement is the progress or decay of the nation, its greater strength or weakness.

It is the purpose of this volume to show what are the general and fundamental laws and tendencies that govern this movement. Undoubtedly, geographical surroundings and other external elements all play a very important part in starting and individualising the life of a nation. A state, like

Athens, or Carthage, or England, on the borders of the sea, will no doubt be more cosmopolitan, more addicted to trade and commerce, than a nation hemmed in by lofty mountains. But, as we shall show, the real laws that govern the internal movements of nations are internal and not external. Nations as widely different in character and environment as Athens and Sparta, Rome and Persia, may rise, flourish and decay in the same way and through the same causes in spite of their different circumstances.

It is the psychological laws that chiefly affect the progress and deterioration of nations. Human passions, human desires, and the complex movements of the human mind are the real elements that have to be taken into consideration. Until recently, the minds of statesmen have been preoccupied rather with the external elements of the state. Actions of prominent men, distribution of wealth, appointments of political preferment, conditions affecting public health, and other elements of a similar character naturally receive a great share of attention. But the causes affecting the being of society are more profound in their nature and are to be found rather in the thoughts, and feelings that pervade the great mass of society.

Society is made up of individuals, and therefore what the individuals are, that society as a whole must be. It may, indeed, seem impossible to formu-

So that the progress of a nation is determined by the character of its individuals, and consequently by the character of its government.

late into general laws and tendencies the various passions and mental conditions that affect society, and still more impossible might it appear for statesmen seriously to take into consideration such occult elements and to legislate accordingly.

A similar objection was also once raised regarding the complicated elements of the science of Political Economy which is now entering so largely into the views of statesmen. But this difficulty has been solved to a very great extent. And so likewise can be solved the difficulty of classifying and grouping into laws the workings of the individual human mind affecting society. As in Political Economy there is a hierarchy of facts, one set containing the smaller, so also is it in regard to the psychological fact of human nature. There are certain dominant thoughts, desires and passions that rule all the others, that shape human conduct on certain definite lines, and it is these that must form the study of any statesman who wishes to be guided by what is relevant and fundamental.

Public documents, ancient and modern, clearly show the prominent importance of this human psychological element in history. Opportunities of conquest accepted by one nation will be rejected by another more temperate in its aims, whose ambitions are rather in the direction of internal prosperity and accumulation of wealth. Foreign invasion will have a most disastrous effect upon a nation

when its citizens are unpatriotic, while, on the other hand, it will often unite and still further strengthen a nation when citizens are full of love for their country. To one nation, opportunities of making wealth will be a source of corruption and decay, to another, the same opportunities will be a spur to a wholesome emulation and greater healthful activity.

In one word, it is the human element that counts, and the object of our research must be to consider scientifically the constituents of this element in the individual and then to see how its workings affect the condition of society.

How important must be such a study can be clearly seen from what is already obvious in the individual human life. What is it that makes a man happy and prosperous? Surely, not merely external circumstances or lofty position of supremacy over other men. There are persons rolling in luxury yet whose vitals are gnawed by vice and unhappiness, while on the other hand, rags and smiles often go together. Success and happiness, therefore, depend chiefly upon the individual, namely upon the complex machinery of thoughts, feelings, desires and ambition that constitute his character.

The same is also true of society. Only superficial legislation can result from the exclusive study of the material and outside elements of society. The thing of supreme importance is to study the souls of men, the laws that govern the human

passions and characters—laws upon which depend mostly the happiness and real strength of a nation.

In order to accomplish this research, a careful study is required, namely first, the study of what happens to the individual, and secondly, the study of the symptoms of corresponding phenomena in the nation itself. These two studies which must accompany each other, will reveal the fact that there are approximately eight psychological tendencies or laws which explain the progress and decline of nations. These are—

- (1) The distinction between the substantial and the accidental in the existence of a nation.
- (2) Law of connection between the psychological conditions and the aims of a nation.
- (3) Harmony of the social element with the extra-social element.
- (4) Relation between the thought of the masses and the thought of the foremost thinkers and statesmen.
- (5) True stimulants to a nation's progress.
- (6) Influence of the classic pagan religion on the state.
- (7) Influence of Christianity on the state.
- (8) Effects of international intercourse on the individual life of the nation.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS SUBSTANTIAL AND WHAT IS ONLY ACCIDENTAL IN THE LIFE OF A NATION.

It is a truism very evident but often forgotten that in every creature there is a combination of the important and of the unimportant. There are qualities essential to the very being of the thing in question and there are qualities that are only subordinate and accidental. Sometimes, it is not easy to distinguish between these two classes of qualities, and, from this circumstance, there frequently arises the difficulty of forming a correct conclusion and decision. But the difference is there, and the task of finding it faces every scientist and every man of affairs who wishes to see and define things as they truly are.

In every department of human life as well as in the material world, we find this combination of the important or substantial with the accidental. Architecture, painting, sculpture, literature, music, every section of the whole world of art furnishes examples of this universal fact. And what is still more rele-

vant to our purpose is that in all the practical affairs of human conduct we find this same distinction. How often do we not hear the expression "That is of *primary* importance," or "Now he is coming to the *point*," or "So and so is always able to grasp the *kernel* of the situation"?

Evidently, a person who wishes to act with wisdom and prudence must ever keep in mind this line of distinction between the substantial and the accidental and, in fact, the supreme law of wisdom may be formulated thus: "Act according to what is essential and not merely according to what is accidental". In other words, we cannot act wisely unless we take broad and comprehensive views of the subject with which we have to deal and unless we are able to see clearly those important elements which chiefly ought to be our guide.

In the arts themselves, how many mistakes are made from ignoring this fundamental principle. While, for example, the early and middle styles of Gothic architecture were noted for their directness and the harmony with which the parts were made all subservient to the whole, the later styles become debased owing to meretricious ornament being inserted for its own sake. In the art of painting, similar extravagances have been committed, minor details being pushed forward too prominently, causing detriment to that unity upon which all true beauty depends. In sculpture, the description given

See Chapt. I "The Cult of Incompleteness"

by Horace of one of the unsuccessful carvers who "seeks to imitate in brass the flexible hair, unhappy yet in the main because he knows not how to complete a finished piece," also illustrates a maxim well known to the artists of antiquity.

Perhaps, literature, above all the other arts, demands the observance of the law of cleaving to the substance and subordinating the accidental. Indeed, two of the foremost writers of the last century owe their respective success and failure in reaching perfection to the avowed adoption and rejection of this principle. Edgar Allan Poe maintained that true poetry consists in a succession of pleasing sounds, in the skilful use of alliteration, assonance, rhythm and other mechanical devices. Cullen Bryant, on the other hand, proclaimed that the true poet will look first and foremost to what is intrinsically beautiful and noble. Results have now shown the inevitable outcome of these opposing principles. For in the opinion of saner critics, Poe's popularity has justly waned owing to the too lavish employment of mere accessories. The ornaments are beautiful but the things they should adorn are too frequently missing. On the other hand, the truly great critics or writers like Bryant are those that realise that exalted art consists of the beautiful and ideal, and that while verbal and accessory details should not be neglected, yet they must be subordinated to the idea and to the corresponding emotion.

If from the realm of art we turn to the ordinary departments of human activity, there, more than ever, we find that true wisdom consists in subordinating the accidental to the substantial. All errors proceed from the opposite course of conduct. The man who spends his money on passing luxuries and then finds himself in the work-house, the fraudulent clerk who risks dishonour and imprisonment for a mere *idle gratification*, the drunkard who spoils life and home for a *passing exhilaration*, the passionate man, the luxurious man who will poison life's cup with venom, all these, in their practical conduct, ignore the substantial and concentrate their attention and desires on the unimportant.

But the wise man will be guided by the synthetic view of things. He looks to the whole not to the part. He does not direct his attention to some small locality in space, nor does he heed exclusively what happens only in a brief period of time. He is guided in all his actions and ruled by broad and comprehensive views of conduct and he can distinguish between what must be retained at all costs, and what on occasion must be relinquished.

So far, we have been considering the supreme rule of prudence and wisdom as applied to the arts, literature and to the ordinary departments of human life and activity.

If we now turn to what is the immediate object of our investigation, namely the state and what per-

tains to its welfare, we find that everything depends upon the observance of this same fundamental principle. In the state or commonwealth, there are things essential and things unessential, and history shows that the very existence of the state depends upon keeping in view this distinction. A true statesman and an enlightened people will always look primarily to that which constitutes the substantial welfare of the state, that upon which its very existence depends, and to this will subordinate the other things. When, however, this principle is ignored, then the state will decline in prosperity and will often cease to be altogether.

Naturally the question arises, What is that fundamental element in society to which all other things must be subordinate? In modern times, society is so complicated, and it contains so many divergent forces and interests that this question is by no means easy to answer. The question, however, is not insoluble and may be reached in two ways, first by considering what was the early spirit and the original institutions of society, secondly by excluding the accidental elements without which society might still exist—then the residue with which we shall find ourselves confronted will be the substantial and essential element.

A study of the societies still in the early stage of their existence, and a historical study of the formation of ancient states, suffice to give us a practical

idea of the formation of what constitutes the foundation elements of society, and some of those may by way of parenthesis be recalled to the reader's mind.

Evidently when man began to form a society for the first time, he could not but regard primarily the essentials of his ^{future} society, otherwise, society would never have been formed. And these essentials or chief formative impulses in the formation of every society, present and past, seem to have been the need of a common worship and the need of self-defence. The higher life, and the defence from external invasion and danger were the two prominent needs. Hence the ark or citadel in Ancient Greece and Rome, where the people were wont to assemble in order to worship and to defend themselves, hence also the fortified sanctuaries among the Pueblos and other tribes. It was felt that a great deal of happiness must needs depend upon the fulfilment of these two great needs. The propitiation of the deities and a course of conduct that would be pleasing to those deities, the cultivation of the natural virtues corresponding to the dictates of their worship, the protection of the rights of each individual man from outside assaults—all these and many other advantages are implicitly contained in these two essentials, religion and self-defence.

Then, almost simultaneously with the obtainment

of such advantages would arise others of a newer kind but also very important. Thus the different units of society would co-operate with one another in contributing to a common stock of wealth. And, even at an early period, there would take place a division of labour. In the pre-historic periods of Greece and Rome, this was the case though, as we see from the poems of Homer, the division of labour was of an elementary character. In certain other nations, where the caste system prevails, there we find even now an existing proof of this early co-operative and mutual division of labour, certain families, from generation to generation, devoting themselves entirely to one particular branch of industry. Then, besides this material progress, they quickly learn the utility of having some organ of common administration, regulating harmoniously their common activities and rights and duties. Hence even in early times, we always find some authority in command, whether it be the Homeric Gens, or the Principes, among the Germans, mentioned by Tacitus, or the Headsman of a Russian Mir.

By this association and mutual partnership, at least in essential things, the individual would find his family and individual rights better protected and regulated. The sacred ties of the family and its hereditary customs would be better secured from the lust and violence of individuals, the increase of

population better regulated, and man's own individual right to happiness, virtue, as well as his rights over property, respected and safeguarded.

All these things would stand pre-eminently before the minds of those people that are still in the early period of the formation of society. And most of their laws and traditions would concern these fundamental things. Hence in the Homeric poems, we find customary laws regulating the position and remuneration of labour, laws protecting the weak and the defenceless, the wayfarer, and the suppliant, while the sanctity of the family was preserved by the practice of monogamy. Among the Romans, the laws regulating the punishment for crime, and safeguarding the rights of the family and of public property and securing at least in theory the just apportionment of public wealth testify to the important position that the essential held in the minds of Roman legislators. While, if we examine the customary law prevailing among our Teutonic ancestors, we shall find, in still clearer evidence, that there existed the subordination of the inferior to the more important element. Punishment of individual crimes that are detrimental to the moral welfare and end of society, precepts determining the national relations between members of the family and different sections of society, and the sacrifice of all that stands in the way of the true welfare of the community, all these are vividly portrayed by Tacitus and are

contrasted with the rottenness undermining the Roman Empire at that time.

It would be possible to make a series of examination of all the different laws, written and customary, that characterise societies in their early beginnings, and everywhere we shall find the same thing, that people then looked to the essentials of the constitution of society, and legislated accordingly. From these laws, we see clearly that society was and is held together by one common purpose, namely that of pursuing what contributes to the harmony and happiness of society.

We must, however, now consider the accidental and accessory elements that accompany the formation of the state. These, though not essential, yet constitute an additional and extrinsic perfection. Material power, possession of riches, and increase of luxury and material comforts are outward embellishments that in nearly every case become the object of every civilised society. Generally they are not sought after simultaneously, but in succession, and in the order we have mentioned. Naturally, the increase of power or dominion, or as the Latins used to call it, of imperium, would be the first object presenting itself to the minds of the newly organised units of society. And this would result from the satisfaction of one of the immediate purposes of society namely self-defence. The building of fortifications, the organisation of armies, and the

sense of victory would speedily beget in the mind a desire of still further extending both power and dominant assertion. Such indeed was the case in European civilised countries. Athenian prowess against the Persians, and the formation of the Confederacy of Delos led to an attempt to establish a real Athenian empire; Sparta's defence against Athens' aggression led to Spartan overlordship and tyranny over all the parts of the Greek world; Rome's defence against Hannibal led up to the aggressive Third Persian War, and the establishment of the Empire led up to the idea of a universal Roman imperium so glorified by the singers of the Augustan Age. Similarly, in modern history, the wars of Louis XIV. which at first were only wars of self-defence became, after the Treaty of Ryswick, wars of aggression, and in later times, Prussia's position as a border state in a dangerous position led up to her assumption of the rôle as dominant military factor in the affairs of Germany. Pun

In all these, as in other instances too numerous to mention, possession of power became the primary object. But after this, quickly steps in the desire of wealth. Hence, almost simultaneous with increase of power in the cases above mentioned, we find Athenian statesmen busy in filling to repletion the treasury of Athens, wringing taxes from the subject allies, that Spartan harposts in the hey-day of their powers were even still more rapacious, and

that Roman tax-gatherers showed unbridled licence in extracting wealth and luxuries from her subject states. While to quote a modern instance, the conquests made by England in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to the rise of the Economic School of Mercantilists who laid so much stress on the accumulation of gold and silver.

Finally, as is well known, the possession of wealth leads up to a desire for material pleasures and comforts. This is the final stage, and while in regard to pagan nations, it preludes their extinction, in regard to Christian nations, it is a harbinger of their rejuvenation. Of these facts, a sufficient instance is the luxury of the Roman empire in its period of decline, and the luxury and corruption that immediately ushered in the period of the French Revolution.

No one, however, could seriously maintain that power and wealth are always in themselves a source of evil or that they do not contribute to the adornment and extrinsic well-being of society. But the evil arises when they are considered exclusively, and when the essential elements of the well-being of society are practically ignored. In other words, disaster inevitably follows where legislatures and peoples imagine that power and wealth are the objects for which society was instituted. Principles quickly incarnate themselves into action. And the consequence of the want of distinction between the essential and the accidental means the formation of

* laws, and the erection of a great number of institutions and aggregations directly subversive of the well-being of society.

At such times, the ancient principles, the ancient institutions are lost sight of, and the state is hurried into all sorts of dangers by a false regard of what is merely accidental and superficial. Even other societies besides the state illustrate this tendency, and from this fact arises the cry "Back to the beginning". Even the Church itself in regard to its human element is no exception. Oftentimes, accidental institutions that were meant to act as subsidiary aids to virtue, may in the minds of many occupy too important a position. And at such times grave abuses may occur. Such was the case in the period that heralded the Reformation. Machiavelli observing the evils of the time merely from the human point of view, and forgetting that the Church is a divine institution, suggested their remedy by saying that, if the Church were not brought back to the spirit of its ancient origin by St. Dominic or St. Francis, or by some other personage, it would become extinguished altogether. Even in religious orders, a similar fact can be noted. They were originally formed by men full of zeal in the practice of the fundamental virtues, such as charity, chastity and humility, while the particular rules and observances were all intended to be as instruments to this great object. But as time goes on, and as fervour

begins to decline, the accessories too often occupy the dominant position and the letter of the law is cultivated at the expense of the spirit. Hence in many religious orders arises the need of reform, and this reform invariably assumes the character of a return to the ancient spirit and practice.

How much greater must be such a danger in the case of civil societies! With the lapse of time, the memory of ancient times and customs grows weak, and what is purely accidental becomes the object of man's desires, with the result that a course of policy and administration is adopted which is both dangerous and ill-advised. If dominion be the primary object of the state, then politicians will devote to this all their energies. Foreign wars, incessant taxation, unconscious weakening of the nation's vitality will ensue. If money be the immediate object of pursuit, then measures equally ill-advised will be adopted. The higher interests of the nation will be sacrificed to the making of money. Financial considerations will dominate the public discussions and deliberations. Statesmen, instead of asking what is just or what is conducive to the real interest of the community, will ask only what is profitable to the treasury. Nor is this all. Money-making will become the dominant pursuit of the community. The poetry of life, the virtues of sympathy, of unselfishness and gentleness sink into the lap of disregard, and whole sections of society will pursue their own

way regardless of the well-being of the commonwealth. Finally, if luxury and material comforts monopolise the attention, effects still more disastrous may be expected, the life blood of the nation being spent no longer upon the fertile fields of devotion, but upon the soft couches of voluptuous pleasure.

Sometimes, the nation arises to a sense of the evil that is being done by such neglect of what is essential to the existence of society. For, moral evil is inevitably followed by material evil. Internal discord, wickedness of individuals, noxious actions of different sections of society, the sense of internal weakness in the face of probability of invasion sometimes have the effect of arousing the nation's conscience. Or, again, it may also happen that just a few individuals more prescient than the others raise their voices and point out the means of redress.

In such cases, an appeal is always made to what had taken place in the beginning of society, to early institutions and early manners. It is well known how in time of distress, the Greeks bethought themselves of the original founders of society whom they had deified, how Roman orators like Cicero, and Roman philosophers like Cato were constantly reminding their hearers of the customs of their ancestors, of the simplicity and grandeur of the Romans in the early times. A similar tendency is found in the course of mediæval and modern history. Again, constantly in English history we find an appeal made

to the charters and customs of our Anglo-Saxon forefathers, and our great boast as Englishmen is that our political development has proceeded from its primitive beginnings without interruption. While, in America the memory of the glorious days of independence and of the framing of the Constitution are blended with far more interesting associations than those of mere resistance to the tyranny of the Mother Country.

Other conspicuous examples we could also find in European history. When the Italian cities were rent asunder by internal strife and factions, Machiavelli remarked that the salvation of states consists in their returning to the primitive conditions of their foundation. Before the French Revolution, there was incessant speculation as to the conditions under which society first of all came into existence, while St. Just, one of the ablest theorizers of the Jacobin party, declared, "unless France could be restored to her original simplicity of living, that he would commit suicide from despair".

In these, and in many cases that might be quoted, we find that in times of national disaster and rottenness, men's minds instinctively think of the early condition of society.

Perhaps the objection might arise that some of the most successful rulers have been those who have been guided by purely personal ambitions, and who did not consult at all the true interests of the state,

whether important or only accessory ! This circumstance, however, can be explained when we remember that sometimes different classes of interests may converge upon the same object or course of action. The personal interests of a ruler are always, at least, partially intertwined with those of the nation at large. An enfeebled, decrepit nation would be a stain upon the escutcheon of a grand monarch and a constant menace to one who should think only of his temporal interests. In other words, personal aggrandisement can often be accomplished only by means of the strength and aggrandisement of the nation.

Such a coincidence of interests could naturally work to the advantage of both parties. Hence Peter the Great, Elizabeth, Louis XIV. and Napoleon, in working for themselves, worked also for the state. But if the monarch has no power of self-restraint, the personal element will sometimes work its own way to material disaster, the monarch rushing after mere shadows and neglecting the substance. Thus, up to the Treaty of Ryswick, the energy of Louis XIV. in strengthening the weak frontiers of his kingdom was a boon to his subjects, but after that treaty, he embarked upon wars of aggression pure and simple which led up to the humiliations and sufferings of the wars of the Grand Alliance and of the Spanish Succession. A similar remark could be made regarding the Napoleonic wars so disastrous after the Treaty of Tilsit.

In matters of domestic administration, the same coincidence becomes apparent, the selfishness of a ruling section often co-operating with the general interests of society. Naturally, an ambitious ruler will seek to establish a strong centralised government, the reins of which will be in his own hands. And who can deny that this form of government is sometimes essential for a nation? When Republican Rome was dissolving like a rotten carcass, when senate, popular assemblies and official magistracies were given up to greed and corruption, it was Cæsar's ambition that became a unifying principle of life, bringing again together the different members of the politic body. Even the old Greek tyrant, so often unjustly abused, performed important services in this regard. And not only the selfishness of persons but even the private ambitions of dominant political parties often perform great service in preventing the decentralising tendencies that dangerously abound in a nation, as was the case with the dominant Jacobin party during the French Revolution, and the powerful Whig majority in England under Walpole's administration.

While this coincidence of private interest and public welfare is only temporary, yet, for the time being, the advantages are great, and in any case, the success of a selfish individual party furnishes no exception to the truth of the general maxim that the prosperity of a nation consists in subor-

dinating the accidental to the essential and important.

This, however, does not mean that the accidental elements are to be ignored altogether. The accessory details must also be an object of attention, but they must be regarded as accessory and not as vital. Power and riches, and even material comfort, are desirable things, and in their proper place must not be overlooked by the statesman.

It is precisely here that arise the great problems of true statesmanship.

If we observe carefully what happens in ordinary life, we find people in forming decisions generally adopt one of these two methods. They either act according to a broad general comprehensive view of the situation, or they act according to a minute and well-reasoned out knowledge of all the details. The former method prevails among the simple-minded and the comparatively uneducated, the latter method is usually adopted by the scientist and the learned. Each method has its own peculiar merits and attendant defects.

In the synthetic method, there is less danger of overlooking the important issues, and there is also greater rapidity of action. On the other hand, small details are apt to be neglected, and thus while no serious error is committed, yet there is imperfection and a continual need for some adjustment. The analytic method discloses to view the small details,

but there is danger of confusing them with the essential issues of a question.

Nations in their infancy generally follow the synthetic method. They take the simple, rough, general view of the situation. Afterwards, as they gradually develop, they begin to reason and to discuss in detail. New developments, new institutions, new relations without and within, furnish ever new and constant material for argument and discussion, and the result is that the mind instead of seeing a given thing with one whole glance, runs discursively over many things. At such times, there is great multiplicity of thought and word, and many parties are formed which represent the different segments of the political field, and engross the attention of the public mind.

Undoubtedly, the best system is to combine as far as possible the synthetic with the analytic method. This may seem a difficult task, but it is not one involving any inherent contradiction. It requires great knowledge of theory, a great command of general principles, a thorough acquaintance with statistics, and at the same time, the facility in viewing complicated data under the light of theory.

Owing to the lack of these qualities, only one of the two methods has in past times been cultivated, necessarily at the expense of the other. In the Middle Ages, political thought was very synthetic. There was very little analytic method and abstrac-

tion, very little examination of details, very little care in the selection of means. At the same time, however, the essential was not lost sight of. Men, not things, were always the chief object of attention. Hence, we find during the Middle Ages lofty enterprises, great ideals, a firm faith in the supernatural and eternal, and a strong prevalence of the ideal and imaginative element. What defects there were proceeded from the neglect of detail and deficiency of analysis, rendering great undertakings more or less imperfect.

After the fifteenth century, the modern period of history ushered in a remarkable development of the power of political analysis. Details were closely inspected, the means were exalted into a position of much importance, and things, more than persons, were the great object of attention. Evidently, great dangers were to be expected from such a system, not the least of these being rampant materialism, and especially the neglect of the essential and important.

In later times, however, a reaction has set in. Both the synthetic and the analytic methods are being adopted. Not only are the general bearings of a question thoroughly discussed and surveyed, but the minute details as well are examined. Thus, not only are great projects and reforms inaugurated, but the means are also carefully selected, and the attendant defects and evils of measures, substantially good, are as far as possible eliminated.

One great factor in this development has been the growth of the science of statistics, by which material facts are closely examined, recorded and classified. In the early stages of history, however, very little attention was given to this department of study. Men contented themselves with observing things *en masse*. They preferred to act from *a priori* principles. Not deduction, but induction was the method they preferred.

But after the fifteenth century the experimental method began to prevail, and with this came in the gradual use of statistics. Growth of population, comparative numbers of births and deaths, relation between the value of exports and imports—these and other similar data were all carefully recorded. Great things were at first expected from this enormous accumulation of facts, but only to be followed by frequent disappointment. For the accumulation of many facts is useless unless guided and accompanied by the light of theory. In other words, neither the process of reasoning nor the mere observation of facts is sufficient. Hence, during the period following the introduction of the experimental method, many serious mistakes were made by following facts too blindly and not reasoning upon the material so abundantly collected.

Only in later times, have the two systems been more or less closely united. While great care is taken in collecting census reports, in tabulating the

number of births, deaths and marriages, in ascertaining the exact number of those who are engaged in the different occupations and conditions of life, equal industry is shown also in classifying the material collected and forming general principles which may serve as a guide to practical legislation. The task, however, is still difficult. Just to know the precise moment when to make the leap from the accumulation of facts to the formation of principles needs a peculiar genius possessed by few. It requires a keen eye for detail and at the same time the power of adjusting the mental vision so as to embrace the whole field. These qualifications, however, are being cultivated now more than they were before. Facts and figures are collected, and upon these both statesmen and writers exercise their ingenuity in the classification of data, and in forming general conclusions.

Perhaps one specific example will suffice to illustrate the development to which we refer—namely, the growth and evolution of the present poor-law system. And what may be said regarding this one particular section of human activity, may also be applied to many others.

During the Middle Ages, the relief of the poor was undertaken mainly by private charity. The monasteries, the guilds and private individuals administered relief to those who applied for such. Principles of charity and benevolence were the source

of activity. But not much attention was paid to details, to the selection of ways and means, and to the avoidance of incidental defects. Hence, we find in the Middle Ages very little in the way of systematisation, very little inquiry into the real needs of applicants, or indeed any serious attempt to connect and organise the different channels of charity. Whence proceeded many abuses. Effects of indiscriminate almsgiving became alarming, and when, owing to the late wars, bad harvests and other causes, the number of the poor and unemployed assumed overwhelming proportions, need was felt of attending to something else besides lofty principles.

Then came the system of relief by the state. And during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we find an elaborate attention paid to details, such as the classification of the poor, distinction between worthy and unworthy poor, and the auditing of receipts and expenses.

For some time there was an improvement. But even the new system was proved to have its own peculiar defects. Legislation was too often based on mere facts without sufficient attempt to theorise or to allow for any other force than that of mere facts and figures. Human inclinations, human perversity and human caprice had not been taken sufficiently into account. And laws were passed, admirable, if viewed in the light of bare statistics, but pernicious if considered in any other light.

Perhaps the most conspicuous of these laws was the Speenhamland Act which provided that insufficient wages should be supplemented by the parish rates. Here, we find an admirable attempt to make one column of figures come up to a just proportion of another column of figures. But by exclusive attention to this mathematical detail, legislators lost sight of the inevitable tendency of human nature—on the part of the workman, the tendency to do as little work as possible, since in any case he would still be remunerated out of the public funds, and on the part of the employer, the tendency to pay wages unjustly low, knowing that the rates of the parish would make up the deficiency.

During the last century, however, the evil was recognised. And the famous poor law of 1836 is a conspicuous example of what can be done by the synthetic and analytic method united, and by the combined use of statistics and theory. For in that report, not only is full light shed upon a multitude of important details, but certain theories and principles are deduced and recognised that may serve as salutary guides of action—among these, perhaps, the most important principle being the one that declares the advisability of making the condition of the relieved pauper less pleasant than that of the independent labourer.

Many other examples besides the poor law might be quoted of the same progress in political science.

Perhaps one of the most hopeful signs of the twentieth century is the wholesome use of the science of statistics. Details are considered carefully but are divided into classes, ranging from the narrow to the more general, while theory and principle are not disregarded.

This itself is a great help to the fundamental maxim of sound administration, namely, to subordinate the accidental to the essential, by no means to neglect the accidental and the accessory, but to subordinate and even to sacrifice it altogether, if necessary for the substantial good of the state.

LAW OF SUCCESSION BETWEEN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF A NATION.

EVERY society is a collection of individuals, and therefore, the society, like the individuals composing it, is susceptible of various moral and mental changes. How many such changes do not take place in the life of even any ordinary individual? Ideas passing in rapid succession, alternating judgments and views, a continual shifting of aims and aspirations, an indefinite almost kaleidoscopic transition of feelings and moods, and above all, a progress in moral perfection or the reverse—all these bring to pass that the individual never remains quite in the same condition but is in a state of perpetual movement. But this movement is not chaotic. There is order. Looking below the surface of ever-varying scenes, we shall see that there are certain laws or general tendencies that make one condition of things glide into another.

In regard to the intellect of man, there are certain definite laws of progression. When he is born into the world he has certain powers of thought that are

as yet in a state of slumber. But by degrees, according as certain stimuli act upon his senses, he begins to form ideas of things. At first, these are only concrete ideas. Then, chiefly by means of language, he begins to sort out these concrete ideas in his mind, to look at their differences or points of resemblance, to regard one part of an idea rather than another, until he thus forms an entire hierarchy of abstract ideas. In like manner, corresponding to this mental development, there is also a moral development. For, the will acts in proportion to the widening of the intellectual outlook. And, finally, from the point of view of emotions and feelings, every sensation, every act performed leaves behind it in the soul a trace, and the co-ordinate accumulation of these begets in the soul certain instinctive tendencies to act in one way rather than in another.

The result is that there is gradually developed in the soul of the individual a certain character, certain deferred modes of action. If, indeed, there were not this defined character, man would be an enigma. It would be impossible to tell how he would act under this or that set of circumstances. Whereas, legislators and economists all admit by the very fact of their laws and pronouncements that they can calculate with more or less precision that men will act in a certain way. Even in ordinary life, it is well known that private individuals are constantly

reckoning upon this stable element of human nature and that they act accordingly.

It remains therefore to be seen how the character of societies is formed, and to see what are the peculiar nexi which link one condition of society to another condition better or worse. Naturally, in a research of this kind, we must be guided by what happens in the individual. For society is not a mere abstraction, and if it has any concrete reality, this reality must be made up of individuals whose development will be in conformity with what we shall point out. At the same time, it must be remembered that when once individuals begin to act in concert, there also enters another element, namely, the social and co-operative element, which modifies and occasionally alters what takes place in the ordinary individual.

For example, it is well known that a crowd seems to be swayed by one common instinct different from the instincts of any one individual composing the crowd. Not, however, as we shall see, is there any contradiction between the social and individual instinct, for the former is only the product of the latter.

An examination of the progressive stages of any society will soon show that the laws governing the succession of these stages may be grouped under the following headings :—

First: Connection between the various *objects* of a nation's ambition.

Second: Connection between the *instruments* which a nation thinks most adapted for obtaining those objects.

Third: Connection which is effected by the shifting of the central organ of government from one element of the constitution to another.

Each one of these will now be considered in detail. First, there is the connection between the various objects that present themselves to the ambition of a nation. Many of these objects are specifically distinct, but they may be all reduced to three supreme genera or classes which are *power, riches* and *material comfort*.

In the early stages of a nation's existence, there is no special tendency towards any of these objects. But when once the period of construction is passed, then there appears a special desire for power or wealth. In European nations, without perhaps any exception, there quickly appeared the ambition for power. Such was the case in the ancient Greek and Roman states. Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Macedonia, Rome—all, as soon as the period of construction was passed, began to seek for power over other nations, a desire which was accomplished either by conquest or by natural absorption. Nor could otherwise be expected. For the strength of a society depends a great deal upon the *number* of its members, since the more members there are the greater becomes the common store to which each

man contributes. Hence, the strong feeling of patriotism in the period of construction would logically lead to a desire of expansion and aggrandisement.

Therefore, the desire for power is quite natural and justifiable in its origin, and indeed remains so for some time. It is only when the desire of power becomes intemperate and wills to be satisfied at all costs, that it then becomes immoral and provocative of disastrous consequences.

The early wars fought by the Greeks and the Romans were generally justifiable by some reason or another, and, throughout the course of the campaign, furnished many examples of unselfish heroism and lofty magnanimity. Generous enterprises, noble deeds, simple and ascetic ways of living characterised such wars. How many beautiful legends, for example, are recorded in regard to the defence made by Athens against the early invasions of the Dorians! how lofty are the strains of Tyrtaeus in calling upon his countrymen to struggle manfully for their very existence. And again, in Roman times the names of Horatius Cocles, Cincinnatus, Tarquinius Capitolinus and Furius Camillus are watchwords of such sterling qualities as valour and disinterestedness.

Evidently, in such wars, generous patriotism, unselfishness and moderation are conspicuous. But the transition from the love of power inspired by patriotism to the love of power for its own sake is

dangerously easy. And in every case, that transition was made. Already it has been shown that the defensive and reasonable wars waged by the ancient states rapidly became wars of brutal aggression. And we might now add that these wars displayed all the characteristics that distinguish the unjust and immoral love of power for its own sake. There was no limit or restraint, there was no honour or dignity or humanity in the conduct of such wars. When, for example, Athens entered upon the real lust for power, she began to appropriate the money of the subject allies and was guilty of such flagrant acts of injustice as the destruction of the Island of Milos, merely because it had refused to join her confederacy ; Sparta, which had begun by opposing the aggressiveness of Athens, ended by oppressing these very people whom she had undertaken to defend, while the deceit and the cruelty displayed by Rome in the last Punic War, can only be explained by the fact that Rome had lost the memory of her early virtues and could think only of conquest.

A similar transition from a temperate and patriotic love of power to an immoral and unbridled lust for power stands out clear in all the pages of more recent history. Even such wars as the Crusades, so noble in their origin, degenerated into wars of mere aggression, the greed for power and conquest swallowing up all other considerations. And among modern nations, the immoderate lust for power for its own

sake follows only too quickly upon the heels of a nation's construction or revival. The successive wars caused by the alternate ambitious schemes of Spain and France, and even during the nineteenth century, the scramble for colonial territory, are symptoms only too evident of the inevitable progression from love of power, caused by unselfish and noble patriotism, to the blind, unrestrained and immoral love for power in itself.

But when a nation has become powerful, or, rather, has developed an ambition for power, there also appears the desire for wealth. Here, again, we must distinguish between an honest and justifiable love of wealth, and a love of wealth that is excessive and undesirable. Wealth may be defined, and has been defined, by some economists as that which is capable of satisfying human wants and desires. It is only reasonable therefore that wealth should be an object of a nation's desire. Greece and Rome, in their early days of integrity, devoted themselves to the production of wealth, and so far back as Homeric times, we find certain trades that clearly recognised the importance of the division of labour. But in order to be immoral the desire for wealth must be immoderate. And it is certainly immoral and productive of disastrous results when everything is weighed and valued only in a money balance, when money-making monopolises an undue share of legislative attention, when each man's vocation seems to

be only to make money, and when luxury and extravagance look down upon and descry the former simplicity of living. In one word, the desire of money in a nation is dangerous when the individual exalts the interests of his own purse above the interests of the community.

What a contrast history presents between the conduct of Fabricius who haughtily refused the tempting bribes of Pyrrhus, and the assembly of the Roman Senate who sacrificed their country's interests to the money of Jugurtha ; between Cincinnatus, who left even his plough to save his country, and the great landowners and equestres of later Roman times fattening like vampires on the blood of the country ! Even in modern times, this evil is not unknown. Venice, as is well known, was at first the champion of Europe against the Turks, and in that rôle advanced to power, glory and wealth, but in the fifteenth century she selfishly devoted herself exclusively to money-making, and even engaged in commerce with Turkish aggressors. And in our own age, the rapacity of wealthy individuals and corporations is often observed to be prejudicial to the welfare of society, the private love of money-making submerging the love of one's country.

Such evils, however, are not so likely to occur when a nation becomes rich by its own productive industry. For no nation can produce wealth without the possession of certain qualities that make for

the general welfare. Such qualities as industry, frugality, energy, foresight, knowledge, and even honesty, are necessary for any country that wishes to become rich. Hence, in the United States, to-day, we find that in spite of her enormous wealth, there are not the same abuses that befell Spain when, in the seventeenth century, she became mistress of the wealth of Mexico and Peru.

But when wealth is acquired by conquest, or by accident, then it is far different. The nation becomes a weak and indolent parasite. Such was the case with Athens who lived upon the labour of slaves and upon the contributions of the subject allies, of Rome after her conquests and the rich legacy left by King Attalus of Pergamum, whose money literally fell into the lap of Rome, and with many of the Oriental nations who, owing to indolence and effeminacy, fell an easy prey to the attacks of the Mongolians.

It is then that there is wont to take place the final transition from love of wealth to love of material comfort and voluptuousness, a condition that, as we have said, preludes either the fall or the rejuvenation of the nation.

The possession of wealth too easily acquired is almost always fatal for the individual. Children of rich parents are frequent examples of recklessness and indolence, while sometimes even worse effects are produced by unearned wealth. And it is the

same also in states. The corruption and immorality defiling the reigns of the later Roman emperors, and the orgies that disgraced French society before the outbreak of the French Revolution, are two instances that stand out above the rest.

When a nation is thus degraded, the activity of the intelligence becomes extremely slack, and the activity of the instinct proportionally strong. Literature and the cultivation of the arts begin to decline, and what activity is still displayed has every sign of emanating from mere instinct. At such times, men cannot consider anything except that which belongs to the present time, they cannot attend to anything which is not in their immediate vicinity, and their energies are all directed to mere local and specialised objects. These symptoms, we need scarcely add, are always manifest even in the individual degraded man. Past and future time seem to have no significance for him, and distant objects are for him non-existent. All his thoughts, all his activities and feelings are converged on to some *particular* object that now at the present time and on this *particular* spot arrests his fancy.

How manifest are the symptoms of a nation thus degraded! If these nations have not yet been civilised, but, like certain Indian tribes, have sunk immediately into the bestial condition, sacrificing the last vestiges of nature and integrity, then they will barter the very necessities of life for a few beads,

or, falling victims to the fire-water, they will drink themselves to death. If, on the other hand, they be nations who have fallen into this state of degradation after having been civilised, then they exhibit similar signs of animality, but in a more refined way. Like the Roman epicures, they will gorge themselves with luxuries and then tickle themselves into a vomit in order to begin all over again; or they will yield to selfish reckless extravagance, regardless of the poverty of the many and of what is demanded by the weal of the state. Nowadays, a person reading some of the sumptuary laws issued by Tiberius and other Roman emperors curtailing luxury in dress and adornment may well be surprised at the state interfering in such details. Such sumptuary laws, however, did not appear at all strange to the legislators of those times, nay more, the attention now bestowed by modern legislators upon the excessive accumulation of capital in the hands of a few persons presents many interesting parallels to the old Roman sumptuary laws.

Obviously, the condition of a nation altogether reduced to the level we have been describing is one of great danger. There is always a probability of invasion from neighbouring nations, who are yet in their infancy, or perhaps only arrived at the period where power and dominion constitute the object of a nation's desire. Such indeed was the case with ancient Rome which fell before the bar-

barian nations yet in the infancy of their existence. History has shown that Southern nations easily fall a prey to those living in more Northern latitudes. For Northern nations are slower in their growth and they retain their vigour, while Southern nations, already in their decline, have become a tempting prey.

Even if there be no invasion, the very soul of the nation has already departed. Each man being intent on his own particular pleasure, and buried in animality, is incapable of that mental effort which is required in order to conceive himself as a member of society, while the will to co-operate to a common end is also wanting. Now there is no doubt that, when the great majority of persons comprising society no longer practically care to continue that society, the society itself has substantially ceased to exist. The appearance of social life and union may still seem to be present, but under these appearances there is only a lifeless corpse.

Such must inevitably be the chain of causes and events that lead to the fall of pagan nations, but, as we shall show in other places, there is in Christian nations a principle of vitality and resurrection which prevents their final extinction.

Having considered the connection between the objects that attract the attention of society, we may now consider the connection between the means that society depends upon in order to obtain its object.

Naturally the first, the simplest and the most easily obtained instrument is physical force. In the hardships of an infant state, man's physical constitution is strong, inured to toil and privation and exulting in the sense of physical vigour. Moreover, the mental life and vigour is as yet only scantily developed. Hence, the history of states shows that in the early period of their existence they chiefly rely upon force. Wars are of constant occurrence, and difficulties and emulations are settled not by finesse but by hard blows.

Such was the condition of early Greece. Even Athens, the leader of intellect in Greece, relied mainly upon force until her intellectual life was fully awakened, and until the cunning of Themistocles, and the genius of Pericles could show how much could be done by prudence and by the less expensive means of intellectual devices and actions. Sparta, as is well known, relied upon brute force even to the end of her history. Owing to her rigid constitution, her development had been almost wholly arrested. And ever since the martial and social discipline, supposed to have been introduced by Lycurgus, Sparta had, so to speak, specialised on mere physical lines of development.

In Rome also the same phenomena are presented. Rome extended her power beyond the frontiers of Latium by a succession of conquests achieved by hard blows. It is true that she was favoured by

the circumstance that at no time had she to face alone the whole of Italy, for she always had the support of one or more states. But such a fortunate coincidence was not deliberately planned, and was only a welcome boon of good fortune.

Similarly, in feudal times, when the new kingdoms had only recently been organised, the reign of brute force was paramount. The feudal system was essentially one huge fighting machine. Indeed, to such an extent was martial force respected and recognised, that fighting assumed almost the character of a sacred profession.

But the period during which the nation trusts chiefly to the sword as an instrument of expansion is only temporary. As the intellect becomes more developed, other means of ascendancy are adopted. Prudence, astuteness, adroitness in negotiations, cleverness in drawing up treaties and forming alliances to one's own advantage—these become the more popular instruments of a nation's success in the great struggle for existence with other nations.

Such was the case in all the ancient states wherever a certain degree of mental development was attained. The later period of the Peloponnesian War was by no means a direct trial of strength of arms but an exhibition of mental cunning and mental alertness, while in Rome, at a comparatively early period, the power of the sword was supplemented by statecraft and far-seeing diplomacy. Of

this, we have a sufficient example in the admirable way in which Rome organised her conquests in Italy. "Divide et impera" was her motto. By giving different privileges to her subject provinces in Italy, she made them jealous of one another and drew them to herself by the bonds of self-interest. Still more conspicuous was her sagacity in dealing with the conquered provinces outside Italy. By refusing to administer certain provinces herself until the occasion was ripe, and by taking certain kingdoms under her protectorate, she thereby relieved herself of excessive work, and at the same time extended her sphere of influence.

During the fourteenth century, we find a similar transition in the choice of means. For even before the mediæval period of history was waning to a close, we find the art of diplomacy and statecraft beginning to be developed, even to a considerable extent. Italy, foremost in the world of arts and literature, was also the pioneer in the science of statecraft, Venice, owing to its position, easily taking the lead. Venetian diplomatists and ambassadors were to be found in all the courts of Europe, while the Venetian court became the very centre of all the more important business and negotiations.

Moreover, this new instrument of diplomacy began to be a determinant factor in the relative strength or weakness of nations. The most suc-

cessful monarchs were no longer men of the sword, like Richard Cœur de Lion, but men like Louis XI. of France, Edward IV. and Henry VII. of England, while, as well as great generals, we find also such clerical statesmen as Wolsey, Ximenes, Amboise, men well versed in statecraft and in all that pertains to the art of diplomacy.

Even at the present day, this important factor still continues. Nations depend upon success in their mutual rivalries quite as much upon prudence and cunning as upon the power of the sword. In fact, it is generally recognised that the latter without the former would be of very little account.

But besides force and human cunning, there is another element that perhaps has not yet formed the conscious object of a nation's dependence, but which has always exercised an unconscious influence—namely, the power of principles. By principles, may be understood certain ideas or maxims that become causes of human actions. One brilliant example of this power of principle in political life we find in the French Revolution. Many were the causes of the French Revolution. Heavy taxes, class privileges, monarchical incompetency all had their share. But the speeches of the leading orators, and the catchwords that resounded in the cafés and streets of Paris show the important part played by what would be considered by many as mere abstract and philosophical principles. “That

society is responsible for the sufferings of its individual members," "that society is the result of a mutual compact among its members," "that all men are equal" were maxims that were discussed not merely by the cultured few, but by the howling mob in the streets. And these principles were first originated in English minds, expounded by such men as Locke and Hobbes, and then, travelling to France, were conveyed to French ears by Condillac and Rousseau. Thus, abstract philosophical principles conceived in England became incarnated into action by French people about two centuries later. Such is the power of an idea once received into the human mind.

If we now look around us and examine the fundamental causes of legislative action and diplomatic activity, who can doubt but that we are entering upon a period when not force, or human astuteness, but the power of principle is being regarded as the grand factor of political life?

First, there is the growth of international law. Is not this fact alone sufficient evidence of the growing respect evinced by nations for the force of principle? That "warfare should be minimised and made human as far as possible"—behold the grand principle that has caused international congresses of peace, establishing rules of warfare which all are bound to obey, and securing that at least some disputes should be settled not by force or cunning,

class

but by a tribunal in which justice as far as possible should prevail.

Then there is another principle that on examination will be found to be underlying many parliamentary discussions and to be the root of much practical legislation and reform. "That states should intervene in order to secure to the workman a living wage" has given rise to such measures as compulsory insurance on the part of employers and working men, and to a state system of old age pensions. That "It is the duty of the government to look after the general interests of the lower classes" has given rise to such Acts as the Factory Act, and Child Labour Act. While the still more important principle that "the State and Church are two different societies" has, in the nineteenth century, formed the subject of much discussion, not only among theorists but also among practical statesmen.

There is great probability that we are entering upon an epoch in which the state will adopt more and more as its conscious instrument not force or even human cunning, but principles. This, in itself, is a great step along the highway of progress. It is a recognition of the importance of principles, and that the moral order of things is a more powerful factor and a more efficient instrument than mere human agencies.

Only one more law of connection remains to be considered, and that is the law that results from the

constant shifting of the balance of administration from one element of society to another. According to the dictum of Aristotle, governments may be divided according as the reins of power are held in the hands of one, or of the few, or of the many. If the main source of administration is with the king, then we have monarchy, if with the few, aristocracy, if with the many, then a polity. He furthermore introduces a classification which depends upon so many debased forms of these three forms of government, for monarchy may degenerate into a tyranny, aristocracy into a selfish oligarchy, and a polity into democracy. This later division, however, we may for the present pass over since it is substantially the same as the first. What, however, more concerns our purpose is that power is continually shifting between the *one*, the *few* and the *many*, by a natural law of connection, not by mere accident.

In the ancient City States, the power was originally in the hands of the king, of the Greek Basileus, of the Latin Rex. At first, this personage seems to have ruled wisely, but in every case, his downfall became inevitable. Either the king became incompetent, or too tyrannical, or objectionable owing to the superior efficiency of a certain section. We know that in Athens the king was gradually deprived of his functions, not owing to any special misdeeds that are recorded but owing to the fact

that a powerful section of the country had become too strong and too eager to assume the reins of power. A similar circumstance occurred in Sparta. In Rome, on the other hand, it was the king's own personal tyranny, possibly his foreign and alien character, that brought about the revolution.

But, in all these cases, the result was the same, for the power passed into the hands of the few. In Athens, the regal functions and duties became divided among the nine archons, the title of Archon Basileus being the only vestige left of the regal dignity ; in Sparta, the full title and position of the kingship was retained, but the real power passed into the hands of the ephors. In Rome, on the other hand, the abstract conception of the imperium or old regal power was retained but put into commission, in other words, divided among other magistrates.

Thus monarchy became an aristocracy. Nor could it be otherwise. In the beginning, the people were unfit for self-government. They were too pre-occupied in procuring for themselves the necessities of life, while experience was altogether wanting. On the other hand, aristocracy, a word which comes from *aristos* (the best), implied the government of the state should be entrusted just to those individuals whose superior virtue, talent and superior wealth and resources best fitted them for the task.

But even government by aristocracy began to decline. Too often, the few began to consult merely their own interests at the expense of the state, and too often they began to monopolise all the dignities, and to devour with insatiable greed the very fat and substance of the land. Hence, came the struggle between the eupatrids and the peasants in Athens, a struggle only terminated by the reforms of Solon and Cleisthenes, the struggle in Sparta between the ruling arbitrary oligarchs and their subjects, and, in Rome, the long contest and litigation between the patrician magistrates and the depressed plebeians. And in almost every case, the result was the same. The power passed from the hands of the few into the hands of the many. Hence in Athens there was formed the most powerful democracy the world has ever seen, all power, not only in theory, but even in reality, being lodged with the people, while in Rome the plebeians, by a series of legislative concessions literally wrung from the patrician oligarchs, succeeded in making themselves, at least in constitutional theory, the dominant ruling class. It is true that in Rome, in spite of the sovereign popular assemblies of the Centuriata and of the Tributa, the real power lay in the hands of the senate. But this was owing to the peculiar circumstances of Rome itself. The Roman character was unfit for a democratic form of government. So long as the rulers did their duty well with a fair

amount of impartiality and efficiency, the early Roman preferred only to obey, and to look after his own agricultural interests. Moreover, Italy was constantly harassed by foreign wars, often of a perilous nature, and the senate being always on the spot, and consisting of the ex-magistrates, who were all the most experienced men in the state, was actually the only body of men that practically could carry on successfully the administration of affairs. This, however, does not militate against the fact that Rome, as far as her character and circumstances could allow, went in the direction of a real democracy.

Sparta was the one example, the one state in the ancient world where the people did not in the long run gain any real voice in the administration of public affairs. Never once did she seem to take any step in the direction of a democracy. This, however, was because she became a stationary nation. Like China and certain other Oriental nations, her rigid social and military constitutions, as well as her innate conservatism, succeeded, even more than her frontier mountains, in segregating her from the forward movements of the outward world.

Let us now turn to the pages of mediæval and modern history. Government was at first essentially in the hands of the one. Every tribe was ruled by its own chieftain who practically had supreme power over the section of people committed to his

charge. And thus as separate Christian barbarian kingdoms slowly rose all over Europe, government by one still continued, the chieftain giving place to the local hereditary king. This was the case in regard to the Visigoths, Ostrogoths and the Frankish kingdoms on the Continent, while in England the same course of events also happened.

But here, again, government by one was superseded by government by the few. Partly owing to the anarchical state of Europe in the ninth century, partly owing to the invasions of the Danes, Norsemen and Magyars, the feudal system became generally introduced. Feudal barons, with more or less territorial jurisdiction, now assumed the real work of government, of restoring order and of resisting invasion. Kings, indeed, there may have been in name, but, as is well known, the king's power was derived mainly from the same source as that of the few, since he was obeyed and respected not so much on account of his consecrated dignity, but for the fact that he was a bigger landowner and had more territorial power and jurisdiction than the others.

Then, when feudalism passed away, or had begun to decline, there appeared a remarkable tendency in the direction of government by the many. Such was the case in France, Spain, Italy and England. Almost everywhere on the Continent, we find the people beginning to assert through the towns or communes a real share in the administration of the

kingdom. Such, for example, was the power exercised by the Communes of France during the times of Philip Augustus and Louis IX., and the power exercised by the German towns in the imperial diet and in the two great leagues, the Hanseatic League and the League of the Rhine in Italy. Such also was the power exercised by Italian towns who were able to defy even the will of the emperor, and in England such was the political power that began to rise from the germ of representative government implanted by Simon de Montfort, who allowed the cities and towns to send representatives to Parliament.

Everywhere, we find the same tendency. And it was only circumstances that thwarted this tendency and again introduced in many places the rule of the one. In France, this was owing to the extraordinary skill and sagacity of the French king, in Italy, to the petty strifes and dissensions between the people themselves. Only in England, did political power really and effectively begin to pass into the hands of the people and to grow and expand, as it were, keeping in reserve the government by many so that, when the time should come, Europe might satisfy its natural tendency, and the people, on reasserting their Power, might find in England a model which they might faithfully and securely copy.

Such was indeed the case. The French Revolution, at the end of the eighteenth century, was the

signal throughout Europe for a general movement in favour of government by the people. And in the eighteenth century, we find established, in every country in Europe, government by the many, which in every instance modelled the framework of its Constitution upon that of England.

Since that time, political power seems to have been shifting alternately between the few and the many. It is impossible for the whole people to undertake, as in Athens, the actual work of government. Their very numbers forbid it, and thus the balance tends to pass into the hands of certain sections who know how to manipulate the reins, or who, by their experience and ability, are really best qualified to govern.

We have now passed in review the various laws of connection, concurring to make a nation pass from one psychological condition to another. These laws of connection are tendencies to pass from a certain object of ambition to another, to change from the use of a certain instrument to another, and to shift the balance between certain elements of the community. All these tendencies, either singly or in combination, are frequently sufficient to explain the successive phases of history, and what is of greater importance, to forecast what will probably take place in the future.

It will be easy to see that the net result of these tendencies will be either good or bad. They may

succeed in making the individual citizens more zealous in co-operating towards the increase of public wealth, or they may have the opposite effect of causing disruptive tendencies, individuals or private sections of the country being so involved in their own private aims as to be heedless of the common welfare. In such a case, the citizens do not really care to continue their society. Its very soul and essence has departed. It is dead, and at the very first rude shock or disaster, will entirely collapse, as was the case with imperial Rome and with many of the Oriental kingdoms.

HARMONY BETWEEN THE STATE AND EXTRA-STATE ELEMENTS.

IN every civilised society, there are two distinct elements which, in practical politics, must always be carefully distinguished. These are the state and the extra-state elements.

By the state element is meant everything that pertains to the civil society and contributes to its nature and special condition. Thus, there are the different ties that bring together the citizens of a society. Of these, there are the natural ties of race, geographical position, common religion, common language, and there are also the still more important ties of government, law and custom. Also, there are all the different signs and symbols that show the union prevailing among the citizens—standards and heraldic devices, uniforms, public buildings, all of which are the outward expression of the social union and co-operation.

But besides this social element, and all that pertains thereunto, there is the extra-state element. This element, as its name implies, is something outside the jurisdiction of society, something that has a

nature of its own and demands therefore a peculiar recognition. Before society ever came into existence, mankind had certain rights and duties. Each individual, each human being, as such, possesses certain prerogatives which all others and even he himself are bound to respect. Such prerogatives are the duty and right to practise justice, to recognise in his own practical conduct everything according to its own proper value, to recognise practically God for what He is, as the Supreme Being, worthy of all adoration and to recognise practically the dignity of the personal element both in oneself and in others. Then again, before the civil society, there was also the society of the family which has certain rights and functions, and finally, there were certain secondary and acquired rights which are also perfectly distinct from the state element.

If we examine carefully the pages of history, we shall find that the distinction between the state and extra-state elements has been frequently ignored or overlooked. Indeed, to see clearly this distinction requires no inconsiderable amount of observation and keen powers of reflection. Hence, in the early history of nations, legislation was not based upon the recognition of this distinction. Indeed, quite down to modern times, the exact border line between the two elements has frequently become blurred and is often of a very tortuous nature.

Nevertheless, the two elements are always there.

And their mutual action and reaction constitutes one of these momentous forces that, remote from human intervention, but moved by providential guidance, direct the destinies of man.

It will be useful, therefore, to consider in detail some of the important activities that make up the extra-state element. For such a study will throw great light even on the very nature of the social element. In fact, the social element has been largely shaped by the extra-state element. Owing to a mysterious law of synthesis, substances of absolutely different nature are made to be mutually dependent upon one another. For example, the soul and the body are mutually dependent, the soul depending upon the body as its organ of thought and sensation, and the body depending on the soul for its animation. Now in society, by a similar law of synthesis, the state and extra-state element mutually act and react one upon the other. Thus, the study of the extra-state element will illuminate some of the most perplexing pages of history and will also serve to explain some of the most serious mistakes that from time to time have been made by legislators.

Among the most important ingredients of the extra-state element, are the position, and the corresponding rights and duties of the individual man that flow from that position.

So accustomed indeed are we to regard man from

the point of view of his relations to other creatures that we sometimes overlook what he is and what he has in himself. The real dignity and position of the individual is too frequently submerged in the fact that he is a unit among many. The glaring falsity of this view, however, will be still more apparent if we only examine what it is that constitutes human nature.

Man, besides animality, has also the light of reason. He is able to know things and their respective value. While, with his senses, he is confined only to a small part of the earth's surface and can display only a certain amount of physical activity, yet with his intellect, he can traverse the past and future, and can contemplate in succession many objects even the most remote. To use a more picturesque mode of explanation, there has been placed before man's mind the great picture of the universe, a picture radiated with the light of reason, and in many cases by the light of faith. In that picture, he sees God, his own fellow-creatures, himself and a great multitude of animate and inanimate things. At once, therefore, the fundamental duty arises of recognising practically by his conduct what he sees in that picture. If man fulfils this duty, if he gives to each that which is demanded by its own intrinsic nobility and nature, then man is happy. He is happy because he adheres to the truth, happy because there is within him an undivided affection, and impulse of will,

happy because he conforms in his own conduct with the order of things, and therefore the universe is at peace with him.

If, on the other hand, man is wicked and immoral, then this means, that he will not recognise practically the intrinsic order of things. Influenced by his passions, he will magnify certain things at the expense of others, and the result will be unhappiness. Such a man will see what he does not really see, and will shape his conduct accordingly. He will produce in himself a chronic condition of internal warfare. Not only will his intellect be at variance with itself, but he will also will exhibit the same phenomenon. For deep down in his heart there will be the love which naturally follows upon the true vision of objects, and this will be in constant collision with the views and artificial love caused by the immoral aberration of the intellect.

Under such circumstances, man becomes a slave, for he wishes what he really does not wish. Epictetus, the famous Stoic philosopher, brings this out very clearly in the following words: "Clearly he is a free man who lives as he wishes, whose desires are not frustrated, and whose aversions are not in vain. Who wishes to live as a wicked man? Certainly none! Who wishes to live in a condition of anger, or jealousy, or abjection? None! Therefore, no wicked man lives as he wishes to live, hence he is not free." In these lines, the writer indicates that

even in wicked men, the will naturally seeks after the intrinsic order of things, but that this will is overcome by the wicked will which tends in the direction of objects that are falsely presented to the mental vision.

It is therefore man's duty and happiness to recognise the truth, to practise virtue. And this right and duty is inalienable. No one can take it away from him, and he cannot give it up himself. Nor, again, is this duty and right derived from society or the state.

And yet it has been maintained even in theory that this duty does proceed from the state. In the Declaration of Rights issued during the French Revolution, it is stated that nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and that law is the expression of general will. What is this but the unblushing proclamation that man's right to virtue and happiness only comes from the state, and what can be the practical logical outcome of such a principle save this, that the state will legislate with no regard to what is intrinsically inherent in man, but according to its own ideas of expediency !

From such a false principle, either openly or secretly adopted, has often proceeded a conflict between the civil laws and man's own individual right to happiness and virtue. Such laws do not distinguish between the state element and what is one of the most important ingredients of the extra-state element.

Hence even in modern times the suppression of monasteries and dispersion of religious orders are a result of the same noxious maxim. While it is admitted that the Church can and should suppress those orders which by interfering unduly in politics, or by entangling themselves in financial difficulties are a menace to the welfare of society, yet the unauthorised suppression of monasteries and convents by the State is a violation of the extra-state rights of man. Such was the case when Joseph II. of Austria suppressed those orders not engaged in active works of charity, and, since that time, similar laws have been passed in France and Germany and Spain during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods. But man's right to cultivate virtue cannot be impugned. And a part of this right is the association of persons into a society or organisation whose sole purpose is the practice of virtue.

So far are the contemplative orders from being detrimental to society that they are positively a source of advantage. Examples of virtue and a prayerful life are centres of good in any community. Nor must the fact be overlooked that, even setting aside other considerations, the prayers of holy men are a valuable asset in a nation's life.

But besides the right to virtue and true happiness, there are also other rights pertaining to the individual man. He has a right to his own life and

to the preservation of his bodily organs, and he could certainly acquire a right to hold property even before the civil society came into existence.

Needless to say, there have been conflicts between all these different aspects of the extra-state element and the state element. The institution of slavery, for example, strikes directly against man's connatural rights to the use of his own bodily organs, especially if this slavery is carried out in the absolute sense of the term,—that is to say, upon the assumption that one man has an absolute command upon another, and when the slave is only a chattel. This was indirectly the case in the early Roman law, for the state alone at that time was supposed to include everything human, and thus, the slave by being considered outside the state, was considered as outside the pale of human society. And such was avowedly the case in regard to slavery in the time of the Southern States, where, according to the law of South Carolina, a slave was a chattel personal to all intents, and when in the law of Maryland, "personal property consists of specific entities such as slaves, working beasts, etc." Evidently, such theories are based upon the false assumptions that a human being may usurp the supreme divine authority over his fellow-creatures, and that the slave is actually only a brute beast.

There is, however, a kind of slavery that, under certain circumstances, is justifiable. For, besides

the personal element in man, there is also the real element, namely, the use of the labour of his body which, like any other thing, may become matter of proprietorship. Thus, a person may rent out the service and labour of his body, while sometimes fortune of war, or crime, may give over to another person the lawful use of one's own body and its organs. In such cases, there is no violation of the moral order, so long as the personal rights of the slave are respected.

Even this, however, constitutes an extra-state element, which may conflict grievously with the state element. Hence, in the pages of history, there are frequent records of the injury done by slaves to society. The insurrections of the slaves in Sparta, the indirect injury done to ^{free} white labour and to the economic prosperity of Athens by the introduction of slave labour, and the alarming slave insurrections in Sicily during Roman times, are examples of the mutual conflict between the social and the extra-social elements. What, however, is worthy of notice, is that even the lawful element in slavery, even that limited overlordship which is found in feudal serfdom and which is akin to the social element, has been found to be more or less antagonistic with it.

In fact, the effort to throw off the last vestiges of feudal overlordship was one important aspect of the French Revolution. The relations between lord

and serf had been beneficial to a society menaced from without by constant invasion, and from within by internal discord. But with the rise of great territorial kingdoms, such a system became extra-social and quite foreign to the altered condition of society. Hence, among the grievances drawn up by the cahiers and enumerated in the Declaration of Rights, very conspicuous are the complaints regarding the dependency of the serf upon his lord, payment of feudal dues, humiliating personal services and other appurtenances of the old feudal system, which were galling to the people and prejudicial to the increasing democratic nature of society.

It would, however, be erroneous to consider the extra-state element arising from the authority of one man over another as always necessarily antagonistic to society. For there is the authority of a master over his servant, of the employer over the employee, and even of the father over his child. Evidently these rights of the extra-state element came into existence before society, they have a separate and independent nature of their own, and even concur to the well-being of society itself. Yet the leaders of the French Revolution, not content with removing the vestiges of feudal overlordship, erring by excess, struck a blow at all kinds of authority, even those we have just enumerated. For one of the clauses of the same Declaration of Rights of Man declared that all jurisdiction resides

in the nation, and that none can exercise authority which does not expressly emanate from the nation. What is this but a denial of the authority of a master over his servant, and a denial of other similar forms of jurisdiction? And this doctrine is still further emphasised by another clause which says: "Nothing may be prevented which is not forbidden by law, and none can be forced to do anything which is not provided for by law". Obviously, according to this doctrine, the children of a family, employers and others, would be practically absolved from any duty of obedience. No parent or guardian, or master, could issue an order without sanction from the state.

These exaggerated ideas, however, were generally owing to a natural reaction and to the feverish excitement of the times. In past times, overlordship had been prejudicial to the well-being of a community, and by a certain rebound, when the people did begin to assert their natural rights, they went to the other extreme, "*In medio tutissimus ibis*". The true position lies between the two extremes—to give to the extra-social element of authority and to the state element that which belongs to both of them, neither more nor less.

But there is another individual right of man constituting part of the extra-state element, and that is the right of acquiring and holding property.

Besides the natural and personal rights of man already mentioned, there are also certain acquired

rights of man, and among the most important of these is that of proprietorship. By the use of his physical activities, man is able to place himself in material connection with certain things, and when once this connection is posited, then the moral law which prevents one man from doing anything to injure or to cause suffering to another, steps in and protects this material connection. And from that moment, there begins the right of proprietorship.

Such a right is obtained in two ways—by occupation and by transmission. A man, for example, sees an unoccupied patch of ground. He settles upon it, builds a house thereon, and a garden. Evidently, the natural law of mutual respect would prohibit any one else from interfering with that man and robbing him of the fruits of his labours. Even Cicero himself recognised the importance of the natural law as an element of right, when he said, “*Natura propensi sumus ad diligendos homines, quod fundamentum juris est*”.

It must be kept in mind, however, that this connection between man and external goods is two-fold. It is a *physical* and *mental* connection as is pointed out in the Roman Digest: “*Quemadmodum nulla possessio adquiri nisi animo et corpore potest, ita nulla amittitur, nisi in quo utrumque in contrarium actum est*”. In other words, man must know and will that with which he is physically connected. Some writers like Hobbes, Spinoza, and

sometimes even Cicero, regard only the physical connection, reducing the right of property to mere brute force. Others, like the socialists and communists, look only to the mental and volitional element, ignoring the physical connexion which is also one of the essential elements of the right to acquire property.

Such are, in brief, the main elements of the acquired right of property. We have dwelt upon them somewhat at length in order that the reader may see more easily that the right of property is antecedent to the formation of society, and, in any case, is an extra-state element not dependent upon society for its existence. Proprietorship existed before the state, and not afterwards. If the proprietorship existed before the state, then evidently it must be independent of the state. There remains, however, the other horn of the dilemma, namely, that rights of proprietorship were posited by society itself. But in all the documents of history there is no evidence relating to such a view. Furthermore, all legislators, ancient and modern, *presuppose* the existence of the rights of proprietorship. Moreover, is there any inherent probability that society would posit such rights of proprietorship? The poor man would certainly have objected to his being relegated to a hut while the rich man was to roam at large in a handsome palace and garden. Then again, the result of such an opinion would be gen-

eral anarchy. The would-be robber would instantly withdraw his assumed assent and would abolish the rights of property. Such indeed was the case during the French Revolution. It is true that the famous Declaration respected in word the rights of property, saying that even the state may not take it away without just cause and sufficient compensation. But some of the extremists, acting upon the more general false maxim, that the state is all in all, did actually plunder and pillage on every side.

It is clear, therefore, from every point of view, that the right to hold property is an extra-social element. It existed before society came into being, and is altogether independent of society.

Between the extra-state element and the state there should be harmony. But too often, in the pages of history, we see bitter hostility between these two elements.

In early Greek times, the growing wealth of the eupatrids as compared with the poverty of the peasants, nearly caused the disruption of the Greek state of Athens. Even in Rome, where so much legislation was framed with a view to regulate the distress of the lower classes, we find that the accumulation of acquired property became a constant menace to the safety of Rome. Extensive landed estates in the country not only did incalculable harm because they were worked by slaves, but also because they interfered with the more equable diffusion

of wealth. Still more was this the case with the equestres. It is true that their methods were often the subject of great accusations, but the mere opportunities of making wealth, such as the prohibition against senators engaging in money-making pursuits, made the equestres extravagantly wealthy. And from this, proceeded all that burden of debt and poverty which made the lower classes so important a factor in the overthrow of the Roman Republic.

During feudal times, there was little struggle between the extra-state right of property and the state. Even without any communistic or socialistic practices, wealth was comparatively fairly distributed. Almost every person had his little plot of ground upon which he could depend for at least a supplementary living, and the reciprocal relations between landlord and serf were such that the former in times of distress had to succour the latter.

But with the rise of the great territorial kingdoms of the sixteenth century, the old antagonism again broke out. Rich and powerful companies, extensive commercial enterprises, new and hitherto undreamed-of trade routes, and a general break-up in the old methods of living, all these again caused a great disparity in the distribution of wealth. Riches and rags again confronted one another.

Only during the last few years, has there seemed to be some favourable signs of a compromise between the two elements. The sacred rights of

property are still recognised, but it is seen that the state has some power to moderate and control those rights to the general interest of the community. Trusts and monopolies are not allowed unbridled action. The principle of the living wage is taught by Catholic economists and others, and in accordance with this principle, such measures are being passed as the "Old Age Pensions Act," taxes on inheritances and incomes, and the state suppression of trusts and monopolies, all tending to combine respect for property with a greater regard for the rights of others in the methods of its acquisition.

Having considered the individual rights of man which form part of the extra-state element, we must now turn to consider another part of the same extra-state element, namely, the *family*.

The society of the family is an extra-state element, and this fact can be easily seen by considering the very nature of the conjugal union, which consists in the fullest possible union between two persons of opposite sexes. This union is not merely that physical connection such as is seen between the animals, but it consists also of a personal union, of the union of the highest elements of human nature. In other words, besides the sexual copulation, there is also the high and ennobled love that can exist between two persons of the same sex, a love that implies the union of the loftiest and most Divine-like qualities in human nature. In fact, even the pagans

sometimes recognised that there was something altogether sacred in the conjugal union. For example, in ancient Rome, one of the methods of forming the matrimonial ties was the *Confarratio*, or eating together of the cake. This was a sacred rite in which the Pontifex Maximus himself united the spouses. Also, among the Orientals, there were no fewer than four different sacred forms of matrimony.

From this principle of the full union of two persons of the opposite sexes, it follows that the conjugal union must necessarily be one and indissoluble. Polyandry and polygamy are therefore absolutely opposed to such fulness of union, and so also is the practice of divorce. In fact, a union which can be terminated any time is not a full union, but only a partial one, and quite alien from that permanency which is an intrinsic quality of the conjugal tie.

From this close and intimate union of two persons of the opposite sex, the family may be said to germinate within itself another society, namely, the parental. The circumstance that the children derive the physical part of their being from their parents, causes a peculiar relation between the children and the parents which again gives rise to rights and duties on both sides. On the parents' side, there is the dominion and authority that they enjoy over the children, and on the side of the children, there are the duties of love, respect, gratitude and obedience.

We must now consider carefully the relations between the state and the extra-state element of the family.

In the first place, the family has largely contributed to the formation of society. History shows that the state was formed by the gradual union of many families into one compact society. According to Sir Henry Maine, the original cell that was destined to form the basic structure of the state was the village community. Now the one fundamental feature of the village community was common relationship. All the inhabitants recognised in one another a common tie of relationship, and it was this which held them together. Then as the family became bigger, this tie of relationship became weaker and weaker, and became gradually supplanted by another kind of tie, namely, the *common land*. So that, people were eventually held together, not because they recognised in each other a distant relationship, but because they lived on the same land, which now became the centre of cherished memories and associations.

How close was the connection between the expansions of the family and the state can be seen from the nature of divisions of the people in the early states. Both in Greece and Rome, the smallest unit was the family, then afterwards, the ever-increasing groups of families gave rise first to the classes, then to the tribes, finally culminating in

the state. It would, however, be an exaggeration to say that the state is merely the result of the aggregation of many families. Other formative causes also co-operated. Thus, among the Hebrews the state seems to have formed mainly by the express will of God Himself. But it is certainly true to say that, in every case, the family is the original cell from which the society of the state derives its origin.

When, however, the state had been once formed, there quickly rose in many places a condition of warfare between it and the family. Nor could otherwise be expected, when one reflects upon the fact that the original family exercised many of the prerogatives which would fall within the jurisdiction of the state. As we have already pointed out, the village community was actually one big family, and the arrangements that were made in regard to self-defence, distribution of wealth, punishment of offences, and such matters were settled by the family-head who was sometimes assisted by a council of elders. When, therefore, the state began to expand, and to take upon itself, for the sake of common good, a great deal of such administrative business that we have been describing, then the family unit would revolt, and the result would be a collision between the family and the state. If the state happened to be victorious, then it would continue in its career of progress, but if the family should be triumphant

then the nation would become stationary. Examples of such stationary states are found even in our own times. China is the most conspicuous example. For it is an admitted fact that the one great reason why China has remained stationary all these years is that the family element has prevailed over the state element. China, therefore, failed to become one united state like the modern European states. And until a few years ago she consisted merely of several districts all kept apart from the other by racial or family traditions and associations.

In regard to European states, nothing can be more instructive than to watch the continued action and reaction between the family and the state element, and to see how the frequent collision between these two elements became one of the great causes of the development of European nations.

And first in regard to the ancient states. For many years in Athens the family was a most serious obstacle in the way of the formation of the state. The families, either singly or in groups, were constantly warring with one another, and constantly refusing to submerge their differences with a view to the formation of a solid nation. Even Solon's reforms were at first powerless to do any good because they failed to reach this root cause of the many ills of Athens. His relief of the insolvent debtor, his liberation of many slaves, his encouragement of trade and agriculture, even his democratic

political reforms speedily collapsed in their effect, because he failed to reconcile the strife between the family and the state. Indeed, scarcely had he left Athens in order to go on his travels than strife broke out afresh, and the hated form of tyrannical government again made its appearance. Then came the tyranny of Pisistratus, during which time Athens was made the battle-ground of contending families. Nor indeed until the time of Cleisthenes was the evil removed. He completely altered the local and tribal divisions of the citizens. Hitherto, the neighbouring demes or townships had been located in one particular tribe. This ancient arrangement had resulted in the grouping of the townships according to mere family connections, for, as a matter of fact, the tribe was only an aggregation of many families. But Cleisthenes now completely upset this arrangement. He substituted ten new tribes for the four old ones, and distributed the townships indiscriminately among the new tribes. It thus became impossible for factions to be formed any more on the lines of mere family interests.

In fact, from this time, the growth of the state of Athens became most rapid. The family, though not crushed, remained in its own proper place, and the national life and activity could exert themselves without any internal restraints.

In Sparta, the family element seems to have been kept under, even from very early times. Constant

peril of invasion and their condition as conquerors lording it over a conquered people, necessitated a strong and highly organised state from the very beginning. Hence we find almost an excess. The state became everything and in many respects, to its own prejudice, absorbed many departments of activity that belonged to other organisations. Thus Sparta became one vast military camp. Children from earliest age were taken in charge by the state. If physically unfit, they were exposed on Mt. Taygetus, if fit, then their whole education fell under the supervision of the state. Even the conjugal life fell under the supervision of the state, all men under sixty being compelled to lead what was practically a club life.

By this means, the state quickly attained exceptional strength. She suffered, however, from other points of view. For, the suffocation of the individual family element entailed a want of progress, a lack of initiative, and a fatal rigidity. Hence Sparta, in spite of her promising beginnings, became one of the most backward of the states of Greece.

Turning to the Italian Peninsula, we find in the history of ancient Rome striking examples of the action and interaction of the family and the state elements.

At first, the divisions of the Roman people were based on family lines. The three ancient tribes were mainly big aggregations of the family element.

And one of the first steps taken in the subordination of the family element to the state was when Servius Tullius substituted for the three tribes four new ones which were mere territorial divisions. But the family still remained very strong. Indeed, it was the great cause of the strife between the patricians and the plebeians that lasted for so many years. Only a person belonging to a patrician family could take the auspices and could therefore perform any important state act. And it was only after the Licinian laws and the Law of Hortensius, that the people were allowed to hold any public offices, no matter to what family they belonged, and that then an official aristocracy was substituted for the old aristocracy of blood.

But even down to late times, survivals of the old strong family life still remained in Rome. The well-known *genii* of the Fabii, Julii, and others always remained very active elements in the social and even in the political life of Rome.

Taking a general survey of the relations between state and family in ancient Rome, it would be well to notice that those relations were in the main harmonious and beneficial. One illustration of this is furnished by the famous *patria potestas* so often commented upon by historians and juriconsults. The exercise of the *patria potestas* was almost unlimited in ancient Roman times. A father of the family had not only absolute control over his son's

movements, but he could even chastise him as he pleased, inflicting even the punishment of death. Nor did this power seem to be very much abused. A healthy condition of the family, and the normal affection of a father were felt to be a sufficient natural restraint. Moreover, such wide authority was recognised to be of great disciplinary value. At least, for a time in his life, the child had to obey, and the obedient child grew up to be an obedient and manageable citizen, as well as a reliable soldier. And in this way the family reacted for the good of the state.

By degrees, however, as the integrity of the Roman character began to diminish, ties of family affection began to alter. Step by step, the Twelve Tables and other legislative enactments began to diminish the *patria potestas*. Nor was it long before this reduction of the father's power began to rebound for evil upon the state itself. Early habits of insubordination and disobedience were no longer punished, and even the very soldier of the Roman army became insubordinate and mutinous.

As the Roman Republic became even more and more corrupt, the family element, both as regards the *patria potestas* and other aspects, grew weaker and weaker, until during the reigns of the later emperors the state took everything into its own hands. Both in theory and in practice, all authority, all jurisdiction appeared to reside in the civil government.

Just at this crisis, both the individual and the family seemed to have been lost to view. But fortunately, just at this very time, there appeared two very important agencies which made a special appeal to the individual and to the family. One of these agencies was Christianity, upon which we shall comment in another chapter, and the other was the invasion of the barbarian tribes.

Amongst the barbarian tribes, the family unit was as yet strong as it must necessarily be in all infant nations. On the other hand, in the Roman Empire, the State element was proportionally strong. In fact, the Roman law and custom and Roman traditions could furnish perhaps the strongest artificial ties that could bind together any nation. It seemed, therefore, a providential circumstance that the barbarians should have invaded the decadent Empire. For both the barbarian and the Roman were able to contribute that in which the other was most lacking. And this becomes all the more apparent when we reflect upon the manner in which the fusion of the two peoples was accomplished. Neither Roman nor barbarian entirely sacrificed his identity. Though essentially a war of conquest, the barbarians did not sweep all before them, but bowed their heads to the old splendour of Roman imperial dominion, and, above all, to the best elements of Roman civilisation.

Hence, the extraordinary vigour and expansive-

ness that characterised the new barbarian kingdoms. Both the state element, and the extra-state element of the individual and of the family emulated each other in growth and progress. Just two or three quotations out of many will be sufficient to illustrate this well-known fact.

Salvian, comparing the Romans with the barbarians, says that "the Romans oppress one another with all sorts of exactions, that the chief citizens draw the substance of widows and orphans, that the Romans prefer to emigrate to the barbarians". Here we can see how, among the Romans, the family and the individual were crushed by the tyranny of the state element. On the other hand, he says that the barbarians fulfil our Lord's precept of charity since they respect and love one another. Then again the superiority of the state element among the Romans is brought out in the words of Priscus, who, showing the other side of the question, maintains that the Roman state exhibits a wonderful example of the good results of division of labour, that the law is administered accurately and carefully.

Many other passages could be quoted of a like nature showing the superiority of the family element in the barbarian tribes, and the development and superiority of the state element among the Romans. Now, nothing could have been more providential for Europe than the commingling of the best elements

of both people. Nor at the risk of anticipating what must come afterwards must we omit to mention the priceless boon of Christianity that the Roman Empire was destined to confer upon the barbarian people. It was Christianity that so powerfully mitigated the antagonism between the state or social element and the family element. As is well known, the Church regards the family as a sacred institution and the conjugal union as a sacrament. On the other hand, she regards also the social element as a great means for the propagation of virtue and charity. For the wider become the bonds of public mutual affection and co-operation, so much the stronger becomes that virtue of charity which it is her mission to expand on earth. Under her auspices, therefore, both the family element and the social element, instead of destroying one another were made to combine, and to concur in the building of the new Christian German states.

Before the barbarian invasions, the government of the tribes was personal, not territorial. According to Cæsar, the Germanic tribes loved to dwell apart from one another, separated by forests and marshes. When, however, these tribes settled on the conquered lands, then the personal or family element began to diminish, and the territorial element threatened partly to take its place. This period was essentially a transition stage. Hence, in Italy, we find that for some time it was permitted to the

inhabitants to have their choice, whether to live under the jurisdiction of the personal law or under the jurisdiction of the territorial law. In England the very name Hundred, a territorial appellation, but once the name of a group of persons, recalls the almost insensible transition from one system to another.

By degrees, therefore, the two elements were fused together, and for a time the results were a condition of ever-increasing order, internal peace and tranquillity. The personal and family element of the government gave strength and unity to the nation, while the territorial and civil element prevented the danger of a tyrannical form of government.

It is, however, only through constant agitation and strife between contending forces that created beings reach their ultimate perfection. With the advent of feudalism, the family element became overwhelmingly strong. Big landowning families of aristocrats began to assume the reins of power. That very territorial element which had till now helped the social element against the family element, now threw its whole weight on to the side of the family. Land became practically the sole fountain-head of political and judicial power, and it was now not the king as such, but the powerful families that held the land and that now exercised corresponding jurisdiction.

Hence, there rose during the Middle Ages, another struggle between the family and the social element. This struggle assumed various aspects, for while the town and the country people rose against the magnates, sometimes the greater families rose against the families of the sovereigns. Thus, nearly all Europe became the battle-ground between the civil and family element. In France, after the time of Philip Augustus, we see the Communes fighting fiercely for their civil independence ; in Germany, powerful combinations of towns against domineering families ; in Italy, the famous struggles between the Italian towns and the nobles, and afterwards with the emperor. Even England was no exception. There, owing to the democratic elements of the old Anglo-Saxon Constitution, and to the reforms of Simon de Montfort, we see the civil element happily asserting itself over the feudatory and family system.

By the sixteenth century, however, this peculiar phase of the struggle had well-nigh passed away, and the varying results became visible all over Europe. In France, Spain and England we behold the rise of great territorial sovereignties, in which the civil and social element strongly asserted itself. In Germany, however, we find the family element still predominant, as was also the case with some of the Italian towns, like Milan and Florence. It only remained for the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars to sweep away the last vestiges of

the old tyrannical feudal family system, not only in France, but also in other countries. Indeed, before the end of the nineteenth century, even Germany and Italy had become raised to the condition of territorial sovereignties in which the civil element was paramount.

There now arises the interesting question as to what is in our own times the relation between the family and the state element. Which element now seems to predominate? So well balanced at present are the two elements that the question is by no means easy to answer. But looking at the general tendency of modern legislation, it would seem that the civil element is slightly predominating over the family element.

Chiefly in three ways does the state seem to be now exercising a considerable amount of influence upon the family—through a state system of education, through an active control of those elements that pertain to the civil element of the marriage tie, and through a supervision of the sanitary and general internal condition of the family; in all these ways, the state puts forward a great deal of activity in regard to the family. At present, however, no very general disasters seem to have resulted. Complaints, however, can still be reasonably made concerning the divorce laws which interfere with the marriage tie, and also concerning the management of state education funds, and the distribution thereof to denomi-

national or unsectarian schools. Probably, however, in course of time, a stronger sense of justice and of morality will prevail.

Turning attention to the condition of the Oriental nations, especially China, there we find a revolution going on of a most remarkable character. In those countries the family has, from the very beginning, been so powerful as to prevent the formation of one united state. Conditions had been brought about which would have been realised in Athens if the family element there had been allowed to become predominant. But now, mainly owing to the active policy of the Emperor of China, the family barriers are being removed, old family traditions, associations, habits of education and of trade, are being discarded, and, in their place, is rising a nation no longer stationary, but permeated by the civil element, which of its very nature is active and progressive. China will now show, in its progress and rise, the same dangers that have befallen Western nations. She will grow and develop along many different lines, but she will also incur the danger of forgetting that upon which the very existence of every society depends, namely, the ancient spirit, and those institutions without which society is only a lifeless thing.

CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SPECULATIVE THOUGHT OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE THOUGHT OF THE MASSES.

EVERY human action is preceded by some thought, and this is especially the case in regard to human events that occupy a place in history. Not only is this evidently true in those actions that manifestly proceed from philosophical principles or political axioms, but it is also true in regard to actions that may seem to proceed from more tangible causes. For when men behave in a corresponding way to these causes, they do so only because they are viewed or conceived in relation with their effects.

If we now examine carefully the nature of the thought that is responsible for historical actions, we shall find that it belongs to one of two kinds, either the thought of the individual, of the speculative thinker, or the practical thought of the masses.

In any civilised society, there is what may be called the thought of that society as a whole. Certain principles held in common, certain maxims of policy handed down from generation to genera-

tion, the possession of common sources of information, peculiar racial ways of looking at things, and finally, a common development of mental progress—all combine to bring about what may be called the thought of the masses, the thought of the nation at large. To some extent, and from one point of view, this thought is incapable of error; that is to say, in so far as it proceeds from the contemplation of the fundamental principles of reasoning beheld by all men. Hence the expression "*Vox populi, vox Dei*" came into being. Not, however, that the fact of its popularity makes the voice true and worthy of acceptance, but just the opposite, namely, that this popularity is a very strong sign that the principles in question do pertain to the fundamental nature of man's intellect and cannot err. Also, in another sense, the thought of the masses is a safe guide. For it is slow in its movements. It is inclined more to a synthetic than to an analytic process of thinking. And, thus, the popular thought is more likely to be guided by the remembrance of the early and the fundamental institutions of the society, and is less likely to confuse the accidental with the substantial.

On the other hand, the popular thought is by no means exempt from the possibility of error. Superstitions and all kinds of errors may be entertained in the minds of the multitude. Idolatry, for example, sufficiently illustrates how the minds of an

entire people may go astray on a very important subject. Then, again, the mass of the people is liable to peculiar passions of its own which, owing to mutual action and reaction, are more violent and headstrong than the passions of the individual.

Such is the general nature of the thought of the masses. We must now consider what we mean by the speculative thought of individual thinkers.

There are always to be found persons whose mental condition and outlook differ from those of ordinary people. The very nature of the human intelligence is such that differential types are to be expected with much greater frequency than is the case in the animal world. There, we find material organisation and corresponding instincts and feelings are the only two great formative factors in the mere brute creation. For this reason within the same animal species we find very few variations. Moreover, if we allow the species to remain untainted by cross-breeding or change of environment, all the members of the same species tend to conform to a uniform type.

Now the very opposite is the case in regard to man—a rational creature. With his light of reason, he is placed in communication with an indefinite number of objects, and the operations of his mind are innumerable. Hence, in each individual mind, we perceive a tendency rather to individualisation than to conformity to a common type. Even in the

period of infancy, we find varying degrees of intellectual power, depending upon the perfection of the body, which is the condition of human thought, and upon the many associations and experiences to which the individual is subjected in this complicated world. And as life advances, different actual experience and acquaintance with very different portions of the world of the knowable tend to widen this divergence. Then again, in some men more than in others, there is a tendency to think on original lines. They will not be bound by the ancient views and opinions of the times, but continually question all that they see and hear. Such people, if gifted with real intellectual power and force of expression, inevitably exercise great influence upon society. They see further ahead than their fellows, and they take a more profound view of the nature of the problems that are presented, and, moreover, by their eloquence can often move in certain directions even the general thought of the great mass of the people.

It is to such as these that reference is made when we speak of the thought of the individuals. Naturally, individuals as rulers have also great influence. But this influence is exercised in an altogether different capacity. We may indeed speak of the influence exercised by strong and able rulers, but we speak of them only incidentally as rulers, namely, in so far as their very position as rulers enables them to take wider views of things, and to raise them to

the condition of powerful speculative thinkers. In other words, this chapter refers to powerful individual thinkers as such, and regards as only accidental to the purpose any official position that such thinkers may hold.

We must now consider in succession some of the most famous of the incidents in history which will be sufficient to illustrate in general what is the relation between the thought of such speculative thinkers and the thought of the masses. Then from these facts, it will be possible to deduce certain conclusions which may be useful in judging of other facts of history, and especially of certain political movements and tendencies of our own times.

In every society, that has already begun to construct itself, there is a period during which are formulated the principles that have already given shape and colour to the society. During the actual construction of the society, there is no reflection upon the principles that must determine the relation between the different members of the society and the manner in which the society generally is to be administered. But almost as soon as this non-reflective, instinctive period of construction has passed, then a need is felt of formulating definitely the method by which the society is to be conducted.

History shows that, when legislation is first of all begun, society itself is already in existence. In fact, from the very nature of things it can be seen

that there can be no legislation without there being already a society for which to legislate, and that therefore, such early legislation will more or less embody forth what has already in practice been adopted as a course of action.

At this point, there naturally rises the interesting question as to the share taken in this legislation by the thought of the great mass of the people and by speculative thinkers? And a careful examination of what so far has invariably happened reveals the fact that, the speculative thinkers practically monopolise the work of early primitive legislation. The people have very little to do with it. Partly owing to their being so pre-occupied with their own individual business, partly owing to lack of philosophical reflection, they seem to recognise their own inability for such work and entrust it to the few speculative thinkers. It is true that these very often occupy an official position of high rank. But the significant fact that, both among the Romans and the Greeks, a choice was made of one of the fittest out of the numbers of the royal house in order to be king, demonstrates that mental ability was considered to be the hall-mark of legislative fitness. Moreover, a person not qualified by birth at all was sometimes invited to undertake the task of political legislation or reform. From this point of view, what could be more significant than the mission of Epaminondas, the Cretan, to Athens.

Such legislative thinkers must have had the necessary qualifications for the task, the power to see what links of society had been already instinctively formed, the power of reflection and abstraction to enable them to distinguish between different groups of actions and ideas, and finally, the power to take a broad view of the condition of society, and thus to see what partial evils must necessarily be endured in order to obtain a greater general good. All these qualifications, however, would be useless if, at the same time, there were wanting on the part of the people the mental capacity to understand the legislative acts, and if there were wanting the goodwill to accept them. Such, however, was not usually the case. For example, in the Greek states, though the people did not choose to legislate directly for themselves, a task for which they were as yet little fit, and for which they had scarcely any desire, yet they submitted themselves as an intelligent instrument to the wishes of the legislator. In Athens, as we have already pointed out, Epaminondas was actually invited to undertake the work of legislature. Then, when Solon began his important work of removing the economic and political troubles that were so grievously impeding the progress of Athens, Athenian society placed itself entirely in his hands. Even the classes whose interests were touched did not dispute his authority—neither the wealthy creditors who lost part of their property by his compromise,

nor the aristocrats, part of whose power went to the people. Perhaps, the reforms of Cleisthenes, removing so many of the old family landmarks, entailed even still greater sacrifices, yet there was no inclination to dispute what Cleisthenes decreed.

During the whole legislative period, therefore, of Athenian history, we find perfect harmony between the thought of the masses and the thought of speculative thinkers. The people were willing to trust the legislative power to those whose ability they recognised, and there seems to have been a general instinctive sympathy between the two strata of thought, the higher and the lower. To some, this sympathy may be hard to understand, but we must consider that the early legislators were evidently working according to elementary principles of justice which are obvious both to the learned and to the unlearned. Abolition of slavery, removal of extremes of riches and poverty, a reasonable chance of promotion given to all, removal of family factions and fights—are all parts of that eternal law of justice that enlightens every man that comes into this world.

Turning to Sparta, the sympathy between the thought of the few and of the masses is still more clearly illustrated. Actual circumstances forced the state of Sparta from the very beginning to assume very peculiar characteristics. For the Dorians were living in the land of a conquered people, people towards whom they assumed the position of

a military aristocracy. Also, the position of the Spartan state, being surrounded as she was by unfriendly peoples, necessitated a highly centralised form of government. For, in order to succeed against the constant presence of enemies, the citizens had to sacrifice many of their individual rights in order to secure an efficient state machinery.

And we know that this was actually the case. The reforms of Lycurgus were indeed most drastic. They deprived the average citizen of home comforts, made him lead from boyhood a life of hardship and self-denial, and practically reduced the state to the condition of one vast military camp. But the citizens willingly acquiesced. There was no collision of opinion between them and their legislator. For they and he knew fully well that, under the existing circumstances, such a constitution was highly necessary for the safety of the state.

Similarly, in early Roman history, we find nothing but harmony between the thought of the speculative thinker and that of the people. The kings merely formulated and put into concrete shape what was already existing either in the minds or in the actions of the people. The early Roman Constitution, consisting of an hereditary king, a senate consisting of elders from the three tribes, and finally the Assembly of the Curiata, was only a recognition of the family element of civil authority and could not therefore cause any friction. Such was also the

case with the religious reforms of Numa Pompilius. They were based upon what formed already the subject-matter of the belief of the Roman people.

If we advance still further, and if we inquire into the legislation of the feudal mediæval states, there, also, we find, in the beginning, the same secret sympathy between the mind of the legislator and the mind of the people. Already, instinctively, most of the conditions of feudal society had been posited by the voluntary action between tenant and landlord. And most of the legislation that was enacted in the beginning of the feudal system was in conformity with these conditions. One example among many we find in the Capitularies of Charlemagne.

The Herbean or fine for refusing to serve in the army, the feudal dues enumerated in the Capitulary de Villis of 801, merely confirmed and organised what was already the practice. Again, another and perhaps more familiar example we find in the legislation of the early Norman kings. This legislation was a formal confirmation of practices already existing under the Normans or Saxons, and could not therefore evoke any serious collision of thought.

Such is then the relation between the thought of speculative thinkers and the thought of the masses during periods of legislation that immediately follow the period of construction. In every case, we find the two kinds of thought working in perfect harmony side by side, the thought of the speculative thinker

and of the legislator being but the more reflex counterpart of the thought of the masses.

But there is another class of speculative thinker to be considered, namely, the philosophers. To a more or less limited extent, nearly every one is a philosopher, since every one is seeking to understand the fundamental reasons and causes of things. We use the term philosopher, however, in a more restricted sense, as applying to a person who has attained individual distinction as an expounder or teacher of philosophic theory, and especially as the founder of a distinct school of philosophic thought.

Now philosophers, in this sense, have always entered into some sort of relation with the public life of the state. For the science of philosophy is remarkable for its unity. All its branches, even those apparently the most distant, are connected one with another. And thus theories regarding such subjects as man's origin and destiny, and the true nature of his happiness have been known to produce very important practical conclusions and political consequences. Indeed, philosophy, in its own line of action, is more thorough and fundamental in its influence than is legislation itself, because it touches the hearts and minds of men without which all legislation would be useless.

What, therefore, is the relation between the thought of the speculative philosopher and the thought of the great mass of the people? In pro-

ceeding to answer this inquiry, one great fact seems to stand out, and that is, that there seems to have been no actual conflict between these two kinds of thought. Philosophy may have failed to gain any recognition or sympathy, but it does not seem to have aroused any positive opposition on the part of the people. On the other hand, philosophers, especially in post-Christian times, have frequently exercised much active influence.

It is very significant that, in pagan times, philosophic reflection so often succeeded in reaching the greatest heights, yet seemed so impotent in regard to the production of practical results. While philosophers were so quick to see both the good and the bad in the different state systems, their observations and warnings seemed to have been of an entirely academic nature. What, for example, could be more beautiful and inspiring than the words of the oration of Pericles over the bodies of those who had fallen during the early part of the Peloponnesian War, where he says that "Our form of government does not enter into rivalry with that of others. While the law secures equal justice to all alike in their private disputes, the claim of excellence is recognised, and when a citizen has in any way distinguished himself, he is promoted in the public service, not as a matter of privilege, but as a reward of merit. There is no exclusiveness in our own public life, and in our private intercourse we

do not have suspicions of one another, nor are we angry with our neighbours if they do what they like. While we are thus unconstrained in our private intercourse, a spirit of reverence pervades our public acts, we are prevented from doing wrong by respect for authority and for the laws, having a special regard for those which are ordained for the protection of the injured, as well as for those unwritten laws which bring upon the transgressor of them the reprobation of the general sentiment." These words show a philosophical observation of the good elements in the state of Athens, and, at the same time, the successful endeavour to arrive at the fundamental causes of those good elements, a task which is eminently characteristic of a philosophic bent of mind. These good qualities, we may recapitulate briefly, are equality before the law, individual liberty, chance of promotion for all, and a constant respect for the individuality and rights of others, while the fundamental causes of this happy condition of affairs are the general upright conscience of the community and a general regard for the unwritten natural law of justice and humanity engraved in the minds of all men.

We must, however, observe that this speech of Pericles was purely academic. His ideas, thus philosophically bodied forth, did not in their reflex condition become a living, energising principle. The good was there already, and had already been

brought about by the providential succession of revolutions, compromises and legislative contrivances dictated by the practical skill of statesmen combined with the exigencies of the hour.

We find the same want of practical power in the philosophical warnings uttered by Aristotle. These warnings, if uttered in our own time, would have awakened much discussion and have aroused some course of action, but in those times they were so many cold utterances seemingly incapable of eliciting any kind of action. Let us take for example, Aristotle's warning in regard to a certain evil of those times, an evil which, like some gangrene, was eating its ulcerous way into the heart of the body politic. For, from this, even more than from the previous extract, can be seen the contrast between speculative philosophical thought and practice. He speaks of the political disease called Stasis. According to him, this disease arises when two parties are formed in the state, each maliciously disposed towards the other. Under such circumstances, according to Thucydides, "those parties, by striving to overcome one another, commit the most monstrous crimes, yet even these are surpassed by the magnitude of their revenges, which they pursue to the utmost, neither party observing any limits of justice or party expediency, but both alike making the caprice of the moment their law, while the citizens of neither party fall a prey to both, either because

the contestants dislike those who held aloof, or are jealous of their surviving." Such are the facts philosophically observed by Thucydides. And Aristotle goes further. He unfolds the nature of the evil and shows its cause and its remedy. He points out that in many of the city states, the two extremes of luxury and rags were constantly meeting one another, and how mutual hatreds and dissensions were thereby continually on the increase. He then suggests as the remedy the formation of a strong middle class. This, according to him, would mitigate the evils arising from so great an inequality of wealth. He shows at the same time that such a remedy would be practicable, and quite within the reach of every state.

Yet, as we well know, the warnings of Aristotle fell on barren ground. As happens where there is wanting the supernatural element in the individual and in the nation, philosophical reflection may observe evils and their remedies, but that is all. It is powerless to move the will in a corresponding direction. And as a matter of fact, most of the Greek states perished, chiefly owing to the very cause pointed out by Aristotle.

Turning now to the pages of Roman history, it is impossible to refrain from astonishment at the same powerlessness of philosophical maxims to reform humanity. Even the most exalted of the philosophers failed to reach effectively the mind of

the masses. No doubt, part of the cause must be attributed to a latent defect in the system of philosophy. For too frequently the practice of virtue and philosophical reflection were confused together, and were taken to mean one and the same thing. When, however, many abuses and excesses were rife in society, the more observant of mankind could not but reflect and express alarm. But they sought for the remedy in the purely ideal world, and were themselves often wanting in the strength necessary for carrying the reform into the real and practical world. There were, it is true, certain brotherhoods that sought to realise their own high maxims. But, as is well known, these very soon deteriorated, and became guilty of excesses almost worse if possible than those they had been condemning. In any case, their maxims, being exceedingly abstract, could not be understood by the great bulk of the people. Seneca himself declared that the pleasure derived from the study of philosophy and from the virtue that is derived therefrom is as far above the common people as the moon is above the earth. “*Talis est sapientis animus, qualis lunae status super mundum.*”

For both those reasons, philosophy was not appreciated by the greater part of the Roman people. Certain persons of a rugged character may have been attracted by the severe precepts of the Stoics, others by the tranquillising tenets of the Epicureans.

But, in course of time, both these systems were seen to depend upon the fallacious assumption that man's happiness lies with man himself. Whether with the Stoics we live "*convenienter naturae*," or whether with Epictitus we "*abstain and sustain*," the only true source of happiness lies in a certain mental attitude. Hence, philosophy became a subject of mockery and ridicule among the Satirists and generally among the people of the lower orders. For example, Petronius speaks of a certain freeman whose bashful epitaph was that he never heard a philosopher, "*non unquam philosophum audivit*," while Juvenal, in his second satire, severely handles the philosophers for using their pretended learning as a cloak to all manner of vices.

There is little doubt that there was a general instinctive feeling that no amount of abstract theory could effect a real general reform. Such conspicuous examples of natural virtue shown, for instance, by Marcus Aurelius were owing, rather to a naturally good disposition, than to the power of any abstract knowledge that he possessed.

When, however, we come to the ages in which Christianity became generally adopted, then we find that the history of the relation between the speculative thought of philosophers and that of the masses assumes a new aspect. In other words, we find that abstract philosophical principles are more often appreciated even by the multitude and also produce

very tangible effects upon human conduct. Nor could this well be otherwise. For after the diffusion of Christianity, man had no longer his own weak thought upon which to depend. It was no longer a case of a cold sterile idea, on the one hand, and on the other comparative helplessness under the action of physical environment and internal instincts and passions. For Christianity infused into the soul of man a certain Divine energy and power which ennobles and has ennobled thousands and millions to practise even the lofty precepts of our Lord.

Moreover, philosophy is not a thing separate from theology. They are two sciences most closely related. Indeed, the very dogmas of faith are clothed in philosophical terms. The child, not yet in its teens, hears continually of such philosophical terms as *person, substance, fault, original conception, eternity*. Nor to the child, are these terms cold abstract, unintelligible abstractions. They have for him a living meaning. By the grace given in baptism, there has been given him a new man, a new heart and a new mind, "created according to justice and to truth". So that by means of this supernatural light, even the young child has a sufficient comprehension of the terms in which are clothed the dogmas of faith. Philosophy therefore is no stranger to the multitude as in pagan times. It has become familiar to all, and what is still more important, there is a certain mysterious latent force

which enables the people continually to carry out what would appear to some to be only lofty abstract principles of philosophy.

What more conspicuous examples of this can we afford than in the monasteries. As in the time of Pythagoras, men during the Middle Ages associated themselves for the express purpose of the acquisition of true wisdom and for the practice of virtue. But the difference between such associations in pagan times and in Christian times is infinite. In monastic institutions, not merely fragments of truth and fragments of virtue are sought after, but all the truth and all virtue. Not merely the few learned are banded together, but people drawn from all classes of society, while, from age to age, are found examples of true and strict virtue testifying to the presence of some mysterious force enabling men to do things quite exceeding the ordinary human strength unaided from above.

Then again, in the "Lives of the Saints," we find the same frequent association between philosophical observances and corresponding practice. Nor can it be denied that even among ordinary men of the world, Christian doctrines still exercise great force, lifting the general conduct of man up to a very high level.

An objection may perhaps be raised that some very erroneous philosophical maxims have also produced tangible results on man's conduct, to the

prejudice of humanity. Such, for example, was the case with the doctrine of Locke and Hobbes already mentioned, doctrines that were greatly responsible for the events of the French Revolution. If, however, we examine this objection carefully, we shall find that it is really only another support to our argument. For such doctrines contain both truth and error, and it was the truth, not the error that became the source of action. Equality before the law, removal of the extremes of riches and poverty, a greater dependence upon experiment and observation, and the cultivation of the spirit of reasonable inquiry are all very desirable things, and it was these that influenced the minds of the multitude during the period of the French Revolution. Surely, the errors that were mixed up with the theory and the corresponding excesses were not the object of search. The French people did not say, "I wish to embrace those principles, because they lead to anarchy, general confusion, atheism, destruction of all virtue and happiness". In effect, as the false elements became apparent, they and the corresponding excesses were automatically eliminated. And the result is that, in the France of to-day, we do find many sound political reforms that are the legitimate outcome of the sound elements of the French Revolutionary theories.

There now arises the interesting question whether the relation between the thought of the individual

and that of the masses has undergone any alteration during the history of the Christian era, whether the thought of the individual thinker is preponderating more or less over the thought of the masses?

Undoubtedly, in the Middle Ages, the thought of the individual thinker was considerably more powerful than it is now. For in those times, there was much more room for individuality than now. In regard to dress and furniture, such was especially the case. Articles of ornament, instead of being turned out by the hundreds from the same piece of machinery, were fashioned by the hand of the individual artist and bore the mark of his individuality. Of this, a walk through any mediæval museum would be a sufficient proof and illustration.

And in conduct, this liberty given to individuality was still more manifest. Life was no mere routine of dull daily duties, all of one drab uniform aspect. Men's minds quickly and eagerly seized upon the new ideas that were launched forth into the mental world from the minds of individual thinkers. Witness, for example, the extraordinary widespread movements of the religious orders founded by St. Dominic and St. Francis. How difficult, nowadays, would it be to start similar movements, so utterly alien from the commonly prevailing habits of society.

Perhaps, an explanation of this power of the individual thinker in the Middle Ages must be partly found in the character of the thinker himself, as well

as in the circumstances of the age. In those times, life was simple, and ideas were fewer. What books there were did not distract the mind with a number of frivolous and subordinate ideas. There were therefore fewer ideas, and those were of an important kind. Contemplation, in other words, became possible, and it is only through contemplation that ideas sink deep into the mind and become causes of practical conduct ; nay more, it is only the dominion of some few grand and simple ideas that can give rise to the character of the man that influences. It was, for example, the constant presence of the idea of sanctity that gave such strength and individuality to the lives of St. Dominic and St. Francis ; it was again the idea of rescuing the Holy Places from the infidel that, monopolising the minds of men, moved all Europe in the direction of the Holy Places.

In modern times, however, it is very different. Contemplation has given way to an excessive use of discussive reason. There is now a multiplicity of ideas and a continual passage from one idea to another. We therefore find it difficult to form those firm and constant persuasions that lie at the basis of influential character.

There is also another side to the question. The power of the common thought of the masses has wonderfully developed. An increased system of elementary education, cheap university training now give to all equal chances of intellectual training

and equipment. Newspapers, magazines, popular addresses, are the sources of information upon which all mainly depend. Moreover, there are nowadays set up certain types of model of thought, character, dress and conduct from which few find it prudent to deviate.

Especially, is this the case in those countries where democracy is all-powerful, as in the United States. In this country it is only with great difficulty that the individual genius can assert political influence. There would seem to exist almost an *a priori* distrust for any person and thing that does not voice what already is thought and spoken by the public gallery. In connection with this we might quote the words of De Tocqueville, who says that in the United States "the people do not hate the higher classes, but they show very little regard towards them and are anxious to exclude them from power; the people do not fear the great intellects but, on the other hand, have little sympathy for them. And in general any excellence that is not derived directly from the people's support with difficulty finds favour". These words were written several years ago, but it would not be difficult to prove their applicability at the present day. For, what commanding influence has there been in the States but owes its power and origin to the people themselves? And what instance can be quoted of any commanding individuality that ever came into collision with the

strength of the masses and was then able by sheer intellectual force and power of will to lead them along?

Even the nature of the administrative machinery proves this power of the thought of the masses. For there is little scope for any individual oratory in the Senate of the House of Representatives. Either the committees, or certain extraneous agencies, manipulate the reins, and even the greatest genius, were he to appear, would find himself as helpless to control the course of affairs as a fly on the wheel of a big machinery plant.

However, under the existing circumstances this is not such an evil as it would have been several years ago, or as it would be perhaps in some other countries. The American people have reached generally a very high level. Even the ordinary workman is fairly well educated and is able to take an intelligent interest in the affairs of his country. At the same time, it is obvious that genius, exceptional foresight, must needs reside in the individual and not in the great majority, whatever degree of perfection it may have reached. Even in the educational system itself, we find apparently an undue discouragement of high individual effort. Thus, for example, the Moseley Commission sent out by the English Government in order to report on the American education system, found that while the average culture of American colleges and

schools was superior to that of the English, yet the work done in the very high branches, in the branches where individual genius would assert itself, is inferior to that of the English. At present, therefore, the thought of the masses in America is of a high order, and possesses almost unlimited influence, but the thought of the individual is comparatively weak.

If we now consider the same question in other countries, and especially in England, there we find that the individual thinker has more chance. It is true that the dual party principle that usually prevails in England, must necessarily occupy a very important position in determining the success or non-success of an original thinker. But instances have not been wanting of individual thinkers who have broached original views, who have emphasised these views so eloquently and forcibly in parliament and in the country at large, that one or both the political parties have been forced by an overpowering public opinion to make the views of the thinker part of its own political problem.

This was the case in regard to the Repeal of the Corn Laws and to Free Trade. It is well known that until 1831, there was no movement, no party in favour of the Repeal of the odious Corn Laws. But the two men, Cobden and Bright, went from town to town, and by speeches and pamphlets so worked upon the minds of the people that it was found impossible to withstand the wave of agitation.

So that at last, Peel himself adopted the anti-corn legislation as a part of his own programme. Other examples from modern English history could also be quoted, showing how the thought of the individual can bear down even the thought of the masses. Factory legislation, which owed its first impulse to Robert Owen, the abolition of the slave trade in which such a prominent part was taken by Wilberforce, the reform of the prison system which originated with the efforts of Howard—these and many other instances might be quoted as illustrative of the influence of the thought of the individuals in England.

Such influence is also perceptible in other ways. There is no denying the power which has been exercised in England by individual writers, philosophers, poets and novelists. English opinion and practical conduct have been greatly modified by the writings of Dickens, the scornful lasher of spurious schools, of a disgraceful hospital system and other social abuses. Then again, the public taste and appreciation of works of artistic merit have been developed to an almost incredible degree by the writings of Ruskin and Tyndall. This also stands out in remarkable contrast with the state of things in America, where reforms and changes have almost invariably arisen from the people themselves, or from persons who owe their influence entirely to the people.

Most modern countries are democratic in their constitutions, but there is one European country in particular in which the personal autocratic element very thoroughly prevails. That country is Germany. Nominally, the power of the people should largely preponderate in the combined Bundesrath and Reichstag, but Prussian influence largely dominates, and in Prussia itself, the government partakes almost of the character of a powerful despotism.

In many ways, the thought of the individual in Germany has succeeded in impressing itself upon the people. As is well known, the creation of modern Germany was mainly owing to the conception and policy of one man, Bismarck, who played the same figure in German history as all legislators in all early periods of state life. But quite apart from this, looking beneath the surface of German life and German thought, we shall find that the thought of the speculative thinker everywhere predominates. Such names as those of Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Nietzsche, Bach, even Wagner, might well be inscribed on the pillars of present German greatness. Nay, more, even the conception of imperial dominion so commonly attributed to Bismarck may perhaps with greater truth be ascribed to Kant—another speculative thinker. For it was Kant, with the rational element of his knowledge, with his theory of intellectual forms

that emanate from the human mind itself, that created the spirit of exalted egoism now so flourishing on German soil. Such a conception of the origin of law naturally led to Hegel's still more drastic annunciation that might is right and that reason is to be found on the side of the conqueror. Now, these are the ideas that have constantly actuated German diplomacy, and it was they which caused the Seven Weeks' War with Austria, the Franco-German War, and the scheme of German colonial expansion. Bismarck was but the practical exponent of these ideas. He carried them out. So that really it was the ideas of the private speculative thinkers that succeeded in forming the character and policy of the German people.

Even, therefore, in a country like Germany, where the strong autocratic element prevails, the thought of the individual speculative thinker manages to exert a very strong influence.

Usually, however, such thought can only exert its influence through the leverage of some political party. Much, therefore, depends upon the nature of the particular party system in vogue. In England there have been two great political parties, labelled respectively Conservatives and Liberals. Where such a system prevails, the individual thinker has some chance of asserting himself. For it would naturally become the object of the party in power to introduce and pass any measure that

had been shown to be wholly beneficial to the interests of the country. Moreover, the adverse party would be less likely to oppose such measures, either because they would be disadvantageously defeated, or because when they themselves came into power, they might find themselves forced to introduce the same measures that they had been attacking. When, however, the parties are many, then the difficulty would be somewhat greater. For every party would think only of that particular line of conduct upon which its existence and *raison d'être* depend. Thus, for example, if the Socialists or Labour Party came into power, they would view things only in so far as they affected the propaganda of the Socialists or Labour Party. Any outside question would have very little chance of being adopted.

It is not likely, however, that the present system of dual party government will be discarded in the near future to the detriment of the influence of the individual thinker. First, because in course of time, great questions inevitably arise which oblige the prominent parties to come to the front and to submerge the smaller parties which are divided on small issues. And secondly, because in the absence of two well-defined parties the whole parliamentary system of government would deteriorate, and thus a greater share of legislation would pass into the hands of individuals—a circumstance, as has been

shown, by no means prejudicial to the influence of the individual thinker.

Viewing, therefore, the general condition of societies from the point of view of the relation between the thought of the individual thinker and that of the masses, there are great hopes for the future. Public thought and opinion are reaching a higher level, and, on the other hand, the individual genius, the speculative thinker can still exist, and exert his influence through the present administrative machinery.

THE STIMULATING ELEMENTS OF A NATION'S PROGRESS.

THE universal cause of human activity is the desire of what is conceived to be good. Such is human nature that when the intellect judges any peculiar object to be good, then the will itself stretches out towards that object, and, at the same time, all the other powers concur, both the rational and even the physical activities.

It is the same with the nation which is only an aggregation of individuals. The source of the nation's activity is the pursuit of some object commonly conceived as a good. At one time, for example, wealth may be considered as the good, and then the greater part of legislation and the greater part of the nation's resources will be directed by the aim of getting wealth. All the corresponding activities of the nation will accordingly be aroused and driven into action by the same object of wealth. Formation of commercial companies, adventurous enterprises, commercial systems of education will all be so many symptoms of the peculiar energy that has been aroused. At another time,

power, dominion, may be the object, and then other activities will be correspondingly called into being. Nor is it impossible for the attention of the state to be preoccupied with the pursuit of good of a moral order, and then during the period that ensues for activities of a different nature to display themselves.

When, however, the object in pursuit is obtained, then for a time the tension is relaxed, and there is a pause, a relaxation of energy. Hence, in regard to the pursuit of certain objects, there is no continued progress in a nation, but a series of movements interspersed with moments of quiescence. Before, however, investigating the mysterious nature of this movement, engendered in the state by the pursuit of what is conceived *sub specie boni*, we must distinguish very carefully between pleasure, satisfaction, contentment, happiness. For the difference between these four things, better than anything else, will enable the reader to see what are the real and wholesome stimuli to the right progress of a nation.

Pleasure consists mainly in a certain condition of freedom from pain and in the actual satisfaction of all the wants of nature. Even animals are susceptible of pleasure when their physical organisation is strong and well balanced. When hunger and the need of rest or exercise are satisfied, the animal shows by its outward movements the pleasant condition in which

it finds itself. Evidently such pleasure does not require for its existence any reflection or self-observation, it is purely a condition of feeling. Such again are the symptoms of pleasure shown by the baby before it has come to the use of its rational faculties. And this is precisely the meaning that we would wish to attribute to the word pleasure. This definition may differ from the meaning that is very often given to the word, but the necessity is thereby saved of coining a new word.

Contentment, on the other hand, implies more than pleasure. It implies also a judgment by which we affirm to ourselves that we actually are in this or that pleasant condition. We form to ourselves the consciousness of our pleasant condition, and thus in contentment there enters, besides the physical element, also the intellectual element, by which we make present to our mind the pleasure that we experience.

Observation indeed will soon reveal the extraordinary fact that no man can be really contented or happy unless he judge himself to be so. Persons may be rolling in affluence, may abound in every conceivable kind of bodily comfort, and yet may be discontented and miserable, for the simple reason that the intellectual element to which we refer is missing. In spite of their pleasures, such persons say to themselves, "I am not happy," "I am not satisfied," and the result is just what would be

expected. On the other hand, the intellectual element may be there, and even though there may be only a few pleasures, yet contentment is the result. A typical illustration of this overpowering influence of the intellectual element we find in the conversation between St. Francis and Brother Elias, St. Francis maintaining that happiness is not to be found in mere riches and pleasure, but rather in poverty and humiliations, and that the greatest happiness would be, if on their return to the monastery the porter were to refuse them admittance and even inflict upon them corporal chastisement. "Ivi é perfetta laetizia," "Here is perfect happiness," says St. Francis.

It was the confused sight of this truth that led so many of the pagan philosophers to place the whole source of man's happiness within himself. Both the Stoics, however, and the Epicureans went too far by exaggerating the importance of this intellectual element and making it to comprise everything. Whereas, there must be some reality corresponding to the judgment. If there be no such reality, then the judgment is false, and there is no real happiness and contentment. Men will often boast of their happiness to outsiders and others, even when on the very brink of desperation. Thus, Rousseau after boastfully proclaiming his happiness to the world, only a few days afterwards made an attempt upon his own life. We must therefore conclude that while

in the words of Cicero "oportet animus tuus te judicet divitem," "your own mind must judge you to be happy," yet, the real and physical element is also required.

Perhaps the most fundamental part of this error on the part of some of the ancient philosophers, consists in this, that they ignore the very common fact that man has the power to deceive himself in regard to the objects that can give him contentment. He has the power of falsifying in his own mind the capacity of certain objects to fulfil his desire for happiness. This power, however, is generally exercised only when the mind has reached a certain degree of development. In the early stages of individual and state life, physical comforts and pleasures are indeed sought after, but the mind appreciates them just at their own proper value and no more. It sees that such pleasures mean the satisfaction of certain physical wants. The mind does not judge that such pleasures satisfy that vague general universal hankering after happiness that is embodied in every human soul. This grievous error we alluded to only takes place afterwards. Only when the mind has developed its power of abstraction to a certain extent, can it fix its attention on qualities in the abstract and transfer these qualities quite arbitrarily from one object to another. Now among such qualities is the power to satisfy the craving of the human will for good in general, and

thus the mind has the power of falsely attributing that power to certain objects.

And this explains why man indulges himself in the gratification of his animal lusts to far greater excess than can be found in the purely brute creation. Man has the abstract conception of boundless happiness, and this he arbitrarily attributes even to filthy pleasures. He may find himself deceived ten, fifty, a hundred times, and still he will continue, until life itself succumbs to the strain. There is in such cases a succession of physical pleasures, and on the occasion of each recurring pleasure, there is a joy, a false joy, however, which leaves behind in the soul a painful void. Thus the life of man becomes a series of pleasant moments succeeded by bitter disappointments, until at last there comes a continued state of sadness and even ferocity. Herod, famed for his lust and fierceness, is a type of only too many. The vain attempts to reach the infinite happiness in what can only give a partial pleasure, begets in the soul a moroseness, an incredible fierceness of disposition.

Similar mistakes are made in regard to the acquisition of money or power. The advent of moderate wealth does not satisfy the avaricious man, who foolishly attributes to money the power of satisfying his desire for boundless happiness. When each new sack of gold fails to satisfy, he falsely believes that the cause is to be found in the limita-

tion, and that he must still acquire another sack. And so he continues, until the time comes when he will sell everything, even virtue, for gold.

Man then has the power of making a false judgment in regard to the objects that can satisfy his desire for happiness. And this power of self-deception must never be lost sight of by practical statesmen. In previous times, serious mistakes have been made by ignoring this deplorable tendency of human nature. Statesmen have sometimes thought to quiet the agitations of a nation by gratifying certain passions for power, or wealth, or pleasure. And the result has frequently been the opposite of what was expected. Whereas, the sound policy would have been to correct those false judgments which lie at the base of practical errors. This indeed was one essential feature of the Gospel that was preached not only to the individuals but also to the nations of the earth. "Blessed are the meek, Blessed are the poor in spirit, Blessed are the pure of heart," are maxims that strike at the very root of a great many national evils, because they remove that false judgment of which we have already spoken.

It has now been made sufficiently clear that in order that there may be real contentment within the heart of man, and a real satisfaction of his desires, there must be a true judgment by which man affirms to himself that he is contented and that he

is satisfied. But this is not all. There still remains the question as to where perfect happiness is to be found, and in what therefore consists perfect happiness. While contentment is to be found in the true judgment by which we affirm that we are in this or that pleasant condition, that this or that particular desire is gratified, perfect happiness means still more, and consists in that true judgment by which we affirm to ourselves that our highest and loftiest desires have been gratified. The nature of man is made not for any particular of limited good but for the good in general, in universal, and therefore man's desires can only be gratified by his union with the whole order of being, with the Essential Subsistent Being, God Himself. This, however, does not mean that the virtuous man here below can already attain this condition of supreme happiness. In the peace and order and tranquillity that dwell within the soul, and especially in the interior union, however imperfect, that the Christian enjoys with God, the Christian soul already enjoys a foretaste of the future happiness. But such happiness is in this present life in an inchoate state, it is as yet only *in statu potentiae*, and must be developed by a succession of acts. In other words, the virtuous man is not yet perfectly happy, and from this point of view, Cicero errs by excess when he says that "hic vero ego M. Regulum ærumnosam nec infelicem, nec miserum unquam putem". For no one in his

senses would deem Regulus happy during the moments of his execution, and many of the martyrs showed symptoms of the agonies that they were undergoing. In fact, only in the future state will virtue and happiness be fully united. And with regard to the present life, all that we can say is that virtue tends to make a man happy, that the mind of the Christian is fortified against all the accidents of life, and that sometimes the supernatural cause of happiness may at times overcome any amount of physical suffering, as was the case with St. Lawrence smiling on the gridiron.

Even a cursory view of the four cardinal virtues illustrates how even, *per se*, a virtuous life tends to happiness. By the virtue of prudence, we can to some extent control the effects of our actions, and can even mitigate that fierce power of destiny to which the ancients so falsely attributed the results of our decisions. By the virtue of justice, we give to each one that which belongs to him, we become faithful to friends, upright and sincere in all our dealings, and thus we tend to be at peace with all. Temperance, which restrains the excesses of the lower appetites conduces to health, both of mind and body, while fortitude not only gives to the character a certain august majesty and splendour, but makes the person, to a great extent, above and independent of all the vicissitudes of life. Thus, the four cardinal virtues even of their nature tend to

bring man along the way which leads to happiness.

It can therefore be easily seen that the perfection and happiness of man lie chiefly in the progress which he makes towards his eternal destiny, but, at the same time, pleasure and contentment are not in themselves evils, but the opposite, provided they be recognised just for what they are worth and no more.

Much time may seem to have been spent in endeavouring to bring out clearly many things which appear truisms. But the distinctions we have been drawing are absolutely necessary for a clear understanding of what is meant by true progress and by the stimuli that help to that progress. At the same time, it can be seen how very fallacious are some of the principles which modern politicians often advance as the only criterion of true progress. The relative proportion of exports and imports, the increase of national debt, the amount of individual capital, the ratio of territorial expansion, readiness in utilising the newest inventions, are the usual standards by which a nation's progress is estimated. It is true that moral statistics are also quoted. But these often occupy only a very minor position. How many writers, for example, in commenting upon the awakening of the Oriental nations, take account of the important spiritual elements we have been enumerating? Much value may indeed be attributed

to the introduction of European elements of civilisation, but by those elements, most writers wish to indicate merely such things as opening of treaty ports, construction of railways, installation of telegraph wires, multiplication of modern institutions of commercial education and business training.

But man can be miserable in spite of all those material improvements, a wide gulf still existing between his desires and their satisfaction. If a man, say, has only twenty per cent. of pleasure and judges that he is satisfied therewith, why boast of giving him sixty per cent. more pleasures when his desires are stimulated so as to go beyond even a hundred per cent.? Before, such a man was happy, now, he is miserable. Why again declare, as some do, that certain nations are backward because they are wanting in the means of gratifying many pleasures, when in spite of all, contentment may have been obtained, and the nation advanced nearer to the obtainment of what alone can give solid happiness? True progress is movement on the right not on the wrong road.

Until a few years ago, however, there prevailed the destructive error that legislation should be based only on the external and mechanical elements of a nation, that the state must only concern itself with the exterior actions and not with the internal disposition of the soul. Such an error rises from not seeing the distinction between the means and the

end. Governments indeed can control only the external movements, but the end of legislation must always be the effect upon the minds of individuals composing the society. It would, for example, be ridiculous to hear a citizen exclaiming, "I am happy in so far as the trade is good, exports are increasing, and consols are firm, but otherwise I am miserable". No state could boast of the happiness of such a citizen.

There now remains the important task of ascertaining the nature of the stimuli that help to the true progress of a nation towards the goal of happiness and contentment. Some of these stimuli regard those material wants and corresponding satisfactions which, to a certain extent are legitimate, others concern directly the obtainment of happiness—in the full sense of the term already pointed out.

In regard to the material progress of a nation, perhaps it is no exaggeration to say that the general stimulating cause of activity—a cause which embraces all the others—is unsatisfied desires. If all the wants of man were gratified, he would not bring forth any further activity. While on the other hand, every desire not yet gratified sets in motion all the various faculties of human nature.

Observing this very common fact, some statesmen have drawn the conclusion that the best means of promoting the progress of a nation is to augment

its needs. Such a maxim, however, would produce most disastrous consequences, and, moreover, it is based upon quite erroneous assumptions. It supposes that increase of desires will necessarily entail a proportionate increase of productiveness, that if there would be more industry and more efficiency the profits would be equitably distributed, violent passions of avarice and mutual jealousy would not be aroused, and the desires would after all be gratified by just and laudable means. Now, history falsifies those assumptions to a considerable extent. The abandonment of the primitive simple life of the Romans and the introduction of extravagant habits and desires impaired rather than improved the industrial efficiency of the Romans. Even when vast wealth has been acquired by gigantic strides in industry and commerce, that wealth has often been unjustly distributed to the misery and discontent of the poorer classes—witness the results of the great mercantile companies and adventurous enterprises of the seventeenth century. Even modern experience shows that desires, increasing beyond a certain limit, have the result of securing not efficient and industrious workers, but rather of multiplying robbers or speculative thieves, who will employ illegitimate means in order to satisfy their desires. Nay more, it is precisely the presence of the many desires that hinders the habit of saving and that, according to Chalmers, the great poor-law expert,

leads the poor citizens to waste their money on superfluous and expensive articles.

If, however, certain limits are taken for granted, then the maxims alluded to are praiseworthy. For it is demonstrably true that nations without desires as yet ungratified show very little progress not only in a material but also in an intellectual and moral sense. This, for example, is the case with savage tribes content to dwell amid all sorts of animal discomforts. China and other stationary civilised nations betray great slowness, physical and intellectual, owing to the paucity of wants and to the corresponding lethargy, while the comparative backwardness in some of the European nations of to-day is also to be attributed to the same cause. But this does not necessarily mean loss of any real happiness. Still less does it mean any going back in the process of civilisation. But it certainly does mean that the physical and mental activities of the nation are as yet not fully awake.

When desires and wants are very few in number, the activity of the nation is decreased. The absence of one thing always entails the absence of the other. But on the other hand, the presence of the one always implies the presence of the other. In the ancient world, great revolutions and great strides in the mental and moral life of the nation were also brought about by the pungency of desires—some of which at least were always material.

Athenian democracy, from some points of view the best form of democracy that the world has ever seen, arose from the discontent, from the unsatisfied material desires of the Athenian populace. In Rome, which brought forth the best oligarchic form of government, we find that the uplifting of the masses of the plebeians to liberty, office, and a full share in the political life were mainly the result of land hunger on the part of the poor plebeians, and ambition for office on the part of the richer plebeians. We may grant that in some cases, as in that of the Catilinarian Conspiracy, the agitation may have been of a maleficent nature. But every force, however necessary, is liable to misuse. Steam, electricity and other forces of nature occasionally work great havoc, but, without them, locomotion would proceed at a small pace. And so it is with the social driving power of wants and desires,—their general working is beneficial, but occasionally there comes a disaster.

During the Middle Ages, the material wants of society were in a quiescent state, and the action of governments tended to keep up that condition. The certainty of a livelihood on the part of the agriculturist, and at that time the majority were agriculturists, the mediæval guild system which, by regulating wages and hours of work throughout the entire trade, prevented keen competition, the laws that were passed, forbidding undue tampering with the markets by forestalling and cornering, even

regulating the prices of certain essential commodities—all these circumstances removed even the possibility of making great fortunes, and thus desires were necessarily of a very moderate nature. Yet there were certain great movements which had the effect of stimulating desires and calling the faculties into play on special lines of activity. The Crusades, for example, by the very fact of causing people to move freely, and to become acquainted with the big cities, also had the effect of widening the desires and of producing an active restlessness. Naturally, the contact with the strange Eastern nations accomplished this still more successfully. Not only was there developed a fashionable taste for Oriental clothes and articles of food, but Oriental ideas, philosophy and letters found their way into Europe.

Still more marvellous was the stimulus caused by increasing wants and desires during the fifteenth century. As not unfrequently happens, the supply of a commodity begets the demand for that commodity, and the discovery and consequent influx of gold from the West Indies engendered a feverish agitation and restlessness throughout society at large. The consequence was the construction of navies and a development of the taste for ocean exploration which led to the sea power of England and Holland. Again, acquaintance with foreign countries and their products brought new comforts and conveniences to the knowledge of the people, and the

result was the formation of great companies, a revolution from the individual industrial system to the co-operative system of industry, and keen development of all business faculties. Banks, trusts, trade-routes, commercial treaties, facilities for educational commercial training, all these rose in quick succession and rapidly influenced the whole political and industrial life of Europe. Wars of religion then became things of the past. The struggle became one for existence in the commercial life. None can deny that this wakening of so many new wants and desires affected the very character of the individual persons that constitute society. Young people had to specialise early and therefore they neglected the broader fields of learning; the virtues, qualities and talents that are necessary for the right and successful conduct of business were loudly extolled, and above all, there was conspicuous the want of that peaceful tranquillity that so distinguished the generality of the lives of men during the Middle Ages.

If we now wish to estimate rightly the real nature of this revolutionary change, we must carefully bear in mind the maxim of policy already explained. If these wants are moderate, and can be satisfied in legitimate ways, and if, furthermore, they are found in people already of a sound moral disposition, then they are an element of real progress. Otherwise they are not.

Conspicuous among the nations successful from

this point of view is the United States. There, the race for wealth and the eagerness to advance has been severely, even caustically, commented upon by many writers. But if closely examined, the rush for money in the States is not accompanied by the evils that so often happen under similar circumstances. The desire for wealth is not of that grossly immoral character which we have been describing. Wealth is appreciated for what it is, and is not confused with the good in general, the universal good, an error which causes that agony and gnawing at the heart that proceeds from boundless disappointments. In the States, again, desires though many, can be gratified, owing to the great resources of the country. And it is quite plain to the casual observer that such desires have awakened the legitimate energies for their gratification. In agriculture, in trade, in commerce, in all the arts and productions, America stands foremost. Finally, the character of the people themselves is a safe field for such desires. For in spite of the graft of certain sections and the corruptibility of political officials, the great mass of the American people is distinguished for its self-restraint and its strong moral sense. Under such conditions, we need not be surprised that the multiplicity of desires and wants in the States is rather a wholesome stimulus to productivity and to general mental development, than a temptation to idle luxury, crime and voluptuousness.

In great contrast to this state of affairs, in the States, is the spectacle of the misery and poverty that is to be found on the one hand, and the extravagance on the other—a spectacle that is indeed a blot on the civilisation of some of the European cities. London, England, may be taken perhaps as an extreme example. There, we find miles of streets lined with dingy houses and back-yards inhabited by underfed and degraded persons. And in an absolutely adjoining district, one may notice the very extremes of elegant and fantastic luxury. If actual visional experience is not sufficient to show this evil, then there are the reports of the late Poor Law Commission revealing in bare statistics, not only, the increasing poverty of the masses but the growing loss of initiative, and the want of all power to save, entirely owing to the factitious wants and desires formed in the life of a big city. Equally significant in this regard is the difficulty experienced in persuading the labourer to be contented with simple country life, away from the distractions of the big cities. All are eager in the rush for advancement and the means for gratifying desires, and the result is “Each man eager for a place, doth thrust his brother into the sea”.

In England again, the attractions of city life are drawing large numbers of English workmen from the country districts into the already congested towns. Nor can it be said that the prevalence of

desires thereby engendered, has encouraged habits of productiveness. Already, years ago, Stuart Mill complained of the habits of the English workman. According to this writer, the English workman, compared with those of many other countries, is resourceless, unmanageable, and frequently wanting in self-respect. Nor does modern experience altogether belie these words. The strenuous labour of agriculture is manifestly unpopular with the masses. Another symptom of the prevalence of this evil is the discussion in the English Parliament upon the recent bill for legalising the putting forward the clock during the summer months. In other European countries, it is already generally the custom to rise between five and six. No other interpretation can be put upon the bill itself save that the great majority are so unwilling to rise to their work that they have to be coerced into it by legislation. Similar evidence is found, all pointing in the same direction, to the ever-shortening hours of work and increasing number of holidays, while in no other country, according to statistics, is there such an enormous number of people living on the industry of others, men of whom Mr. John Burns is reported to have said, "Their one prayer on rising, if they ever do pray, is that they may not find work that day". And yet, side by side with this inactivity, there is a growing tendency to hanker after ease and comfort, and an inability to

endure hardships which were thought nothing of by a previous generation.

How serious therefore is the problem facing every government! Mere economic considerations of the law of supply and demand, or the mobility of labour according as ~~it is ranked in different phases,~~ ^{needed in different places,} or the mere relation between wants and the corresponding means of satisfaction, will be quite insufficient data upon which to introduce sound legislation. Of far greater importance is the changing character of the individuals composing a nation. The cultivation of new desires may be disastrous to one class of people and beneficial to another. The allurements of new gratifications to the amount of ten per cent. may cause a corresponding increase in the number of desires, but the increase of say thirty per cent. more of gratification might increase the desires a hundred-fold, even to an indefinite extent, owing to the inward action of the passions that are aroused. The all-important task, therefore, is to encourage the desires and wants of a nation just so far as is necessary for the legitimate increase in the output of a nation's activities.

There are, however, various important principles to be borne in mind in this task, and one of them is to secure to every man as far as possible a living wage. To this, the working man is already entitled as a matter of justice. Nothing can be clearer on this point, than the words of Pope Leo XIII. :

“Let it be granted then that as a rule, workmen and employer should make agreements, and in particular, should freely agree as to wages, but there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, and that is that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort”. Reason itself tells us that the respect due to a person's personal dignity and to his personal and connatural rights which he cannot alienate from himself, demands that he shall receive a just and living wage. But let us waive for the time being the question of justice. What concerns our argument is that the want of a living wage means the abiding presence of desires that are necessary and inevitable, and yet which cannot be gratified. The same evils are produced, therefore, as when extravagant and immoderate desires are rife. There is a continual irritation and disappointment. On every hand, there is excessive and even desperate competition.

It is to the interest of the state, therefore, to interfere in such matters, to endeavour to legislate so as to secure to all willing workers this living wage. Some may perhaps allege the spurious objection that the presence of ungratified desires for the necessities of life has occasioned most important political reforms. And there certainly are such cases in history. Thus, the extreme misery of the debtor in

Athens brought on by the reforms of Solon, and at the present day, the discontent and land hunger of the Russian peasant are largely accountable for the increased amount of political liberty and representative government that has been allowed to the Russian people. But in such cases, the deep economic discontent has only been the occasional cause. It has always been an evil in itself and, when not remedied, has wrought great havoc to the state.

It is therefore a wise policy to endeavour to secure to all, as far as possible, the means of livelihood. Especially is this so at the present day when wages are, generally speaking, below the cost of living. In the United States, the living wage for a man with a family is, according to Professor Small of Chicago University, at least \$1,000 a year : whereas, according to Marshall, the labour leader, such a wage in big cities should be at least over \$620 a year. On the other hand, there is, according to the United States statistics, a considerable number of workmen gaining less than this amount. In certain occupations there are no fewer than fifty or sixty per cent. of the workers thus underpaid. In Canada, in spite of its resources and comparative paucity of population, we find a similar disparity between the fair and the average wage. During the past few years the reports of the Civil Service Commission clearly show that the increase in the cost of living does

not harmonise with the increase in wages, and evidence in the same direction is given by the reports of the Fair Wage Board. Then again, while it is admitted that generally the cost of living in Canada approximates that of the States, yet the average wage-earner receives even less remuneration than in the States. Thus, in the flourishing town of Hamilton, the most opulent of the towns in Ontario, the average wage for a working man is only between \$400 and \$500.

There is, however, a general movement on the part of legislators to remedy this. Old Age Pensions that have lately been introduced in England, compulsory insurance for the workman, to which he himself, the employer and the state contribute, is already practised in Germany, and state regulations of hours of labour are indirect means of raising wages. In some countries, even more direct means are adopted to secure the same benefit whether for a section or for the whole working population. In Canada, there is the Fair Wage Board, in New Zealand, a legal minimum wage is fixed, and in Victoria (Australia) the wage is not permitted to fall below the cost of living.

Such efforts will certainly bring their own reward. Not only are the demands of justice satisfied, but there are also removed those profound causes of discontent which prevent contentment, and are more than anything else the cause of social disorder.

While, however, the supply of work and amount of wage should be sufficient, so as to meet the necessary demands of even the lowest unskilled labour, a mistake in the opposite direction is equally to be avoided. For it is easy, by the establishment of industries, not necessary, to create immoderate wants, and artificial desires provocative of disastrous consequences. Not unfrequently, indeed, the frugal and industrious character of certain localities has been completely destroyed by the introduction of manufactures, by introducing new wants and desires. To quote one instance out of many, a case occurred some time ago in the Department of Seine-et-Oise in France. There, the main industry was hand-weaving. Wants were few, and frugality and simplicity of living were the rule. Suddenly, a factory was set up, and immediately everything changed. The inhabitants became extravagant, quickly got into debt, and lost their old habits of productive industry. A similar disastrous change was visible some time ago in some of the districts in the northern parts of Italy.

Unfortunately, the tendency of legislators is to regard only the economical effects of measures. That is to say, they look to the immediate effect of the introduction of industries upon such things as revenue and the relative proportion between exports and imports. Hence under the guidance of such material maxims they encourage new industries and multiply

old ones by such artificial measures as protection and bounties. The immediate results may perhaps be beneficial, but in the long run, even the material gain is found to be disappointing. It is the psychological element that eventually counts for everything. The real source of human productivity is to be found in the human soul, which obeys quite other laws than those dreamed of by purely technical economists.

Generally, it is more advisable to check than to develop the growth of material wants and desires. Especially is this so in England and in the States. In England, the multiplication of the artificial wants have, as we have already shown, lessened rather than increased the productive power of the nation. In the States, the multiplication of such wants has caused over-production and under-consumption which entails even material loss and discomfort. Professor Hadley of Yale brings this out very clearly in his work on Economics. He also with equal clearness, shows that what at present is needed seems to be a greater general consumption of the goods produced and a more even distribution of such. In other words, the nation needs not the stimulus of new wants but the satisfaction of old and perhaps necessary wants and desires. This is already being partially accomplished in some countries by such means as the Old Age Pensions Act, proper supervision of hours of labour, a graduated income tax, and especially, taxes upon inheritances.

Thus far we have seen the way in which the state might beneficially interfere in regard to the wants of the citizens. Moderate and legitimate desires which encourage the true progress of a nation can be stimulated and increased but, with great caution and prudence. By this means, the progress of a nation will not be feverish and intermittent. It will be a progress in the right direction, for while a wholesome stimulus will have been given to the nation's faculties, there will also be a lasting satisfaction and contentment.

There now remains to be considered briefly the second part of the problem, namely, how to promote by legislation the true happiness of the nation—a happiness which consists in the satisfaction of the highest and noblest of men's desires. Evidently, this satisfaction cannot be obtained by the mere possession of some partial good, but by being placed in proper relation with the whole order of being, in communication with the Supreme Being Itself. Or, according to the Aristotelian maxim, we must find this happiness in the best operations of the highest power of man in regard to the highest object.

But certain modern writers, as we have pointed out, have fallen into the error of thinking that the state should not have in view this ultimate end and destiny of man. This partly arises as we have seen, from mistaking the end for the means. The elements over which society has control are essentially

external. No state, for example, can legislate that a person shall think and will in conformity with the moral law. But the end of the supreme happiness of man must ever be kept in view and must be the object point of the external legislative enactments that are prescribed.

Another cause of this erroneous opinion that the state should not heed the spiritual happiness of man, is the want of distinction between *public* good and *common* good, two totally different things. The common good is the good of the individual members, the public good is the good of society considered abstractly as an independent entity. Now the public good is subordinate to the common good. No majority, no civil power, however great, can justly and morally infringe upon the person and connatural right of man, of any individual, however beneficial such a course of action might seem to the state. Directly we admit the opposite principle that the public good alone should be sought after, then the most pernicious consequences would follow such as that "a majority can do anything," "one must die for the sake of the whole State," "might and right are the same," "a nation has no conscience and need not have any," and finally, that the "State need only have in view the material condition and circumstances of man".

These maxims, or some of them, have been proclaimed and acted upon in our times. Vergniaud,

in voting for the execution of Louis XVI., declared it was expedient that one man should die for the country. At the time of the Dreyfus case, some newspapers actually declared that though innocent, the victim should be allowed to remain in imprisonment lest his return should disturb the tranquillity of France.

Other examples might also be quoted. Joseph II., in banishing the contemplative orders, declared that they were noxious to the public good. The arbitrary arrangements of Balkan Provinces made by the chief European Powers at the Congress of Berlin were made in accordance with the abstract conception of those provinces as states, and in utter disregard of the public good and racial tendencies of the individual inhabitants.

Generally speaking, however, it is only a small school of writers who maintain in theory that the state should look only to the material changes that legislation might effect in society.

Even pagan states have implicitly admitted a far different principle. In the ancient codes of Greece, certain actions were commanded or forbidden merely on account of their moral nature, while the implicit recognition of justice and equity prevailed in the codes of all the great legislators. Also, in ancient Rome the compensations that could be demanded for injuries received, and the various legislations regarding property that we find in the

Twelve Tables, clearly recognise the same principle of natural justice. Still more conspicuous is the fact that the *jus gentium*, afterwards formulated by Roman lawyers, was in substance the formulation of natural principles of justice common to all mankind. Evidently, therefore, even the pagans admitted some other criteria of statecraft besides that of mere material and outward effects.

Turning to later periods, we find that among our Anglo-Saxon forefathers moral defects were, *per se*, prohibited. Disrespect towards elders, untruthfulness, impiety, even sloth were rigorously punished. Charlemagne's Capitularies contain many precepts of a similar nature. Thus, in one of them, we read that all must live in accordance with God's precept, under a just rule and in harmony with his fellows. When, however, feudalism was established, there naturally set in a dearth of general legislation in the ordinary sense of the word. Man's conduct was regulated mainly by feudal customs, guild regulations, and direct ecclesiastical jurisdiction. But in all these the moral element very strongly prevailed, and often prevailed over every other.

Then again, when feudalism was swept away, and natural monarchies with their respective legislative systems, were set up all over Europe, we find the same importance given to the moral element quite independent of utilitarian and economic considerations. Even the severe laws passed by certain govern-

ments during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, against the adherents of a proscribed religion testify to the fact that legislators had in mind the moral welfare of the people.

It is true that many of the state documents usually quoted in text-books do not contain many allusions to legislations of an ethical character. For they regard chiefly certain critical points of contention between parliaments and kings, and the settlement of relations between different states. But plenty of statistics can be found in the Calendar State Papers. In fact, certain regulations regarding the moral life of the citizen might nowadays be considered minute and almost vexatious. Especially was this the case in regard to the lower classes. So anxious, for example, was the Government of England on this point that the overseers of the parishes were actually charged with the duty of investigating the daily life of the labourers. (See Poor Law Regulations of Charles II.)

If we examine legislation in quite modern times we find the same principle frequently adopted—at least implicitly. The famous Abolition of the Slave Trade was fought for and obtained on ethical grounds. Changes were made in the penal code with a view to the reformation and not the mere punishment of the criminal; diffusion of education, cultivation of the public taste by means of art museums and picture galleries, temperance legislation, supervision

of disorderly houses, repression of licentious theatres, tracts and pictures, legal observance of the Sunday—all these measures show very clearly that statesmen are not forgetful of the great principle that the true contentment and happiness of the people consist in the satisfaction of their highest desires.

This circumstance, in itself is sometimes an offset to the great evil that is sometimes produced by the undue exaltation of the public good and consequent international immorality, and there is hope that, in the course of time, the strong ethical policy may act even upon international relations.

Hague Tribunals and Peace Conferences, though sometimes failures, also testify to an increasing improvement on this point. Nations are now supposed not to be mere entities, but they are called upon to act as collections of individuals with an individual responsible conscience; while the ethical principles of justice are supposed to prevail both in matters of domestic and foreign policy.

INFLUENCE OF THE CLASSIC PAGAN RELIGION UPON THE STATE.

AMONG the first difficulties which confront the student who investigates the relations between religion and the state, as well as the influence of the former on the welfare of the latter, is that of formulating a correct definition of religion. Technically, religion has been defined as the sum of the duties of man towards God. This explanation has been partly suggested by a consideration of the nominal value of the word. Religion comes from the word *re-legare*—to bind, and thus religion is taken to mean the group of man's activities which unite him to his Creator. Such a definition is correct and quite useful for ordinary purposes. When, however, we wish to investigate in a wide manner the influence of the higher element upon human history, we must, for convenience sake, give to the word religion a more comprehensive meaning, such as will enable us to include also the condition of the pagan nations who were cut off not only from Christianity but even more or less from Jewish tradition.

Tylor defines religion as "belief in spiritual

beings". Matthew Arnold expresses the same thing when he defines it as a "faith in a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness," while Dr. Schreider of Vienna University gives a more detailed formula of the same idea when he says that "religion is the faith in spiritual beings or powers, holding sway outside of and above the sphere of man, the feeling of dependence on them and the need of faith in spiritual beings or powers". These three definitions all concur in this, that there must be a belief in an objective being or beings higher than ourselves. From this point of view therefore, such definitions are preferable to some others, for example, to that of one writer who says that by religion man becomes conscious of the higher part of himself, and to that of Howarth who defines it as the effective desire to be in right relations with the power manifesting itself in the universe. Such definitions as these would frequently exclude not only Christianity but even pagan forms of worship.

Perhaps, it will be sufficient for our purpose if we accept the definition of Arnold that "religion consists in faith in a higher power not ourselves," only that we would make the meaning somewhat clearer by saying faith in a Divine power. This definition would include many and most varied forms of religion. It must be remembered that even in pagan idolatry, there was some vestige of the true religion and of true faith in God. For among the Greeks and Romans

there was always some conception of the Unity and Supremacy of God—as is seen in their Zeus and Jupiter who were respectively considered by the Greeks and Romans as the chief of the gods, and holding the reins of providence over the minor gods and over human creatures. Also, there was the belief in a future state, and in some kind of reward or punishment.

Taking, therefore, the word in this wide sense, the question before us is “how far religion has influenced the state, how far has it contributed to the progress or decline of nations?”

How close has been in past times the relation between religion and the state, can be seen from the fact that, in many cases, the state actually grew out of the religious condition of the people. Not perhaps exclusively, but at least in combination with the family tribal element. The common meeting-place of the family was at the same time the common place of worship. The citadel to which the family flocked for shelter and self-defence was also the sanctuary. “*Maiores nostri religiosissimi mortales*,” “our ancestors were most religious,” is only a matter-of-fact way of expressing what the poet affirms when he says of individuals that heaven lies about them in their infancy.

Nay more, this connection between religion and the state has sometimes been so strong that the State and the Church have actually been one,

in other words, the same society, belonging to the category of theocratic states. Thus, the Jewish nation was essentially a theocratic state, for its rulers governed by Divine ordinance, as holding a religious office, and there was absolutely no distinction between Church and State. Of a similar character was the Mohammedan State, the Father of the Faithful being also political ruler. While another noted example of a theocratic state was the Temporal Dominion of the Popes, the Pope ruling both as an ecclesiastical and as a civil ruler.

Even when states are not directly theocratic, like those we have mentioned, yet there are many instances where states have more or less partaken of the nature of theocratic institutions. Such was the case during the Middle Ages. Not only was Church and State then regarded as one society, governed conjointly by Pope and Emperor, but a great deal of the practical administration was also shared in common. Bishops were very often allowed to govern the cities and the surrounding country, clerical statesmen monopolised places at the national councils, bishops, as in England, used to sit side by side with lay judges, trying both civil and ecclesiastical offences, and last, but not least, the Church often became in a technical sense the State Church.

As time, however, rolled on, this intimate connection between Church and State became weakened.

And history contains many pages illustrating the tendency of Church and State to dissolve the intimate alliance to which we have alluded. The noted controversy between the mediæval Popes and Emperors had undoubtedly the effect of clarifying the minds of men in regard to the different nature of the two societies of Church and State, and thus of bringing about a greater division of functions. All this, in fact, becomes clear by the end of the Middle Ages. By that time, we find not only the national monarchies with a civil administration of their own, but, even in theory, we find more clearly delineated the sphere of jurisdiction of Church and State. Certainly, in some cases there was an exaggeration. When, for example, the Gallican Propositions denied the infallibility of the Pope, and asserted that he had no right whatever to interfere in the temporal power, we find the minds of men taking an erroneous and distorted view of the distinct nature of the two societies. For while Church and State are different societies, yet they have certain elements in common, as, for instance, maintenance of the public morality, and certain things *de jure*. Moreover, as it has already been pointed out, the remote end of the State is the same as the immediate end of the Church, namely, the sanctification and true happiness of the souls of men. But in spite of these errors, the underlying tendency was correct. And the increasing separ-

ation of Church and State in England, and the already accomplished separation in America and in France, are all parts of the present broad general movement on the part of Church and State to act as far as possible independently of one another. Recent disturbances in Spain and in Italy may perhaps be partly attributed to the same cause. And the temporal head of the Catholic Church himself, the reigning Pope Pius X., has recently commented upon the same tendency visible also in other countries, and in our own times.

Much might therefore be said in regard to the states either theocratic or partly theocratic. But the task before us is a wider and more general one, namely, to investigate the way in which religion has caused the progress or decline of nations. For the sake of brevity and continuity, first the ancient Classic states will be considered and then the Christian states.

Although the pagan religions contained so many elements of falsehood, yet it is impossible to deny that they exercised a very great influence for good upon the state. This was so even if we regard the purely ethical element. Many of the precepts of the pagan moral code were only a positive insistence upon the dictates of the natural law. In a rude and undeveloped people, mere ideal principles with difficulty influence human conduct. Such principles have need to be put into a real and concrete form

and to be accompanied also by positive sanctions of reward or punishment. This was one of the great services rendered by the solemn promulgation of the Ten Commandments on Mt. Sinai and a similar though infinitely inferior service was rendered by the positive utterance given to some of the natural dictates of reason among pagan peoples. In addition to this, the pagan religion exercised some considerable influence in building up that individual character upon which depends the peculiar character of the state itself. Men were taught to take life more seriously. The very feeling of subordination to higher powers tended to give rise to certain virtues of obedience, humility and reverence. Even the idea of some sort of fate suggested the idea of probation, a habit of looking into the future, and, above all, the idea of struggling upwards to some kind of perfection.

But besides this general effect, there were also clearly defined ways in which the pagan religion acted upon the progress or decline of the Greek and Roman states. Authority was inculcated, a system of law was established, a gradation of punishments for crime was instituted, the unity of the state was promoted, the natural ties of society were strengthened, and the idea of the value of the state life was inculcated. Even, the very methods of government were often profoundly affected. On some of these points, there are to be found distinct

parallels in the history of Greece and Rome. But there were also certain differences, and it will be advisable therefore to consider each nation separately, first of all Greece and then Rome.

Without some kind of authority, the state would be practically impossible, for there must be some central organism by which the functions of the state can be controlled and governed. Now in Greece, the authority of the ancient kings was essentially of a religious nature. The Homeric kings were actually called gods. Not that they were actually regarded as such, but that they were looked upon as divine, as exponents of the divine will and ruling with a power not merely human. Usually, one of his ancestors was reputed by tradition to have been a god, and the king himself was the high priest of the family, the go-between of gods and men.

Such a view, however erroneous, must have been of considerable help in establishing the king's authority over a rough and barbarous people. The influence of such a doctrine must have been indeed far more powerful than the doctrine of Divine rights inculcated by divines during the Stuart period in England. Nay more, when brute force was identified with right, it was, to say the least, a convenient way of establishing the kingly authority.

One interesting illustration of this is furnished by the famous "themistes" of the early Greek kings. These "themistes" were the judgments given by

the king in disputed cases. Such judgments were supposed to be not of the king's own creation but to be divinely inspired. His words were believed to be the utterance of thoughts conceived in the minds of the gods themselves. To quote the words of Clarke, "the themis is derived from the root $\Theta\epsilon$, to set or appoint, to which the noun theos is ultimately referable". Derivationally, then, it means that which is appointed and ordained. " $\Theta\epsilon\mu\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\varsigma$ appear to have been ordinances or prospective orders, or principles of justice proceeding from heaven and given as heaven's commission to a king or judge, which a just judge does not forget, but sifts out in straight judgments." Such was the Greek conception of the nature of the law, even of civil law, nor was it altogether erroneous. Many of the king's utterances must have been given in accordance with the natural principles of justice engraved in the mind of every man that comes into this world, principles to which we may also apply the words of the Psalmist, "Signatum est lumen vultus tui Domine," "the light of Thy countenance has been sealed upon us, O Lord"; though this truth was more or less distorted in the minds of the pagans.

The themistes were not perhaps laws in our modern sense of the term. They were not obligatory on all the citizens indiscriminately of class and rank. They partook rather of the nature of indi-

vidual commands. At the same time, however, they prepared the way for the conception of law. Certain customs or methods of conduct were established which almost corresponded to customary law, while they gradually instilled into the minds of the people the idea of a purely civil law. In fact, the word *nomos*, the later Greek word for law, meant both the custom established by the *themistes*, and also, in later times, the ordinary meaning that we give to secular law.

Laws, however, are of very little use without what is legally termed sanction. By sanction is meant the punishment that is meted out to the transgressors of the law, and, in early times, the punishment was distinctly connected with religion. The laws themselves were under the special protection of Zeus, and violations of those laws were to be punished as offences to the god. Only, indeed, in very recent times, did the Greeks regard a crime as an offence against the state itself. Crime was always looked upon as an offence against gods or as an injury to man, and was also vested with a certain sacrilegious character. And when offences were not punished by the state, there was always some vague idea of a punishment that would be awarded in a future life. Thus in Pindar we read: "Of all who die, the guilty souls pay penalty, for all their sins sinned in this realm of Zeus are judgeable under earth, pronouncing sentence by unclosed constraint".

Even therefore from the point of view of sanction, religion came to the aid of law and made it a living, binding thing. And the importance of this is clearly seen when we remember that law is one of the strongest artificial ties that bind together society. Like many other things, its value is well tested by its imagined absence. Now if we imagine a state deprived of law, then at once anarchy and dissolution would ensue. The action of law in one respect may be compared to the harmony and active mutual co-operation imparted by the soul to the different members of the physical body. Without law, death and dissolution would immediately ensue.

In another way, also, religion contributed to the strengthening of authority, and that was by giving a certain divine dignity to the conception of the state itself. A certain divine halo surrounded the memory of the founder of the city-state. The very gods themselves were regarded as fellow-citizens belonging to the same state. When, for example, the Athenians had to take refuge on the Island of Salamis, in order to escape from the Persians, they still seemed to see the sacred procession of the Eleusinian mysteries winding its way along the streets of Athens. Naturally, the result of this association of the state with religion was to give to the Greeks the most exalted conception of the state. In their minds, the state was almost

apotheosized. It certainly was regarded as immortal.

Immediate practical results were bound to flow from such conceptions, when generally entertained by the people. In the words of Aristotle, "the good life is essentially blended with the city-state. No man by his own individual effort, by aiming at mere individual greatness, can attain to the true stature of his being; a life that is perfect and self-satisfying can be found only in the city-state."

Nor can it be denied that this theory also contained some elements of truth. It implied the fact that man cannot obtain perfection by himself alone, it enabled man to objectify more and more all his aims and efforts, to go outside himself and enlarge himself in the wider circle of his fellow-beings. Even more than this, it expanded the principle of benevolence and of that social element which is the greatest moral asset of every society.

On the other hand, such a theory exalted unduly the nature and prerogatives of the state. The public good completely monopolised attention, to the prejudice of the common good. Strange to say, it even led to the same abuses that are found in Oriental despotism. Asiatic monarchism was essentially based upon the principle that the subject is absolutely in subordination to the external power of the king who rules from above, and the results were frequent tyranny and oppression of all kinds.

Similarly, the principle prevailing among Greek minds that the state was everything often led to the gravest kinds of tyrannical injustice, only with this difference, that the excess of state power sprang from the people themselves. Thus, in Greek history, we come across numerous examples of oppression exercised by the state. Merciless executions of individuals who had incurred popular displeasure were frequent in the later period of Athenian history, while in Sparta it is only too well known that the individual life was almost completely crushed by the heel of the all-powerful state.

At the same time, we must not forget that, in the long run, the good out-weighed the evil. At least, lawless individualism was crushed. And in those states, where culture and civilisation were paramount, we find that many individuals led higher lives, had more varied interests, and practised many natural virtues owing to the good elements contained in this principle.

Religion, therefore, did good to the state by giving to public life a nobler and loftier spirit. But there were other and more practical ways in which religion influenced the whole of Greek life. In three practical ways, did religion come into contact with the public life of Greece, namely, in the Amphictyonic Council, in the Oracles, and in the Public Games.

Perhaps the most important of these councils was that whose centre was at the Temple of Apollo at

Delphi. Another of very great importance was the religious league at the Island of Delos, famed for its sanctuary. Again, among other less important leagues was that of the Ionians at the Sanctuary of Mycalæ and that of the Dorians at the Sanctuary of Cape Trinopean.

So important was the League of Delphi that it comprised no fewer than twelve different peoples. It meant in fact the partial union of the inhabitants of Thessaly and Northern Greece. Moreover, any nation had a right to belong to this league. Its organisation and activity were principally religious, but in certain matters the whole political life of Greece was more or less affected.

First, the league, being an assembly of peoples, not merely of city-states, widened the mind and the political outlook of the Hellenes. They were enabled to look beyond the narrow confines of city life and to conceive the possibility of a wider union. Also, a greater condition of peace was maintained by the definite establishment of certain relations between the different states, so that if war did happen to break out, it was mitigated by the enforced observance of certain humanitarian regulations. In a certain sense, it was also the guardian of patriotism. Of this, we have instances in the outlawing of the traitor Ephaltes who showed to the Persians the way by which to attack the Greeks at Thermopylæ on the rear, and by its erection of a

monument to the memory of those who had fallen on the same spot.

Such was the general effect of the leagues on the Greek states. But incidentally, they also affected Greek politics. Thus, the absence of the spirit of exclusiveness enabled Macedonia to become a member of the Amphictyonic Council and thus to interfere the more effectively in Greek politics.

Another way in which religion touched Greek political life was by means of the Oracles. At Dodona in Epirus was the famous oracle of Zeus, the voice of the god uttering its thought amid the rustling of the oak leaves. But the most perfect type of the Greek oracles was that of Apollo at Delphi. Persons came from all the parts of Greece in order to consult this oracle. According to Strabo, the priestess who pronounced the answer was seated on a tripod placed over a deep hole in the ground. From this hole there issued a certain kind of gas, under the influence of which the priestess passed into a condition bordering on delirium—giving forth all sorts of utterances which were taken down and interpreted by the surrounding priests. The oracle at Delphi, and, to a less extent, the other oracles also exercised a great political influence in Greece. Perhaps it would be too much to say that the oracles were instrumental in producing the expansion of new colonies. Certainly, they were possessed of great geographical knowledge and could give much

useful information. It is more than likely, however, that the emigrants had already made up their minds, and that the oracles merely confirmed what was already made inevitable by self-interest and by force of circumstances. But it cannot be denied that they did exercise a certain kind of balance of power, their decisions sometimes effectually helping one nation sometimes another. Also they maintained the purity of Greek religion by jealously guarding the admission of new and foreign deities into the public worship. While, as regards public morality, they, like the old themistes, formulated and put into a concrete shape some of the dictates of the natural light of man's reason.

While perhaps we cannot agree with Curtius in thinking that the oracles were the cause of all progress in every department of intellectual life, in religious and moral speculation, in politics, in architecture and sculpture, in music and in poetry, yet we must concede that the oracles did exercise a great conservative tradition and moderating influence.

They generally followed the Aristotelian maxim, "*in medio tutissimus ibis*," and gave fuller sanction and practical importance to the decisions of a nation both in regard to its foreign and domestic policy. For "*so the Delphian Oracle has ordered*," being the usual formula recited after such decisions. And so, from this point of view, the oracle gave greater power to the voice of the authority of the state.

In a third way did the Greek religion act upon the political life of the people, and that was through the Public Games.

There were four great public games in Greece, the Pythian celebrated at Delphi, the Olympic celebrated at Olympia, in the Western Peloponnesus, the Isthmian Games at Corinth, and the Nemean at Nemea, in the Eastern Peloponnesus. Then, besides these four games, there were also other games held in the great towns. But the four mentioned were of wide national importance.

The Olympic Games, in particular, partook of a religious character. They were held in honour of Zeus. Sacrifices in honour of the god preceded the celebration of the games. Fines which were occasionally levied were devoted to the erection of brazen images of Zeus in the vicinity of the place where the games were held. And so sacred a character was given to the games that the spectators, no matter what might be the condition of the weather, had to assist bareheaded.

Such games were, indeed, far from being the cult of mere material athleticism, either amateur or professional. Among other things, they cultivated a spirit of justice and fair play. For, conspicuous among the impressive ceremonies preceding the games, was that in which the contestants assembled before the statue of Zeus, swearing that they were fit and worthy to compete and that they would en-

deavour to act faithfully and loyally. Nor were such protestations mere matter of form. Thirty days before the contest, select judges were continually examining and sifting the character and antecedents of those who presented themselves. These games also cultivated a spirit of reverence. The splendour of the ceremonies, the awe-inspiring crowds, the stately processions, and the co-operation of all that is beautiful and majestic in art must have contributed to produce an effect both elevating and inspiring, to make public life grandiose and strong. And far more than the game of cricket in England, or of baseball in America, they caused the pulse of national life to beat more quickly, powerfully, harmoniously, and bringing together the highest and the best that could be found throughout the Greek states.

After a survey of the various ways in which religion affected political life in Greece, it is impossible not to carry away the impression that religion was the chief cause of the maintenance and well-being of the state. Without it, unity, a sense of order, respect for authority, enforcement of law, cultivation of public unselfishness would have been well-nigh impossible. At the same time, the work of the pagan religion ultimately became a failure because that religion was, in the main, purely subjective. It was the outward expression, the formal utterance only of what

was the highest in the natural man. There was no objective, outside reality coming to the aid of man. When man himself became decadent, when the soul itself began to be torn asunder by internal jealousy and strife, then religion itself began to decline. Indeed, since religion was merely the expression of the internal element, nothing else could be expected save that the decay of the one should include also the decay of the other. And hence one of the surest signs of approaching disaster in the Greek states was the decline of religious belief and practices.

Turning now to the history of ancient Rome, there also, we find religion exercising a constant and very important influence. Perhaps, this was even more so than in Greece. For in Rome, the religion was universal, more pervasive in its influence. The Roman calendar was essentially a sacred thing, the chief seasons of the year being dedicated to the worship of some particular god or gods; the gods of Rome entered even into the domestic life of the Romans, while no important state act could be performed without the intervention of some religious ceremonial.

In Rome, therefore, we find that religion affected profoundly the political life of the citizens.

And first, as in Greece, it gave greater importance to authority. The king was high priest of the people, and was the intercessor between them and

the gods. His position, however, was not by any means so theocratic as was that of the early Greek king. His person was not regarded as divine, and the fact that election to kingship was not limited to one royal family, clearly shows that his ancestors need not necessarily have been divinities. Unlike the Greeks, the Romans regarded the office rather than the man, and the high religious prerogatives therefore as pertaining rather to the office than to the man. In other words, the august blessing of the gods under whom Rome was first founded "descended upon any one who was found fit by the patres of the senate to hold the office".

Only in one particular way, did religion limit the holding of office to particular persons, and this was in regard to the patricians. Only persons of patrician blood were supposed to possess the secret of performing rightly those religious acts intimately connected with every act of state. The plebeians, therefore, were excluded from all political office. And only after the *Lex Cannulæ* allowed a marriage between plebeians and patricians, were the former permitted to perform these sacred acts, and thus to hold office.

This was practically the only exception. Generally, in regard to offices and state functions, the Roman religion had great influence, which was independent of any particular caste of society.

The system of law which is so important a bond

in every state was developed from the religious element. It is true that the Romans did not have the themistes, or divinely inspired utterances of kings. But offences against the laws were regarded as offences against the deities, and punishable by them. Hence came the expression "homo sacer". A "homo sacer" was placed outside the protection of the gods, a man completely cut off from all human intercourse. Owing to the close connection between religious and state acts, this meant that the criminal was practically outside the pale of society, and that his property could be confiscated and very life could be declared "sacred" and therefore destroyed. Then again, not only were offences in general regarded as offences against the deities, but also there were certain laws that were supposed to convey express commands from the gods themselves. Such laws were generally known under the title of "fas". Some of them were enumerations of the dictates of the natural law, as for example, the prohibition of incest and of violation of one's promise. Others again referred to mere ceremonial.

Yet another and very important service was rendered by Roman religion, and that was the formal dignity given to the dictates of public conscience. The "boni mores" or good customs depended for their sanction at first upon the conscience of the individual, and, in later times, upon

the supervision of the Censor. In fact, the Censor was practically the public exponent of the voice of the public conscience. It was his duty to insist upon the observance of such virtues as chastity, honour in keeping contracts, respect and obedience from subordinates to superior. Here, none can fail to see the parallel between the "boni mores" and the "themistes". As the "themistes" were of distinct service in giving positive utterance to the abstract dictates of the natural law, so also were the "boni mores" and the authority of the Censor most useful in rendering vivid and concrete what might otherwise have degenerated into a cold and lifeless theory. One of the important functions of the Censor was to cross out the name of any unworthy member from the senate roll. This was also a tacit recognition of the fact that, above all the din and distraction of political life, there should be some organ in the state representing not a mere political element, but that voice of justice and integrity which should make itself heard above all party considerations or motives of mere expediency.

Thus far, we have seen how the religion of the Romans gave rise to the Roman system of law, and how even down to latest times, a great deal of the unwritten law depended for its validity upon the respect held for the individual conscience. There now remains to be seen the way in which religion

affected the relation between the individual and the state.

As in Greece, the concept of the state was ennobled and dignified by the presence of the religious element, so it was in Rome. Almost every phase of public and private life was hallowed by the association with some preternatural being. The temple of Vesta with the light ever burning, reminded every one of the hallowed antiquity of ancient Rome, and that Rome was under the special protection of the tutelary goddess. The ten vestal virgins were also a continual reminder of the virtue of chastity. The virginity of these vestal virgins, which had to be maintained under such severe penalties, was known to all and was a public example. The circumstance that they had the privilege of pleading for the liberation of a criminal, even on his way to capital punishment, was an ever-present testimony of public respect to the most sacred and most tender of virtues. Then, again, "lares" and "pennates," or the household gods, gave a certain dignity to the family household. At least, the family was raised to a height above that of animal intercourse and generation of offspring.

Even the public buildings and streets, and the very fields were hallowed by the presence and protection of some deity. There were the "compitales" or deities who presided over the cross-roads, and there were the statues or busts of the god Terminus placed

along the borders of fields and forests in order to mark off the limits of private property. No doubt, the custom was tainted with idolatrous notions. But the effect was to give a religious sanction to the rights of private property. For he who trespassed on the domains of another thereby committed a sacrilege, and was liable to be punished for such. Men were thereby taught that there was a strong ethical element in the notion of proprietorship and that property was not merely a question of might.

Then again, the religious element gave its sanction to certain very important occupations and pursuits. Mars was the god of agriculture as well as of war, and thus one of the main sources of a nation's strength, both moral and material, acquired a certain prestige and honourable standing among the people. Even the ordinary business pursuits of life received encouragement from the same source. Traffic and exchange were under the patronage of the god Mercury, and contracts under that of the god of good faith, "*Deus Fideus*". Perhaps it was for this reason that "*fides*" or faithfulness in contracts was so much esteemed among the Romans. Rare indeed were the violations of this virtue, and when they did occur, they met with general reprobation.

Thus, even the ordinary business pursuits of man were purified, and public credit was strengthened. Much, too, might be said of the economic prosperity of Rome, in the early and middle period of the

career of the Republic. But it must not be overlooked that one essential condition of that prosperity was mutual trust and confidence, and this was chiefly contributed by the influence of religion.

Besides the presence of the deities, there were also the religious acts which accompanied and affected the character of all the state acts of Rome. When, for example, it was a question of making a re-distribution of the members of the different tribes for voting purposes, there was the solemn procession along the boundaries of Rome, accompanied by the sprinkling of water, a ceremony called the "lustratio". Whenever any important undertaking was being discussed or projected, the will of the gods was ascertained by means of the taking of the auspices. Superstitious though the practice was, yet it served to remind the Romans of the element of uncertainty that has to be taken into account in all things. Even in the civil contract of marriage, a sacred symbolism was sometimes employed by the "confarratio" or mutual participation of the sacred cake.

Finally, there were the Colleges of Priests. Chief of these, was the College of Pontiffs who, as the name implies, were entrusted with the duty of keeping in repair the bridge across the Tiber. Marriages, wills, and preliminary questions on all important matters fell within their jurisdiction. And what was perhaps of still greater importance, was that they were the custodians of the historical and legendary

lore of Rome. They alone were acquainted with the ancient traditions of Rome. Now, when we remember how important it is that a nation should ever keep in mind those ancient institutions which are essential to the very being of society, this service rendered by the pontiffs was incalculable. While, from one point of view, their usefulness somewhat resembled that of the Under-Secretary for Home Affairs, a continuity and fixed line of development being given to affairs of domestic policy.

In connection with this subject, we might also mention the college of *fetiales*. The priests of this college seemed to have been more or less closely connected with the foreign policy of Rome and with international law. It was their office to declare peace and war, to arbitrate when arbitration was possible, and especially to keep the record of the different treaties that had been made in the past. Thus even in the matter of foreign policy, a certain constant line was pursued which was far better than shaping one's conduct according to the accident of new and varying circumstances. Possibly, this was partly the reason why Rome showed a firmness and a method in her dealings with foreign nations such as were conspicuously absent in the pages of Greek history.

Of the taking of the auspices, we have spoken already. A special college of priests called *augurs* were entrusted with the performance of this act.

Something, therefore, still remains to be said as regards the position and powers of the augurs. Cicero, in *de Legibus*, informs us that the position of the augurs was of the highest authority. "For what can be more important in respect to official dignity than the power of dismissing the assemblies of the people, and the councils, though convoked by the chief rulers, or of annulling their enactments? What power, I say, can be more absolute than that by which even a single augur can adjourn any political proceeding to another day? What can be more transcendent than that authority which may command even consuls to lay down their offices? What more sacred than their power of granting or refusing permission to form treaties and compacts? Or their power of abrogating laws, which had not been legitimately enacted? What can be more honourable than the fact that there is no edict of the magistrates relating either to domestic or foreign affairs, which can be ratified without the augurs' authority?" This passage, quoted somewhat extensively, illustrates perhaps more than anything else the way in which religion could control the whole course of public business. There is no doubt that at some time or another, those powers were all legitimately enforced, while even in later times, they did not altogether fall into desuetude. They must have accomplished the purpose of giving to the working of the Constitution a most wholesome elasticity, and of

checking anomalies that are bound to arise even in the best political machinery.

Having thus passed in review the various ways in which Roman religion touched and profoundly affected the whole course of public life in Rome, we are now better enabled to see how far that influence was beneficial. The Roman religion gave a moral and preternatural dignity to the Roman conception of the state; it ennobled the private homes, the domestic affairs, the very occupations and professional pursuits of the Romans. It enabled the people to retain for a long time the memory of the essential institutions upon which the very existence of every society depends. And finally, it facilitated the working of the Constitution in all its parts.

There was, however, one defect in the Roman religion that made it a useless prop in the very hour of need. Like the Greek religion, it was purely natural. However sublime and beautiful its maxims may have been, there was no reality to come to the strength of man's inherent weakness. In other words, the Roman religion was but the expression of the best that could be found in the Roman character, and a means by which that best could be kept up for some considerable time.

With the decay of the different elements of the state, there proceeded also a decay in the various elements of religion. Even faith in the gods themselves began to decline until we hear the words of

Petronius "Now-a-days nobody believes in Heaven and nobody cares a straw for Jove, but every Jack man of them shuts his eyes and just keeps thinking about his own affairs. That's why the gods are stealthily dodging us to-day. It's because we haven't any more religion." In these words, we see that the decline of religion was merely the outward symptom of the internal disease. Roman religion at least had lifted man out of the narrow prison of his own individualism. For gross selfishness, it substituted the altruism of the state. But when by the time of Marius and Sulla, almost every part of the Constitution was disordered, when consuls were venal, senators hopelessly corrupt, equites only bent upon making extravagant fortunes, and the once sovereign assemblies anarchical rabbles—then, individual selfishness began to break up the bonds of society. Men then ceased to believe in the gods because they ceased to believe any longer in the things symbolised by the gods. National integrity, honest labour by agriculture in the fields, honesty in keeping contracts, and the domestic sanctity of the home began to lose their value in the popular estimation and with this came disbelief in the existence of the gods.

One great cause of the undermining of the greatness of the Roman Republic was that the character of the Roman people was tainted by intercourse with foreign nations. Roman truthfulness was being

perverted by Greek sophistry. Roman fortitude was fast crumbling under the influence of oriental habits of luxury. The result was that foreign rites also introduced themselves into the Roman religion. Livy, in book xxv. remarks that "the citizens were seized with such a passion for superstitious observances that for the most part were introduced from foreign countries, that either the people or the gods seem to have undergone a sudden change . . . in the Forum and in the Capitol there are crowds of women sacrificing and offering up prayers to the gods, in modes unusual in that country". Again, in another chapter, Livy also speaks of a certain Greek "of mean condition, a low operator in sacrifices . . . and a priest of secret nocturnal rites". He then proceeds to speak of the meeting-place "as a store house of villainy from which come false witnesses, counterfeit seals, passion and secret murder and that the infection of this mischief like that of the contagion of some disease spread from Etruria to Rome". There is little doubt that this complaint proceeded from a strong feeling of alarm, not only for the integrity of the Roman religion but for the integrity of the state itself. The introduction and the corresponding influence of foreign superstitions was but the accompaniment, the outside symptom of the evils being wrought by the engrafting of foreign elements on to Roman character.

However beautiful and artistic the Roman religion may have appeared in its various forms, it was powerless to satisfy the inevitable needs of humanity. Ideas alone will not save a falling nation. Only a supernatural force can save a nation that is once started on the road to ruin, and this force is conferred only by Christianity. Upon this subject, however, and its relations with the state we will speak in the following chapter.

INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY UPON THE STATE.

WHEN the strong hands of Julius Cæsar grasped the reins of autocratic power, Rome seemed to be entering upon a new career of greatness. Such an event seemed to be the one thing necessary for the rehabilitation of the Roman state. Hitherto, the upper and ruling classes had been venal and incapable of governing, the lower classes had been pauperised and turbulent, factions of discontented citizens had been formed, menacing the existence of the state, pagan beliefs had declined and the provinces, badly governed, were disloyal and mutinous. Perhaps, none better than Cæsar knew the nature of the evils and the corresponding remedies that were needed. For, his sojourn in Gaul had already taught him the value of the essential institutions in society, and had also enabled him to take an outside view of the true condition of Rome. Even the few months of his administration had accomplished much. The condition of the poor classes was relieved, and public confidence restored, while

his strong hand took the place of corrupt senators and their officials.

When Augustus succeeded Julius Cæsar, hopes were perhaps still brighter. His reforms were as efficient as those of Cæsar, but they were more moderate in their method. Poets, like Vergil, may well have seemed to see in his reign the beginning of the golden age when all would be restored. Domestic and foreign affairs quickly prospered, the old religion revived, and everywhere the Roman eagles floated peacefully and powerfully.

This era of prosperity, however, was bound to be only temporary. It was quite possible to overhaul and to improve the political machinery of government and yet to leave radical causes of evil just as they were before. Both philosophers and poets failed to see that the poisonous root was the condition of the Roman people individually and not in their public capacity. The character of that people had been undermined, each man looked only after his own individual wants, and false ideals of happiness still prevailed. Legislation indeed abounded and almost to an excess—only testifying to the presence of many dangerous symptoms. The sumptuary laws, especially, were an eloquent witness to the luxury and voluptuousness of the times. Reverence and the practice of obedience had long since declined with the decline of the *patria potestas*, and the very soldiers themselves began to mutiny. Such em-

perors as Caligula and Nero naturally increased the evil by their reckless conduct, until, by the time of Diocletian and Constantine, the whole Empire was on the point of dissolution. And then not only did geographical conditions render it a well-nigh impossible task to govern an empire extending from Britain to Egypt, but there was wanting that which constitutes the soul and strength of any society, namely the will of the citizens to co-operate socially. This was well-nigh absolutely wanting, and therefore the reforms of Diocletian and of Constantine failed to accomplish their purpose.

During the years, however, that followed the reign of Augustus, there was rapidly increasing a mysterious force which alone could save society. That force was Christianity, containing within itself that virtue which alone can restore the nations.

We have already shown that the Roman Empire had already run through the various stages of decline, seeking, alternately, power, riches and pleasure. Not that these things are in themselves intrinsically evil, provided that they be regarded as the means, not as the end. But in the later days of the empire, merely physical pleasure had become one object of pursuit. Now, Christianity amended this evil by proposing an altogether new form of good. The gospel was indeed tidings of great joy. Men were told to seek first after the kingdom of God and His justice, and that then the other things would

be added. Directly mankind were thus removed some distance from the blinding fascinations exercised by earthly riches and pleasures, they were immediately enabled to regard them from the true point of view, and to value them at their true worth. In fact, when Christianity succeeded in reaching the masses of the people, then we find riches and pleasures again becoming wholesome stimulants to activity. While the decadent pagan Roman lay torpid and degraded, we find the Christian citizen content to lead a life of unremitting toil for only a small competence. Not because he foolishly expected to find all his happiness in that recompense, but because he appreciated the scanty wage and the proportionate amount of comfort just at their true worth, and knew how to find true happiness elsewhere. This again re-acted for good upon the whole economic life of society. Supply and demand became better proportioned to one another. There was a comparative absence of feverish ambition and irritating disappointment. At the same time, production was more constant and its distribution more regular. In fact, it is well known that the problem of poverty was very light during the Middle Ages, that is to say precisely at the time when the influence of Christianity was most predominant.

A second great cause of decline had been the excessive preponderance of the state element, and oppression of the extra-state element. Altogether

a false impression had been formed of the state. The conception of it as the only means of leading the good life had become distorted beyond description. In the minds of the later Romans, the state had become like some powerful juggernaut machine before which everything else had to yield. In other words, the extra-state element did not receive any recognition. Man's individual rights, both personal and connatural, were treated with contempt, and the family found its circle continually trespassed upon by the state. With regard to the personal rights of man, the will of the emperor had become in later times the absolute source of all law ; it was regarded as unlimited in its action precisely because the emperor was the supposed mouthpiece of the all-potent state. If we wish to find the exact formulæ for the prevailing error at that time we might find it in the words of Lamennais, the well-known French writer of the last century, who maintains that "every society is founded on the right to command and on the duty of obedience, and where this is taken away, society itself is destroyed." In like manner, the family and its intrinsic dignity were lost sight of, through the overpowering position of importance given to the state.

Christianity, on the other hand, appealed to the extra-state element ; it appealed principally to the individual, and to the family, to the common good rather than to the public good. Christianity, by

its doctrines of heaven and hell, by its exhortations to all to practice perfection, again upheld the intrinsic dignity of man and his individual rights. Unlike the ideal of the Greeks and the Romans, the ideal of the Church was to enable man to secure the full stature of his perfection, and reach full happiness not merely in and through the state, but in and through himself. "The kingdom of God is within" also implicitly admonishes us that the same kingdom is not to be found in the state.

Very significant in this regard are the words of Our Lord who did not proclaim himself a Jew or a member of any other nationality, but contented Himself with saying that He was the Son of Man. And St. Paul's words are an echo of the same sentiment when he says, "There is neither Jew nor Greek ; there is neither bound nor free". Christianity then accomplished the great task of giving to all men a new charter of liberty, an immutable unusual law of justice in comparison with which the *jus gentium* of the Romans sinks into insignificance. And this right of the individual has never been forgotten. The mediæval serf, the over-taxed Englishman in the days of the Stuarts, the ground-down peasant that, with stooped back and shamed countenance, preluded the French Revolution—all these appealed to the same great charter. Even the "Declaration of Rights," in spite of its many false assumptions, was, in essence, an appeal to

this gospel doctrine of the rights of the individual man.

In another way also, did Christianity appeal to the individual, and that was by addressing itself to his intellect. The Roman Empire was then steeped in corruption. It could only appreciate the concrete. It had all the tendencies of a being, moved by mere instinct, and could busy itself only with what immediately concerned the present time, with the one actual pleasure that stood before the imagination. But Christianity again recalled the memory of the abstract. "My kingdom is not of this world," says Our Lord.

Moreover, the introduction of new words into human intercourse is another sign of the re-awakening of the life of reflection. For, words are essentially the instruments by which man is able to seize and follow ideas of intangible things, the relations between things, their common qualities and differences, in one word, to obtain the myriad activity of the reflex intellectual life. Therefore, the new words introduced by Christianity are a living witness to what was accomplished by Christianity in the minds of men. Examples of such words can be found in almost every page of the New Testament, and they give to humanity a current of abstract and philosophic thought that has never been dried up. Not only are the dogmas of religious thoughts clothed in abstract thoughts, intelligible to the ordinary child, but from age to age, the people themselves have

taken delight in philosophic speculation. Of this, we have examples in the philosophic discourses so fashionable in the Oriental Empire from the sixth to the ninth centuries, when not only learned men, professing to be such, but the very barbers in the shops discussed the subtlest theological doctrines. Even the religious wars and disputes of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries testify to the popular interest in abstract doctrines—all this affording lively contrast with the exclusive and spasmodic interest taken in such things by the pagans.

Other prerogatives of the intellect as opposed to the mere workings of animal instinct are the appreciation of numbers, space and duration. Here also, Christianity showed its influence. Everywhere in Christian doctrine, and in Christian history, we find not merely one thing but many. The people are reminded again and again to meditate upon the works of the Lord, the sun, the stars, the birds of the air, and the fishes, to reflect upon the number of the angels that gather around the throne of God, to occupy themselves with the pursuit of all virtues, to contemplate in all things the workings of Divine Providence. In regard to space, Spain whose empire embracing the Indies and a great part of Europe astounded the world, England, upon whose lands the sun never sets, are merely local compared with the vastness of the Church. Geographical barriers were no barriers to Christianity. Even the

hindrances of racial sentiment and exclusiveness had to yield to its influence. For the Church has known how to blend itself with every kind of patriotism no matter how different—whether in France or Germany, England or Canada we find the religious element harmonising with the national feeling. This was never possible even in the proud Augustan age of Rome. For the Roman religion could only be embraced by those who had practically expatriated themselves. Even more, however, than the physical, is the invisible extension of the Church, embracing as she does the heavens above, and those who are purging away their faults in the penal rivers below. Thus, Christianity ever keeps before the mind the concepts of distance, vastness, expansion—which qualities are diametrically opposed to the local exclusiveness which is the accompaniment of mere animal instinct.

In regard to time, the promise of duration made to the Church in those words, “Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church,” is a direct reminder of something beyond the mere present. And the historic character of the Church also acts in the same way. The spectacle of one institution, with the memories, traditions and associations of all the ages, cannot but impress itself upon the imagination. Moreover, eternity is the constant refrain of the principles and the precepts of the Church. The chastisements as well as the rewards

that she holds out are eternal, while her expectation is for the final consummation, when the Church militant will be finally absorbed into the everlasting Church triumphant in Heaven.

Christianity, therefore, appealed to the intellect of the individual man and lifted him up from the animal condition into which he had fallen. And as we have seen, she appealed to his will by offering to his desires an entirely new object in which to place his true happiness, so she appealed also to his intellect and gave to it the activity that has never entirely slackened.

All this, however, would have been useless if man had been left merely to his own natural strength and resources. If such had been the case, mankind would have shown the same fatal weakness in regard to the doctrines of Christianity as he did in regard to those of the pagan philosophers. But not only faith, even experience, testifies that Christianity has given to man a certain mysterious force which enables him to practice her arduous precepts. The expansion of the Church in spite of fire and sword is a witness to this fact. The lives of holy people in all ages is another. No other institution can boast of having "Lives of the Saints". On turning over the pages of that book, we are confronted everywhere with the outward signs of supernatural force. Accounts of miracles, of persons lifted up in the air, of taming wild beasts

drinking poison without harm are, at least, evidence to the consciousness of that force. But there are other narratives which will appeal still more strongly to the sceptical mind. Where the Pythagorean cults failed, the monastic institutions succeeded. Men and women of all ranks, and conditions leave the world and deliberately pass their days in self-denial, and almost incredible mortification. Nor is the actual practice of virtue confined to those who profess a life of endeavour after perfection. Ordinary persons, living in the world, consistently exhibit a self-restraint and very often an heroic sanctity undreamt of by the pagans of antiquity. And what is still more remarkable is the presence of a certain latent force that enables Christian nations to revive and rehabilitate themselves when the classic pagan nations would inevitably have perished. Perhaps the condition of France, in the last century, was providentially permitted in order that it might be seen what in the hour of need could be done by that mysterious force. France, at that time, was, to use the somewhat exaggerated words of Edmund Burke, like a man in an epileptic fit trying to dash out his brains on the pavement, an object of pity and scorn to all the other nations. A dethroned king, a reckless and yet timid assembly, a powerful and lawless mob were evils enough, but, coupled with all this, was the apparent extinction of faith, reverence and virtue in the nation. The old aristocratic

families which with their grand traditions had been the soul of French society, had become physically or virtually extinct, vice had everywhere become rampant even in the high places, and disbelief had received its apotheosis, when the prostitute was worshipped on the high altar of Notre Dame by an adoring mob. And yet, France not only survived, but rejuvenated herself. Contrary to what Burke and many others had predicted, the French Revolution was not merely an act of destruction but really was a reformation. And in the course of a few years, she rose again with a new constitution and order of government. Nay, still more wonderful was it that the ecclesiastical organisation, once so corrupt in its high officials, again should reappear, purified, and again exerting its salutary influence over the minds of the people.

Thus, did Christianity give to the individual man not only ideas, but also a certain force which has from time to time asserted itself in marvellous ways.

Besides the rights of the individual man, there is another extra-state element, namely, the family, and this also was rehabilitated by Christianity. Up to the time of Christianity, marriage was substantially only a civil contract. The Roman ceremony of *confarreatio* was only one way of forming the connubial tie, and with the decadence of the pagan religion, even this ceased to have any effect.

From this, proceeded gradually the decay of the nature of the family itself. Complete union of the higher affections, indissolubility, perpetuity,—these were rendered generally impossible. In fact, the usual Roman form of marriage by which the woman was conveyed to the husband by purchase and sale, reduced the woman to the position of a chattel. Even in the palmiest days of Roman jurisprudence, the woman was not allowed to take that place of partnership to which she was entitled. The incapacity of the woman to communicate any rights of *agnation* and the perpetual tutelage of woman, sufficiently illustrate this inferior position of woman in the eyes of the Roman law. Naturally, when even the theoretic position of the woman made her inferior, her practical position became still more so. But Christianity remedied all this, by consecrating the marriage tie and raising it to the dignity of a sacrament. Perhaps, out of the many links in common between the society of the Church and the society of the State, there is none which affects both societies so equally and completely as the rite of marriage. Christianity by raising it to the dignity of a sacrament, made the conjugal union complete and perpetual in the fullest sense of the word. For the two souls become united together in regard to the highest part of their being, even in regard to their supernatural position and activities. Hence, the married couple are no longer

dependent upon the fleeting tie of physical union and love, but upon a sacramental form of divine charity which is of its nature eternal. Thus, where Christianity has flourished in its highest sense, the marriage tie has also been respected. But directly the influence of Christianity has begun to decline, then at once, there have entered all the evils of divorce, as has been illustrated even in our own times.

With the sanctity of the marriage tie, came also the elevation of the woman to that position to which she was entitled. In marriage, there are now found even more than the loftiest elements of immortal friendship ever dreamt of by Cicero, and therefore woman has become indeed the consort, not the slave of man. Whether as wife or as mother, she now fulfils all her important functions in the development of the human race. Her sympathy, her peculiar powers of contemplation and piety, her possession of the softer virtues contribute to human society that most necessary element called feminism—using the word in the highest sense. That feminism, which forms such a strong element in the best products of Latin civilisations, which is the very soul of the intuitive artistic perception, and which is the necessary counterbalance to the materialism of a hustling age.

Yet one other extra-state element must be noticed, and that is proprietorship. Before the state

ever existed, man could and did acquire property. But with the degradation of the state, came also the violation of this fundamental right of man. One of the essential conditions of acquiring wealth is labour. But it cannot be said that, in Roman times, labour was free. By far the greater part of labour was performed by slaves. This necessarily thrust aside the white labourer. And so while the vast estates "latefundi," were cultivated by hordes of slaves who received no wages, and were in no way connected with the soil on which they toiled, the streets of the Roman capital were congested with white labourers, free in name, but not free in regard to the birthright of every man not to be deprived unlawfully of the means of earning an honourable competency. Now, Christianity succeeded in restoring to the labourer his freedom, and it was precisely owing to Christianity that labour has been allowed to assert itself and to demand a fair share of what in pagan times had gone entirely to the capitalist. The partnership of capital and labour, like the partnership of husband and wife, is owing to Christianity. With the abolition of slavery, came also the right to own the land. The two things go together. And so, as Christianity spread itself over the world, we find everywhere rising the peasant proprietor, master of his labour and of the fruits of his labour. Nor is this all, but the dignity of labour has been enhanced by Christianity. Man has been taught how to find in

labour itself a secret compensation for his trials. What would be thought now-a-days if a few thousand workmen were to band together and say "We will work hard all the year round, we will till and plough the soil, erect houses and churches and we will not accept more than \$500 a year?" What would be thought of such abnegation? What a contagious example of moderate desires combined with the maximum of productiveness? Yet, spectacles of this kind were the order of the day in the Middle Ages, and are not wanting even in our own times. Thousands of monks have done this in the past, and the buildings and reclaimed lands of Mediæval Europe are a witness to this fact.

In another way also labour has been elevated. The work of the clerk and the artisan have been raised to the status of a profession. "Let every man abide in the same calling in which he is called," says St. Paul. And these very remarkable words are amply illustrative of those ages in which the influence of the Church has been strongest. They account for that stability, that contentment usually characterising the craftsman of the Middle Ages.

All this strengthening of the extra-state elements means the rehabilitation of society, as a whole. Individuals and families in their aggregate capacity form the state. What they are, that the state will be, and if they vanish, the state also vanishes.

But Christianity did even more than this. It acted directly on the state by strengthening the artificial ties that bind together its respective members.

The state, being a living organism, requires something that will give unity and harmony of action to its various members. As in the living human body, there is a principle that gives unity and harmony to the activity of the lungs, the brain, the heart and all the other parts, so it is with regard to society. There must be some function which gives unity of action to the many individuals comprising society. This function is performed by that particular element we call government. It is government that gives unity, order and therefore power to a nation. But on the other hand, there can be no government without authority on the one hand and obedience on the other. Not even a standing army by itself is sufficient to maintain a government in power. Not only, in the words of Burke, is any army dangerous to liberty, but an army is only a material force and no material force can accomplish that inevitable union and co-operation of minds and hearts that constitute society. Authority, therefore, and obedience must rest upon some other foundation.

Among the Greeks and the Romans, the pagan religion partly met this difficulty. Both Greek and Roman kings enjoyed a quasi-sacred character which impelled the people to give to them a willing

obedience. Also we have seen that the system of law both in Rome and Greece derived its sanction from religion. When however religion itself is false in many respects, and is void of any real supernatural activity, then the state authority rests upon an insecure foundation. Thus, in Greece the sovereign power fluctuated between the kings, the aristocracy and the masses, but nowhere could authority find a permanent hold. The early Greek kings, the nobles and the tyrants, and finally, even the assemblies of the people ceased to retain that authority which alone can command obedience. It might have been imagined that, at least, the well-nigh perfect democracy of Athens could have solved the problem, but, as history attests, even this failed in the hour of trial.

A similar failure attended the Roman system of government. Much might have been expected from the Roman senate which contained all that was best in Rome, the most experienced generals, judges, and ex-statesmen. Still more perhaps might have been expected from the ingenious systems of checks and balances that characterised the Roman constitution. When consuls, senate, and popular assemblies were mutually balanced in such a way that neither element could apparently exceed its powers it would seem that neither element could possibly abuse its power. Yet we know that such abuse took place. All these elements became hope-

lessly corrupt, and the "consensus ordinum" so much dreamed of by Cicero became an impossibility. The reforms of Sulla only demonstrated this fact. The early emperors were indeed obeyed, but only temporarily. Even in their case, the true basis of authority seems to have been wanting, and it needed only a Nero or a Caligula to show how vain is the hope of them that trust in princes, while the revolts of the Prætorian Guards also showed the futility of an authority resting merely upon the material force of arms.

If we turn to the East, among the Oriental people, we find the same incapacity to deal with the same problem. Despotism was the prevailing system. But government by one man is in reality the weakest of all governments. The few, and especially the many, can make some show of power against those who resist their ordinances. But the one man depends entirely upon himself and upon the consent of the people he governs. Thus, the history of the Oriental governments only illustrates the apt saying that government was but tyranny tempered by assassination. Or to use the words of de Maistre, the people, when tired of the excesses of their rulers could always say, "When we are tired we will cut off your head".

Christianity alone could solve this problem, and it has done so successfully by placing the authority of the state on a true and proper basis.

"All power is from God." This single sentence of St. Paul went to the very core of the difficulty. The democracy of Greece, the despotism of Persia, the oligarchy of Rome had failed, because these governments were purely human. Christianity, on the other hand, taught that no man, as such, could command another, that all authority comes from God alone. Yet no particular form of government was patronised. Society was still left the choice of election. Whether the subject of that choice be a monarchy or a republic it matters not; provided it be there, then the divine sanction descends upon it and imparts a dignity which commands reverence and respect. When Pope Leo XIII. told the French bishops that the practice of the Holy See was to recognise governments *de facto*, he was but stating explicitly in the twentieth century what the Apostle Paul had already announced in the first.

When authority is conferred on the one side, then obedience becomes possible on the other. Not an obedience extracted by armed force, but an obedience granted by free will. It is the same kind of obedience as that which was yielded by the Spartans before the battle of Thermopylæ, when they declared that they would die for their country and its laws. Only, that the obedience rendered by Christian subjects is a constant factor, and is based upon the abiding persuasion that authority comes from God.

In another way, also, did Christianity strengthen the authority of the state, and that was by the example of its own hierarchy. The obedience rendered by the faithful is entirely voluntary. Any moment a person may say, "I will now no longer obey". And yet no punishment would follow. And it is precisely this freedom of subjection, this reverence for invisible authority that, in the early part of the Middle Ages, permeated society and accustomed society to give the same obedience also to their earthly superiors. And the necessity of this obedience was also enforced by the fact, that the Church constantly reminded the faithful that the sacred nature of obedience extended to them in their capacity even as ordinary citizens.

Reading the history of the Middle Ages, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the Church was mainly instrumental in upholding the authority of the state. Church and State, at that time, were regarded as one society, and, therefore the state enjoyed a great deal of that prestige and obedience that was enjoyed by the ecclesiastical authorities. Both directly indeed, and indirectly, did the Church maintain the task of government during the Middle Ages. Directly, as when during the darkest period of Italian history, the bishops administered the laws in the cities and in the surrounding territory, indirectly, by clothing the temporal ruler with the garb of religious authority. Quite a true meaning there-

fore can be given to the words of Innocent III., who justly says as follows: "God has set two dynasties in the firmament of the Church, the greater to rule by day, that is to say, souls, the lesser to rule the night, that is the bodies. These dignities are the papal authority and the royal power. And just as the moon gets her light from the sun, so the royal power gets the splendour of its dignity from the papal authority." It was in conformity with these words that every king of the Romans, before being made emperor, had to receive the sanction of the Pope, while until a later period of mediæval history, it was the practice of the king to go to Rome to be crowned. Nor was this the case only with the emperor. In France, the Frankish kings were visited with a certain sacred character owing to their being consecrated with the oil from "*Ampulla Rhemensis*," while it is well known that the house of Charlemagne could not assert the nominal and legal sovereignty of France until the Pope Zacharius favoured the claims of the king of Pippin. Again, with regard to the kingdom of Hungary, the words of Pope Sylvester eloquently attest the actual condition of affairs: "Now, therefore, glorious son, by the authority of the omnipotent God and of St. Peter, the Prince of Apostles, we freely grant, concede and bestow with an apostolic benediction all that you have sought from us and the Apostolic See, namely the royal crown and name; moreover

we receive under the protection of the holy Church the Kingdom of Hungary together with yourself and your people the Hungarian nation". And such protection was not merely so in name. For at least, the people living in those times had a very sensible fear of the thunders of the excommunication and interdict of the Church.

Turning to the history of England, we find that the Church not only protected the government in the way we have been describing but even took an active share in the organisation of the government. As Green, in the *History of the English People*, remarks, the spiritual supremacy of the primate at Canterbury prepared men's minds for one temporal overlord, the ecclesiastical councils prepared the way for the national legislative gatherings, dioceses became kingdoms, and the monarchy of laymen, priests and bishops and primate set the model for the temporal hierarchy of the state.

Thus, everywhere throughout Europe, we find Christianity as the main basis of the temporal power. And yet at the same time it became a check upon the exercise of that very power. When the German emperors tried to exceed the limits of their jurisdiction, then the popes sternly reminded them that they were not despots but held only a limited authority for which they would have to give an account. This function of the papacy is again clearly brought out in the words of Pope Gregory VII. to the

Bishop of Metz, "Since it belongs to our office to admonish and to encourage as befits the special rank and dignity which he enjoys, we endeavour by God's grace to implant in emperors and kings the virtue of humility, let kings and princes fear lest the more they exult in their sway over men in this life, the more they will be subjected to eternal fires ; if it be no slight task for any devout soul in a private station to guard his single soul, how much labour devolves upon them who rule over thousands of souls?" If we now recall to mind how strong a factor in the political life of those times was the personal character of potentates, we shall readily understand what a strong restraining influence was the authority of the Church. Also, in English history, there are many examples of the way in which the Church by her direct action restrained the tyranny of the Angevin rulers. It was the Catholic Archbishop Stephen Langton that took a prominent part in the obtainment of the Magna Charta, while the final overthrow of King John was chiefly owing to the action of the Pope, who deposed the king and invited the king of France to amend the condition of the kingdom.

The same restraining activity also exerted itself in order to mitigate some of the harsher features of feudalism. Owing to the Church, the serf could never become reduced to the pitiable condition of the slaves in pagan times. His personal dignity

and rights were, on the whole, faithfully respected. Landowners were encouraged by the Church to emancipate their serfs, while the fact that even a serf could enter holy orders continually upheld, at least, the principle of equality. Yet one other way remains to be mentioned by which the Church was able to mitigate the despotic tendencies and to curb the wayward passions of temporal rulers. That was the confessional. However powerful and proud a prince might be, whatever the fear he might inspire in those around him, yet there was one person before whom he himself had to bend his knee and make humble confession of his faults. Even setting aside the nature of that voluntary act of self-abasement and humiliation, the mere searching into one's own conscience, and the hearkening to the advice of another, must have exercised a most salutary effect. The royal confessor played a very important part in the history of Europe. First the mendicant friar, and then afterwards in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Jesuits played a conspicuous part in the written annals of the times.

Such then was the action of the Church upon society in the Middle Ages. It both gave authority and acted as a check upon that very authority. During those times, the art of government was as yet in its infancy. Men were still living, as it were, from hand to mouth, and only later theorists could

devise that ingenious contrivance of checks and balances and counterpoises adequate to secure the easy and harmonious working of the political machinery. It cannot be denied that sometimes there were difficulties and frictions. It not unfrequently happened that the State being too jealous of its own prerogatives, attempted to encroach upon the sphere of the activity of the Church. The latter, however, while adopting a conciliatory attitude, resolutely defended its intrinsic rights. This fact is clearly brought out in the following documentary evidence. As early as 494, Pope Gelasius wrote to Emperor Theodosius, "if, therefore, the ministers of religion obey your laws in everything that concerns the temporal order, because they know that your power comes from God, tell me with what love should you not render obedience to the dispensations of the holy ministers?" What was this but an admission that the two societies of Church and State are distinct from each other, and that while the civil power should submit itself to priests in all things concerning the spiritual order, so the priest should, in things purely temporal, submit himself to the civil power? Again, in 592, Pope Gregory the Great even went so far as to consent to the publication of an order from the Emperor Mauritius though apparently hostile to the interests of the Church, at the same time, however, asking the emperor to revoke the law. What afterwards produced the confused notion of the

identity of Church and State was feudalism, a condition of society in which the same man so often appeared clothed with double authority, ecclesiastical and lay ; but even against this error the popes successfully fought, eventually eliminating the feudal element from the ecclesiastical system. In the main, the action of the Church upon society in the Middle Ages was indispensable ; it upheld authority and at the same time, it acted as a restraint upon that authority.

Turning to the more modern period, we find the state still leaning to a considerable extent upon the Church. Here, however, we find a change. The state no longer content to receive support from the sanction of ecclesiastical authority, tries to render itself despotic and tyrannical even by that very authority.

In England, as is well known, both Henry VIII. and Elizabeth endeavoured to make their power stronger by reducing the Church to a mere state institution. Evidently, under such circumstances, the chief usefulness of the Church would vanish. If it be only a state institution, then the Church is no longer an independent spiritual power, and, therefore, is no longer capable of restraining the actions of government. In fact, after the time of Henry VIII., the Anglican Church has often been merely an instrument in the hands of the royal power, exercising no outside restraining power. The same thing was

actually accomplished by Peter of Russia when he made himself head of the Greek Church in Russia. In France, also, under Louis XIV. a similar attempt was made to reduce the Church into a condition of vassalage, and dependence upon the state, for such, indeed was the actual drift of the Gallican propositions, afterwards revoked and retracted. In still later times, Napoleon also attempted the same policy, first trying to effect the civil transformation of the clergy, and then making the Church a mere instrument of personal government. The organic articles, the Commission of Cardinal Tesch, the imprisonment of the Pope at Savona, were all steps in the same direction. While Napoleon was perfectly willing to use the Church as a means of ascending to power, esteeming, in his own words, the Pope's help as equivalent to the presence of so many more battalions, he had no scruples in attacking the spiritual rights of the Church, when they stood in the way of his despotic authority. It was indeed strange to see that Napoleon failed to recognise that the support of the Church could be of real value only in so far as she was free. Indeed, only so long as she is independent, can she safely dictate to the minds and consciences of men.

In Germany, also, we find the same tendencies of the state to lean upon the support of the Church. Loud indeed were the complaints in Prussia when the dogma of papal infallibility was declared. Even

responsible statesmen erroneously feared that this apparent extension of the Church's spiritual power might have the effect of prejudicing the temporal power in Germany. Dr. Döllinger, leader of the old Catholic party in Germany, remarked on the proposed dogma, "In this Vatican Council new doctrines of faith, of a character likely to arouse the profoundest amity with regard to ecclesiastical policy will be laid down. . . . If the infallibility of the Pope, for instance, is elevated into a dogma, then the celebrated bull, 'Unam Sanctam' is *eo ipso regula fidei*, and therewith the complete authority of the Pope in things temporal and politics is stamped, once and for all, as a divinely communicated dogma, which must consequently be taught henceforth in the Catechism, in the Confessional, and in every pulpit and choir." Even Count Beust, the famous Austrian statesman, though expressing confidence that the Catholic bishops in the Council would speak according to the practical knowledge which they have of the necessities of the age, yet, in a despatch to the Austrian minister in Bavaria, says, "Should the convoked council hereafter actually proceed to intrude upon the domain of state authority . . . then in the opinion of the imperial and royal government, the possibility would certainly not be excluded, that concordantly with the defensive and dissuasive action of the separate states, a joint conciliation of the Cabinets, with a

view to the united defence of the sovereign rights of the state, might prove to be necessary or advantageous". These and other quotations that might be cited, show very clearly the ill-grounded fear that the definition of the dogma would mean an interference with the state's authority, and betrays an extreme jealousy of the ecclesiastical power in Austria.

It was in pursuance with this same spirit that some years later were passed the famous May Laws. These laws attempted to destroy, as far as possible, the independent spiritual jurisdiction of the Church, to cut off the hierarchical subordination of bishops upon the Pope, and, practically, to reduce the Church to the position of a mere official organ of the state. In fact, Bismarck openly avowed that the German Empire could not really be one unless the Church were nationalised. Here again, we see the same policy as that adopted by Henry VIII. and partially so by Louis XIV., that of strengthening the position of the temporal power by crippling the spiritual power of the Church. And yet, what were the consequences? Only a short time elapsed before Bismarck had to reverse his policy. For, the growing insolence and dangerous attacks of the Socialists compelled him to seek the support of that very Church whose power he had so much dreaded. A reconciliation was again effected between Church and State, while the Cen-

tral Catholic Party under Windhorst became the strongest champion of the cause of the government. Thus, the very independence of the Church enabled it to assume its old rôle of supporter of the temporal power. Nor has Germany departed from this policy. Only recently, the moral influence of the Church has been found useful in forwarding Germany's expansion in the East, and the support of the papacy is one of the most valuable assets in the defensive war waged against socialistic doctrines in Germany.

Even in American politics, we find sometimes, on the part of the Government, a tendency to use the influence of the Church in order to strengthen its position. One of the first things done by the American Government after the acquisition of the Philippines from the Spaniards was to seek to win over the allegiance of the people by the influence of the Church. It was said that one of the chief causes of trouble and friction was the desire of the Americans that an American hierarchy of bishops and priests should be introduced among the Philippines. Negotiations, however, were carried on for some time between the Vatican and the American Government, and among the clauses of compromise was one that declared that, little by little, ecclesiastics of other nationalities, especially American, should be introduced. Not that thereby the Church would be sanctioning and upholding the temporal authority of

the American Government in the same way that it had upheld state authority during the Middle Ages ; but the circumstances show that indirectly and more subtly, the Church was useful in upholding the temporal authority.

On examining closely the relations between religion and the state as they are in our own times, we find, in many cases, a tendency on the part of the State and Church to sever that close connection that had been so conspicuous during the Middle Ages. Not only is the old idea discarded that Church and State are one society, but even the more modern connection between Church and State is being dissolved. In other words, State Churches are beginning to be a thing of the past. In America, it would indeed be incorrect to say that the State takes no account at all of the Church, for the existence of God is officially recognised and the American Government is favourable to any form of religion that is not subversive of public order. But there is no official Church. In France, the separation between Church and State is already an accomplished fact. In Spain and Italy, there have been partial agitations in favour of such a separation. Although only evil can come to a godless state without religion, yet such movements show that the distinction between the two societies of Church and State is more clearly recognised than ever before. At the same time, it also shows the

supernatural nature of the Christian religion. Such a separation between Church and State in pagan Greece and Rome would have been impossible, for the simple reason that the theocratic society pure and simple was not yet in existence.

Far otherwise is it with the relations between Church and State. When the new Barbarian kingdoms were being formed, when systems of government were as yet inchoate, when brute force everywhere prevailed, then the state was taken under the special protection of the religious element, or, to use a figure of speech to be taken only in a limited sense, the state still lay within the womb of the Church. Now, however, the state is able with greater safety to proceed forward even with its own strength.

It would, however, be absolutely untrue to say that therefore the influence of religion upon the state has become altogether weakened. Rather, the opposite. The religious element acts more strongly than ever upon the individuals of society. Government institutions, and politics are now indeed being left alone by the Church. But the all-important modern question is who are the men that work these institutions, and modern experience testifies that such men are, at least in Anglo-Saxon countries, men who are animated by a general spirit of justice and fair play. The religious element is perhaps even stronger than before, since it acts in more fundamental ways upon the individual and

the family and so is able to act more freely and more boldly. The frequent appeals to justice made in modern legislative assemblies, the attempt to curb such national vices as intemperance and slavery, the efforts to ameliorate the condition of the poor and to secure fair wages, all show that the statesmen of our own times are, for the most part, under the influence of the religious element. That the present system works well is the opinion even of Pope Pius X. who, only lately, has commented upon the happy results of separation of Church and State in the United States.

EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL INTERCOURSE.

A NATION is a collection of persons. It has an intellect, a will, a conscience, an emotional apparatus of its own. It has even certain modes of expression entirely proper to its peculiar character. And this collective person is distinct from the individual persons that make or comprise the nation. We may imagine for example that nine persons in a room suddenly agree to form themselves into a society. Immediately there would then be not merely nine persons but ten, the additional person evolved into being by the social action of the nine individuals. Such is precisely the case with nations. Obviously, only one thing is lacking and that is some one particular object to which it is possible to point and say "there is the collective person". But apart from this, all the attributes of personality are there.

Among the attributes of personality, is that of being modified for better or for worse by contact with other surrounding persons. As a matter of fact, persons are amenable to the same fundamental

laws that govern the perfection or decay of all other substances. In nature, there is constantly going on the struggle for existence, and yet there is an absolute dependence of one substance upon another. Change of climate, substitution of one environment for another, accidental propinquity of different species, transmission of certain qualities from generation to generation, power of perfectibility and a constant struggle for existence are precisely what mainly constitute the peculiar character and individuality of plants and animals. And the same phenomena shows itself in the history of nations.

Invariably, it happens that persons living in warm climates have quite different characteristics from those living in colder climates. They are more impulsive and emotional. According to some writers, they run through their course of development more quickly, and are more particularly adapted for monarchical forms of Government. Oriental nations, for example, notwithstanding diversity of origin, are everywhere more or less ill-adapted to a full enjoyment of representative institutions. And this influence of climate is shown after a few years of migration. For example, the Britisher in Australia exhibits quite different traits from the Britisher in Canada, and only two hundred years have been sufficient to give to the inhabitants of the United States a peculiar *ensemble* of qualities that distinguish the Yankee at once from other

national types. Physiognomy, race, manner, way of viewing things, artistic appreciation, literary style, even sports—all these now have a peculiar impress of their own.

Of even greater importance is the accidental propinquity of a nation with another. The next-door neighbour is a most powerful factor in the life of a single individual and he is not less so in the case of nations. History continually shows how national propinquity has substantially affected the internal condition of nations. Without Persia, where would have been the greatness of Athens, where the Imperial Conference of Delos ; without the tyrannical aggression of Athens, where would have been the chance of Sparta being able to play the rôle of defender of oppressed states? In Italy, it was Carthage that by its emulating presence induced Italy to adopt an Imperial policy that afterwards affected so profoundly the character and happiness of Roman civilisation. In Mediæval Europe, we find feudalism rising owing to the aggressive presence of the Slavs, the Wends and the Magyars and other fiercely attacking tribes. And in our Modern Europe, Germany became a military nation owing to the presence around her of neighbours animated by anything but neighbourly affections. Accidental propinquity of nations, therefore, perhaps more than any other external circumstance, exercises influence upon the character of nations.

Transmission of national qualities from generation to generation is another important factor. Owing to its subtle nature, this transmission has, till recently, eluded the search of students of political science. Yet that the thing is actually there, facts show most demonstrably. No nation changes its entire character with every succeeding generation. Collective qualities are continually perpetuated but with very important variations. As in the lives of individuals, we find certain qualities disappearing for a while, skipping one or two generations and then reappearing, so also with nations. For example, at present, the Englishman is supposed to be cold and phlegmatic ; in the words of Emerson, "he is quite a little island in himself". Yet this was certainly not true some years back. In Elizabethan times, during the period when English character was coming out with exceptionally strong characteristics of its own, we find Walter Raleigh impulsively throwing his cloak into the mud, and Spenser and Shakespeare not only not betraying in themselves that cold reserve and unemotionalism, now talked of, but constantly introducing into their English characters just the very opposite qualities. On the other hand, there is some evidence in support of the criticism made by Emerson and others, regarding the present want of emotionalism on the part of the English. In like manner, we see a transmission of qualities with variations in different European countries. The

Prussian military character, partly owing to this transmission, partly to outward circumstances, has become almost purely military ; at least, most of its virtues and defects are of the military type.

Struggle for existence is again another very important element in the contest between nation and nation. The continual wars, that appear on the pages of history, testify to the perpetuity of this struggle, from the times of the military Roman classes in Italy, down to the struggle between the English and the Boers. Nations are like plants and members of the animal world. They have only a limited environment in which to live. The favoured spots are few, and in reality the struggle between nations is only a counterpart of the struggle between the brute animals striving to procure the means of subsistence from things which are limited in quantity. It is from this circumstance that nearly all the wars fought in Europe from the fifteenth century down to our own times have been wars for the open market. The Seven Years' War between England and France on the battlefields of Canada and India, was fought out mainly on the question as to who should acquire the rich and productive lands of these countries and enjoy the products thereof. Even in our own times, the struggle between Japan and Corea, the misunderstanding between the United States and Japan, and the growing mutual distrust between England and Germany, are chiefly owing

to the struggle for productive lands, to the need of finding some outlet for an ever-increasing and redundant population.

Such then are the various ways in which nations come into contact with one another. And we can see at once how important a factor for weal or for woe must be this international contact. Not that nations rise or fall exclusively owing to this circumstance. For the internal spirit and condition of the nation must also be taken into account. The two elements, however, work hand in hand, one forming the propelling or driving force, the other constituting the dirigible force.

Having pointed out, quite in general, how nations may and do affect one another, it remains to be seen how far this mutual intercourse is beneficial. How does it affect the progress or decay of nations? And especially in what way does this element in our own time affect the well-being of nations.

In the first place, it is a very remarkable fact that when a nation is exclusive, shut up within itself, there, at once, sets in a period of sterility, a period of stagnation which may eventually prove disastrous. This was the case with Sparta. Owing to the geographical barriers by which she was surrounded, owing to the immediate necessity of maintaining the nation always in the highest standard of military efficiency, she found neither opportunity nor inclination to admit any foreign influence. The

result was stagnation. Sparta fell into the category of stationary nations, at least in the partial sense of the word. India, and until recently, China and Japan afford further instances of such effects produced by isolation. It was only by the introduction of the foreign element that China became awakened from lethargy and stimulated to walk in the path of progress. Spain also furnishes another illustration. During the last four years, distinguished writers of that country have been pointing out certain evils and have been trying to diagnose the cause of those evils. Picavea, in his *El Problem Nacional*, speaks of the individualism of the Spaniard, of the constant seditions and outbreaks in Spain, of the big array of pronounciamentos, and especially of the anti-social attitude of the Spaniard, which induces him to confine his attention only to the minor circle of friends and acquaintances, in which he passes his day. Other writers again, like Unanimo and Ganuet, complain of the narrowness of Spanish ideas. Both of those men, brilliant writers and apparently sympathetic writers, seem to think that this and other ills of Spain are owing to her lack of receptivity to moral influences. In previous times, both Christian and Moor multiplied their points of contact with the outer-world. If we may put into concrete form Herbert Spencer's definition of life, Spain had much national life because she had opened up correspond-

ence with a wide environment. When, however, Spain ceased to correspond with a wide environment, then there began to appear symptoms of decay, that fearful national miasma which, for some time, reduced Spain to a low place in the scale of European nations.

England, according to some writers, is also suffering from the same complaint. Already we have quoted Emerson's criticism of her insularity. And we might also have mentioned that peculiar contempt of things foreign that characterises the modern Englishman, his comparative unwillingness to learn foreign languages, and especially his slowness in becoming acquainted with the ideas and customs of other countries. Possibly, this may be partly owing to his big oriental empire. For many who used formerly to make the European tour part of their education now prefer to visit the East. Certain symptoms, however, are very obvious,—her slowness in following the example of her neighbours as, for example, in such matters as Protection instead of Free Trade, of adopting some modified system of military conscription, and finally allowing herself to be outwitted and excelled by superior German methods of trade and commerce.

It is contact with other nations that imparts to the individual state an active and healthy life. Even in the animal kingdom, a species confined to itself will degenerate into one common variety of

no superior excellence. Cross-breeding and coming into contact with other animal life, alone produce superior results and real developement. Cross-breeding especially is as necessary for the national as for the purely animal life. The tribes that prospered most in Greek history were precisely those that were most composite in character, and that were most susceptible to foreign influence. In Italy, it required the triple combination of the Latin with the Greek tradition and sentiment, the Etruscan with their advanced intellectualism and religious ceremonial, the Sabine with its strong ruggedness to produce the Roman character, that admirable blend of all three elements. When Christianity came into the world, Europe teemed with the offspring of strong herculean nations combining within themselves the Roman element with its glorious traditions, and the Barbarian element with its strength and simplicity. England owes her character to the Danes, the Anglo-Saxons, the Celts and the Normans. France, up to a few years ago, contained both the Romantic and Teutonic elements. And, according to some, her decadence is attributable to the fact that the Teutonic element is dying out, leaving only the Bétise element. Finally, America at the present seethes with intense national life owing to the cataracts of English, Irish, Swedes, and Italians that are poured into the same territory year after year.

Even, from this point of view alone, it would seem necessary that a nation should for the sake of its own welfare beware of standing alone. But mutual intercourse is also necessary from another point of view. Wideness of mental vision, power of advancing in the life of reflection and philosophical observation, can only be obtained by mutual intercourse. Here again, nations have been made mutually dependent upon one another, but the good is not so unmixed as in the previous case. For every nation has its own intellectual defects, and it is just possible that these, as well as the good qualities, may be assimilated. Under such circumstances, these defects meet the fate of microbes when admitted to the human body. That is to say, if the body is in a decadent condition, then disastrous effects may follow. Such was typically the case in the contact between Greek and Roman intellectual life. Though Rome owed so much to Greece in regard to philosophy and poetry, yet the introduction of Greek sophistry and of Greek moral insincerity combined fatally with the decline that had already taken place in the Roman character. Usually, however, the influence is beneficial.

What conversation is to individual persons, namely, a stimulus and a material for thought, that, international contact is to a nation. What would English literature be without its indebtedness to the foreign element? The greater part of English poetry from

Chaucer to Spenser was either a translation of French metrical Romances, or at least, written directly after the style of the Troubadours and Trouveres. Milton, it is admitted, owed much to his acquaintance with Italy and her literary writers, while Shakespeare had borrowed largely not only from the early British sources, but also from first-hand information of foreign countries and their ways. Especially is this so in regard to Italy. Shakespeare's intimate knowledge of her water-ways showing that he must have made a practical acquaintance of that country. Then, besides local colour, there is also that peculiar Italian element which shows itself in his portrayal of certain characters.

If we now look at the converse side of the picture, how much has France owed to England for her literature! Voltaire during his two years' residence in England made acquaintance with Shakespeare's plays and borrowed largely from him. In fact, he himself admitted that Brutus and Semiramis were taken from Shakespeare. The encyclopædists, d'Alembert and Diderot, were only imitating Chambers' Encyclopædia, Condillac carefully walked in the footpaths of Locke and Hobbes, and, Montesquieu, as is well known, made an exclusive study of the English Constitution. Chateaubriand had studied for a long time the works of Shakespeare, Milton and Ossian. Comte, in his *Traité d'Économie Publique Politique*, was a

sedulous expounder of Adam Smith's views with certain additions and modifications of his own, while Michelet and Taine had both evidently fallen under the influence of Carlyle.

Moreover, the interesting point is that the more different are two nations, the more they have to gain by such intellectual exchange of ideas. The one supplies the deficiencies of the other. So that, if one nation has already progressed beyond the other, then the inferior nation is stimulated to make quicker strides on the road of progress.

Another phenomenon in connection with this mutual intercourse has to be noted, and that is the tendency of civilisation to travel in certain directions, moving in certain lines from one nation to another. Hitherto, the general movement has proceeded from East to West. The nations of Europe have been like a row of balls in the same line, the impetus to one being communicated to the other, each ball becoming an instrument of transmission.

Assyria, Babylonia, Media, Persia, and Phœnicia were the greatest civilised nations in the dawn of European history. And out of these, the Phœnicians transmitted the movement of progress in a westerly direction. Their possession of rich timber lands, and the ability of their merchants and seamen, their skill in exploring the natural resources of the countries they visited, and the skill of their engineers and craftsmen made Phœnicia the great

moral and commercial power of the world. Incidentally, she also fulfilled a glorious mission. Everywhere she visited, she disseminated the culture of Eastern civilisation. Not only the knowledge of the alphabet, but the knowledge of the arts and handicrafts was conveyed to the rude tribes living on the shore of the Aegean and the Mediterranean. Athens, perhaps, more than any other nation inherited the power which fell from the hands of the Phœnicians. Besides maritime prowess, a successful democracy, superiority in arts and philosophy, all those fell to her share. Then came the rivalry between Rome and Carthage. Rome was successful and not only gave to the Western world some of the traditions she had received from conquered Greece, but also added thereto priceless gifts of her own, especially the tradition of character and the boon of her matchless jurisprudence. Later on, by one of those backward movements apparently visible even when the tide is advancing, Constantinople became the heir to Rome's intellectual and material greatness. By subtlety of thought, by her originality of design and architecture, Constantinople also added of her own to what she had received and was going to transmit to others. Afterwards, the East again gave an impulsive forward movement of civilisation. For, wherever they went, the Arabians carried with them the wonderful fertility and originality of

Greek thought. Arabian libraries and universities became the resorts of the most ardent scholars of Europe. Medicine, chemistry, philosophy, mathematics—all these received a powerful impetus from the invasions of the Arabians.

But by the tenth and the eleventh centuries, the wave of progress again took for its starting-point the shores of Italy. Genoa, Pisa and Amalfi, during the crusades, grew rapidly in importance and prestige, and their sailors brought even to the shores of England, not only spices from the East but also the most recent efforts in culture and learning. Venice, especially, acquired the greater part of the carrying trade of the world, the produce of the East being brought first to her and thence conveyed up the waters of the Danube and the Rhine. It was in this way that Venice delivered to the hands of Germany the lighted torch she had received from the East. Such towns as Bremen, Hamburg, Bruges and Ghent quickly acquired not only the same commercial prosperity but also the same intellectual fervid activity that had pervaded the Italian towns, only that the Germans added to the treasure they had received, something of their own thoroughness and profundity of thought.

After this, there again appeared in succession the ascendancy of Spain, of Holland and of France, to be followed by the more enduring greatness of the

English Empire. This was no doubt partly owing to such fortunate combination of circumstances as the discovery of the route around the Cape of Good Hope, and the discovery of America, which shifted the centre of commerce and international interest from the Mediterranean to the wide ocean waters. At the same time, this success was partly owing to the peculiar genius of the English people themselves who showed an extraordinary power of sympathy with the peoples whom they governed.

Still onwards, the wave of progress pursued its westerly course. Until, by the eighteenth century, America received from England and made her own the heritage of power and learning that England herself had received from the more easterly nations. In less perhaps than fifty years, the wave of progress had traversed the whole of the mighty continent and even the Oriental nations awakened by its touch are rising from the slumber with results that at present can hardly be foreseen.

Taking a general view of this mighty movement of civilisation, one can easily see its general course and direction. The line it has followed lies from east to west. Not an absolutely straight line, however, but rather spiral shaped, the forward movement sometimes appearing to take a backward direction. Nor again has this progress been purely mechanical, each nation in turn merely being affected by movement. For, each successive link of

the chain has contributed something of its own to the character of the advancing movement. Thus, the Greeks not only adopted some of the best elements of Phœnician civilisation but added also some of their own native genius, namely, that subtlety of thought and visionary power so essentially Grecian. Rome again, while borrowing from her eastern neighbour, imparted to Greek thought and culture the tradition of character and power of practical systematisation which showed itself so admirably in her jurisprudence. Then again, in more modern times, the Arabians, the Italians, the Germans, the French, the English, all contributed to the common stock. So that the progressive movement has accumulated and every nation is indebted more or less to its neighbours. Unconsciously, by means of secret influences, known only to Divine Providence, the mutual interaction of state and state has been the chief instrument in forming the civilisation such as we see it at the present day.

Nevertheless, in spite of this co-operation, there has always been manifest a certain law of antagonism prevailing among nations. Even, throughout nature herself, there goes on a continual warfare, a chronic condition of mutual antagonism, from which, however, there emerges a more perfect world than if there had been no struggle. The world is only a limited being, and therefore some goods can only be enjoyed at the expense of a certain amount of evil.

Without the pangs of hunger, where would be the enjoyment of the meal, without occasional feelings of sickness where would be the consciousness of the blessings of health, without toil and ardent emulation where would be the pleasure of winning the prize? And so even that very antagonism which we see in nature has its own beneficial results by weeding out our weak useless species, and bracing up the energies of the strong. The very instinct to continue one's self-existence impels creatures unconsciously to adopt an attitude often mutually hostile.

Nations are no exception to this general rule. History is full of wars. No state has ever seemed to be exempt from them. But such wars, however disastrous, are in the long run, as we hope to show, provocative of much tangible good.

There is little doubt that the chief cause of war is the natural and inevitable struggle for existence. Mere racial differences have not been a sufficient cause, though they may seem to have accentuated other causes already existing. Material goods are limited in number, and when two nations both desire to possess the same goods, strife must arise. Naturally much will depend upon geographical conditions. Certain nations that possess frontiers capable of expansion and which, as it were, invite expansion, cannot avoid following their natural vocation. Phœnicia, bordered on the one hand by

vast timber lands, and on the other by the sea, naturally had no other alternative but to cut down the timber, make ships and scour the seas. Athens, possessed of her excellent harbour, and immediately opposite the inviting coast lands of Asia Minor, was instinctively impelled to take to the sea and to establish colonies along the isles of the Aegean Sea and the coast lands of Asia Minor. The mountains of Italy, and the island of Sicily half-way between Italy and Africa, resulted in the Roman conquest of Italy and of Africa. In Mediæval History, Venice with her sea waterway and half-way position between the East and the West, was likewise impelled to become a sea force, and a coloniser as well, establishing settlements all over the Eastern part of the Mediterranean. England, owing to her insular position and the new ocean trade routes, also found mapped out for her a similar destiny.

If any nation would seem exempt from this law of expansion, the United States would seem to be that nation. The vastness of her territory even as compared with her increasing population, would seem to make her self-sufficing. Moreover, the political tradition established by the Monroe doctrine had almost created a prejudice against any movement in the direction of further territorial acquisition. But circumstances have all along been too strong. In spite of the fact that at the last presidential election, both political parties were opposed to an imperialistic

policy, in spite, therefore, of the evident inclination of the great majority in the states, we find the same impulse which had pushed the Americans across the great North Western plain, across the Rockies, and down the Pacific slope has likewise driven them to seize hold of other lands. Cuba, the Philippines, the Isthmus of Panama are already under their control, and an ominous interest has already been aroused in regard to certain territories in China.

How much stronger then must be this expansion when immediate necessity forces a nation to find some outlet for its overgrowing population? It is well known, for example, that the population of Germany is increasing by leaps and bounds. According to statistics, her population augments by 900,000 every year. Before long, Germany will be physically incapable of finding food for her own inhabitants. Instincts of preservation are compelling Germany to become a colonial power, and thus in South Africa and Persia, German colonial expansion is already beginning to collide with England's pre-established influence. China is in a similar position. It is her overflow of population that compels her people to migrate to the eastern shores of the Pacific, and especially to seek a foothold in the inviting lands of Australia. Japan also in her struggle for Corea, was impelled by circumstances arising from the inability of her territories

to satisfy the wants of an ever-growing population.

Geographical circumstances, therefore, compel most nations to adopt a policy of expansion. Only a few nations are the exception. Sparta, for example, owing to its mountain barriers was practically delivered from such a policy. Switzerland again is hemmed in by its mountain valleys, and, a few countries, like Belgium, owe their existence mainly to an understanding among the Great Powers, and can hardly be considered subject to the same material laws that affect ordinary nations.

It remains now to be seen what are the effects of this struggle for existence, and whether, on the whole, they are beneficial. Obviously, the unfit nations go to the wall. A people that is behind-hand, stationary, unprogressive, not on the *qui vive* to follow all the latest improvements and inventions, will inevitably go to the wall. As the weaker plants and animals are exterminated in the great struggle for existence, so it is with nations. Many instances might be quoted from both ancient and modern history, illustrating this process of elimination. But several very important distinctions have to be made.

Sometimes it has happened that nations thus practically eliminated, have arrived at the last stage decadence, that, having been in succession powerful and rich, they have limited their aims and

ambitions to the acquisition of physical pleasures. Individualism in its worst sense then reigns supreme. Patriotism ceases to exist. The very will to co-operate to a common end is wanting, and thus the state, as a whole, is ready to fall at the very first shock. Such, for example, was the condition of the Roman Empire in the times preceding the invasions of the Barbarians. Decay of mind and of body go hand in hand, for the body is an instrument of thought. When therefore the body begins to become weakened, owing to the absence of that which imparts strong and hardy impulses, the intellect also declines and with this comes also the weakening of the will. Undoubtedly, it was owing to a recognition of this truth that the Spartans insisted so much on physical strength, and that the Gauls punished severely those who became corpulent beyond a certain point, and that even modern nations pay attention to the physical training of the citizens. It is not merely a question of forming strong soldiers, but of seeking a preventive against the decadence of the intellect and of the will.

Peoples that have once fallen a prey to that state of degradation, when both the physical and the intellectual elements are deteriorated, become completely submerged by any wave of foreign invasion, and in ancient times, the result of such invasion meant slavery in the worst sense of the term. For

the nations that descend like a scourge of God upon a degraded people are often moved by a secret feeling of indignation, and also by a sense of superiority towards those whom they make the object of their attacks, while on the other hand the victims themselves have not the wish to become free, or even the ability to use their freedom even if granted. From this point of view alone, the extraordinary prevalence of slavery, in its lowest forms, illustrates the general degradation of humanity in the times immediately preceding the Christian era. Though the slaves in Athens outnumbered their masters, yet we read of no general attempts to regain their liberty. And even in Sicily, where the general insurrection broke out under Eunus, the stimulants to revolt were the exceptional hardships inflicted upon the natives, not any feeling they had of the degradation of slavery.

Anything like a general emancipation of slaves was unknown in pagan times for the reason that a people once fallen into a condition of decay was incapable of rising again. Christianity alone could render this possible. It not only taught the proprietor the immorality of slavery, but rendered the slave himself fit and worthy to be a free man. Hence, during the Christian era, instances even of general emancipation of slaves were not wanting. There was, for example, the general emancipation of slaves during the first four centuries of the history

of the Church, and in later times, the emancipation of slaves in the United States and in other parts of the world.

Slavery in the future now seems hardly possible because nations, owing to the saving power of Christianity, do not sink to the degraded condition, in which slavery becomes an apparent necessity even on the part of the nation enslaved.

Slavery, therefore, and the complete extermination of the nation, as such, are exceptionally severe consequences of the struggle for existence. When the conquered nation is still possessed of a certain quantity of healthy moral life, then the conquerors generally allow the vanquished a corresponding amount of liberty. This happened when the Dorians, in their early migrations, took possession of part of the middle, and occupied nearly the whole of the entire southern portion of Greece. Many of the original inhabitants, who formed the class called the *Periœci*, received quite favoured treatment from the Dorians, and were allowed to retain many of their local rights as well as to enjoy a certain amount of self-government. Even the helots were not slaves in the absolute sense of the term. For they were not regarded as the chattels of their individual owners. It is true that, on the other hand, we read of slavery being inflicted upon the Athenians after they were defeated in the Syracusan expedition, and of other instances where the survivors of armies were made

slaves by the victors. But these spasmodic cases are quite different from the continuous systematisation of slavery; they belong to the same category as penal servitude or imprisonment with hard labour such as we have in our own times.

After the introduction of the Christian era, the usual results of the conquest of a nation have been either the assimilation of the conquered people or, at the worst, the institution of some kind of overlordship. When Poland was seized and divided among her powerful neighbours, the process of assimilation was adopted with more or less success, perhaps less. Even when the fierce Tartars invaded Russia, they allowed the conquered Scandinavians a considerable amount of liberty, even leaving to them an *imperium in imperio* at Moscow. Still more tolerant was the treatment meted out to the conquered Saxons by the Normans. Not only did William the Conqueror pose as the powerful rightful heir to the English throne, basing his claim to rule mainly on that title, but, as is well known, after about two hundred years, there was effected a complete amalgamation of the two peoples.

There would seem, therefore, to be a very just law of proportion between the fitness to survive and the amount of political life allowed to a conquered nation. The proportion, moreover, does not seem to depend upon the mere caprice of human liberty, but to be an automatic operation. Struggle for

existence, here, means not only the weeding out of decrepit nations in proportion to their unworthiness, but at the same time a just retribution for the misdeeds of a nation.

Viewing the general results of this struggle upon the conquering nations or upon nations still surviving, we shall see that the greatest possible benefit accrues therefrom. The mere presence of danger intensifies all the energies of a nation. The society is driven through sheer instinct of self-preservation, both to develop its military resources, and to promote that goodwill and co-operation of its citizens, without which no defence would be possible. It is a well-known fact that all border states, or states with exposed frontiers, are obliged to keep a very high standard of military efficiency. Sparta, during all her history, Prussia, in the days of Frederick the Great, were compelled to keep up very powerful armies ; so also has it been with France, since the unification of Germany. Even this in itself means the improvement of the physical standard of the whole nation. Enforced exercise, regular habits, daily drill, all brace up the body. Habits of discipline are inculcated, and at least, for some period of his life, the man has to obey. Then again, the mere performance of such a public duty takes him out of the narrow circle of selfish individualism, compels him to associate with his fellow countrymen and to breathe the strong bracing atmosphere of public life.

States, that have been forced to adopt conscription under some form or other, are invariably more patriotic than those that have not, at least, their patriotism assumes a more active and demonstrative form and is a very tangible factor upon which to reckon.

Besides the direct and the indirect results accruing from the possession of greater military strength, the nation, exposed to danger is forced to rely upon the active co-operation of its citizens. Hence, the struggle for existence has been the occasional cause of many of the most important reforms in history. It was the presence of external enemies that compelled Sparta to put a sudden stop to the anarchy and confusion within her borders, and to establish a constitution which, in spite of its imperfections, at least brought about a condition of harmony and strength. Without the presence of such a stimulus, it is extremely doubtful whether, in Rome, the strife between the patricians and the plebeians would ever have been healed. It was the ruin occasioned by foreign wars that inspired Servius Tullius with the idea of admitting the plebeians to the condition of citizen-soldiers, and later on, only the imminent attacks of the Volscii and Hernici, brought about the first great legal compromise between these two orders. Coming to modern times, the liberal reforms instituted in Prussia by Stein and Hardenburg were prompted by the necessity of utilising all

the various elements in the state, of securing the greater co-operation of the serfs and the townspeople and of bringing together the resources of the country. Poland, again, by way of contrast, presents the spectacle of a nation endeavouring to substitute for a confused and anarchical constitution, a constitution in which there should be some order and fixity, but prevented from so doing by Russia who already had in view the partition of Poland.

The same cause of external danger also brought about many of the best elements of the movements of the French Revolution. Until foreign armies were almost crossing the frontiers of France, factions and disorders reigned in Paris and throughout the country. But when the danger became perceptible, then the government began to be highly centralised, and France, owing to her greater unity, was able to resist her foes.

It would be interesting also to observe how the same struggle for existence has brought about the combination of nations, sometimes, into strong confederations. One noted example is that of the United States of to-day. Had it not been for the war between England and France, it is very doubtful when the English colonies would eventually have joined together ; at the most, they would have probably been only a loose kind of confederation, such as exists in Australia of to-day. But the need of defence necessitated an immediate union and co-

operation of a very close kind which gradually, under the influence of further stimuli, led up to the Confederation of 1787. Again in Europe, we find another example, though perhaps not so conspicuous for its success. This is the Austria-Hungary monarchy. Antagonistic in so many respects, the two countries of Austria and Hungary are held together by the stern necessity of depending upon each other's strength. Hungary, apart from Austria, would not be sufficient to resist the designs of Russia, whose inhabitants are mainly Slavs, and would otherwise constantly aim at the absorption into herself of a weak Slav state like Hungary. Austria, on the other hand, if alone, would have everything to fear from certain states like Germany and Italy, especially from Germany, who would evidently seek to acquire those territories of Austria that are inhabited by German-speaking peoples.

Undoubtedly, the exertion of constant pressure from outside is not unfrequently accompanied by abuses and by certain inevitable evils. There is a constant strain, a certain restless agitation that is not conducive to a peaceful spirit. Also, deception and brutality are not seldom missing. But we are concerned with the general results, with the question whether such pressure from outside is substantially good. And the net results, as we have shown, are satisfactory. Even with regard to the strain put upon the nation, this only means that the struggle

for existence within the nation itself is rendered more acute. It means that the weak and inefficient, owing to keener competition, are submerged more quickly, and that only persons of fitness and power survive the struggle. Or, to put it more accurately, all classes of society are compelled to aim more strenuously at a condition of efficiency. Those who, in ordinary circumstances, would put forth very little efficiency are thereby stimulated to the utmost exertion. Nor is it the case of a partial unjust pressure, but it means rather the whole nation being spurred on to greater activity.

So far, we have been considering the struggle for existence from the material point of view. But the material element cannot be disassociated from the intellectual element. Mazzini's words are truer to-day than ever they were, and perhaps have a wider sense than when they were first uttered. "Soldiers cannot fight well unless they have ideas at the points of their bayonets." The struggle for existence does not imply a contest of sheer brute strength, but it implies also the presence of a wholesome emulation. Certain material goods there are which cannot be enjoyed by an unlimited number, but there are also goods of a higher order that can be enjoyed by an unlimited number without any risk of diminution or depletion. An essential part of the struggle for existence is the emulation in the intellectual order of things, rivalry in scientific

advance, a determination not to be outstripped either intellectually or morally. In this again, statistics play a very important part. In the different speeches that are made in the various legislatures, frequent reference is made to reports of advances made in other countries and of what must be done in order to reach the same level. Then again, from time to time, special commissions are formed in order to examine into the ways by which other nations obtain excellency in certain departments. Of this, a recent example is furnished by the United States Commission appointed to investigate England's methods of administering tropical countries. Thus, even the moral element gains by this material struggle. For statistics regarding crime and kindred matters become a spur to the Governments of every nation not to take a low and shameful position even in things which pertain to the moral order.

Whatever incidental hardship and cruelty may be entailed by a constant struggle for existence, there can remain very little doubt as to the general result of such a struggle. Not only is it more free from that merciless action that is visible so often in the lower kingdoms of nature, but it stimulates into action certain functions that cannot but promote the true welfare of all. The intellectual and the moral faculties, in other words, receive a continual spur to activity. Moreover, the attendant hardships

of the struggle are being ever more mitigated by another element in the national intercourse of the nations, namely the development of international morality.

Even from the very earliest times, there has existed some kind of international morality and conscience. Much as the Romans valued their system of positive law, the system of their own jurisprudence, they also appreciated the value of equity which was supposed to be distinct from the positive law, and in later times, was held even superior. The origin of the conception of equity in Ancient Rome took its rise in a peculiar manner. The Romans refused to admit foreigners to the privilege of using their own law, but some kind of law was undoubtedly necessary in order to regulate the ever-increasing commercial transactions between Rome and foreign countries. Roman lawyers, therefore, formed and elaborated the conception of *jus gentium*. This *jus gentium* consisted of those elements of law that are common to all nations. Originally, it was held in small esteem by the Roman lawyers, who regarded it as a law only framed for foreigners, who, at that time, were looked upon as inferior beings. But by degrees this idea underwent a change. The *jus gentium* came to be identified with equity, with the natural principles of justice that are above the ordinary and particular positive laws of the land. In fact, equity, as understood in

the Court of Chancery of to-day, answers the express purpose of remedying defects or anomalies that are found in the existing laws or in their working. It is considered to be, to some extent, an expression of the eternal law of justice which is common to all nations and which is superior to any particular positive law.

Incidentally, from this *jus gentium* there was developed the conception of international law, a law before which all states, whether great or small, were equal. This law, moreover, has a certain dignity and intrinsic perfection of its own not possessed by the particular law of any state. For whatever clauses are engrafted on the international law are supposed to emanate *directly* from the principles of eternal justice. In matters of ordinary law, *state authority* is regarded by some as sufficient, but international law rests upon a still deeper foundation, namely justice.

During the Middle Ages, this conception of an international law as distinct from the particular positive law was never extinct. It survived under other forms. Even within the feudal system, there were developed certain maxims or principles of conduct which were obligatory on all nations. Customs of knightly chivalry, humanity to the oppressed and fallen, mutual relations of obedience and authority between tenant and landlord, such accepted theories as that wages, price of goods,

should be regulated by a certain standard,—all clearly show the conception of international law under another though partial form. There was always the idea of a law that was all-pervading, a law that was intimately connected with principles of natural justice.

With the growth of territorial sovereignties, this conception underwent another change. Society, during the Middle Ages, had been divided not vertically but horizontally. It had been divided more according to class distinctions than according to territorial divisions. Modern history, however, introduces the latter kind of division, and the principles of general equity, instead of regarding chiefly the relations between the classes, now once again regarded rather the relations between the territorial units, the state being considered as having an independent existence. Perhaps the first tangible instance of an appeal to this international law was made by Elizabeth. When Drake had been accused of piracy in the West Indies, Elizabeth retorted that Spain had drawn such attacks upon herself by having excluded England from commercial transactions with the West Indies, which action was *contra jus gentium*. Nor was it long before various circumstances compelled nations to make more frequent appeals to the same law. Thus, for example, the great colonising movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries raised the

important question of the extent of right to occupy land. The English claimed the entire width of the American continent from East to West, quoting charters to that effect, while France maintained that she was the first who actually occupied the territory west of the Allegheny Mountains. Evidently this was a question of natural equity. Then again, disputes frequently arose regarding the jurisdiction over the seas, as to the extent of the right of fishing enjoyed by certain nations.

Under such circumstances, it is extremely difficult to determine what are the actual principles of justice in this or that particular case. Something was needed corresponding to the *jus gentium* of the early Romans. A definite code of law drawn up by common agreement and expressing, as far as possible, what seemed to be fair and just, would have dealt adequately with the situation. But, as Lord Salisbury observed in one of his speeches, "International law has not any existence in the sense in which the term 'law' is generally understood. It depends generally upon the prejudices of writers of text-books. It can be enforced by no tribunal, and therefore to apply to it the phrase law is misleading." These words are substantially true if by law is meant a definite precise code drawn up in the form of a document.

Much, however, has been accomplished during the last few years by the Hague Tribunal. Origin-

ally the scope of the work done by this tribunal was limited merely to the question of diminishing war expenditure and reducing the size of standing armies. But, at each sitting of the tribunal, the scope of its activity became enlarged. Arbitration between nations, regulations of customs of war, rights and duties of belligerents, and neutrals, and the interpretation of matters relating to extradition, copyright, commerce and sanitary precautions now fall within its jurisdiction. But the important element in the situation is, that the Hague Tribunal has been the means of converting the abstract international law into a definite written code.

By this means, the moral element that should exist between nations has been greatly increased. The peculiar bitterness that accompanied the material strife of nations has been removed, and now, war is practically fought out only between the professional combatants on either side. Also the area of the strife has been considerably lessened. Even more important still is the recognition of justice, and, not mere might as the solution of problems that may arise.

With regard to the effect on the individual nation, the very existence of such a law must have a most beneficial influence on positive particular legislation. Ordinary common law is promulgated by the authorities of the state. Naturally, when it is glaringly unjust, the sufferers complain and ask

for the repeal of such obnoxious laws. But in the ordinary course of affairs, the law is obeyed because it is the law of the land and transgressors will be proportionally punished. The ethical element does not very often claim or receive explicit attention, whereas the international law is founded upon no other basis. Whatever force of sanction may afterwards be added is only the result of the general agreement given in accordance with what had been considered as just.

Besides the international law, it would be possible to enumerate instances in which the mutual action and reaction between nations tends to their moral welfare. International movements of all descriptions are a marked feature of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Scientific congresses, medical congresses, legal congresses, ecclesiastical gatherings, show that the nations of the world are participating more than ever in each other's progress. Perhaps, the latest outcome is the international moral educational congress having for its object the better promotion of education throughout the world. This mutual co-operation in the intellectual and moral life is of the highest possible value, though its special significance has not yet perhaps been appreciated. To the world of to-day might be applied the same compliment that Gravina paid to the Romans when he said "*viribus et opibus aliorum populorum ad universalem juris gentium com-*

munionem extentionemque rationabilis vitae atque ad humani generis emendationem uterentur." "They used the wealth and resources of other nations to the universal participation in the law of nations, to the extension of the activity of the mind and the improvement of the human race." Only we may add, with this difference, that now equal states are doing to one another what the Romans were doing to their subject peoples. The root cause of injustice in human societies is narrowness, exclusiveness. If this be removed, then mutual benevolence reigns supreme, and all concur to the common good, realising these words of Cicero, "The whole of this world is one city inhabited alike by gods and men," or to refer to the higher thought of a Christian writer, "The City of God has at last been realised on earth".

APPENDIX.

INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY ON HISTORY.

WHEN we observe the facts of history under the light of the influence of the physical shape of the world, it is impossible not to notice the many relations between geography and history. The character of nations, their natural proclivities, their capacity for business and self-government, and, above all, the peculiar texture of their intercourse, are largely dependent upon such things as climate, rivers, seas and mountains. States, for example, along the shores of the sea or along the banks of great lakes, generally have a vocation for shipbuilding and commercial enterprise, while states separated from one another by mountain ranges or other natural barriers, seem, by a law equally inexorable, to be divided, one from the other.

Yet geographical influences are not universal in the same sense as are the laws of nature. They are liable to many exceptions. They express indeed merely general tendencies, in this respect, closely resembling the so-called laws of economics. None, for example, would say that every human person is influenced in his conduct exactly by the law of supply and demand, or by the proportionate opportunity of gain that is presented. Yet eighty or ninety per cent. of persons would be so influenced. And this is precisely what we mean when we speak of the influences of geography.

In order that we may formulate, however briefly, some idea of the collective extent of these influences, we will pass in re-

view the more important geographical features of the globe, endeavouring to suggest in what way they have influenced history. Much might be written upon such a subject. But mere indications as well as a few remarkable instances will suffice to illustrate for our purpose the correlation of geography with the rise and decline of nations.

One of the most important geographical elements is the sea. Nations that dwell by the sea, especially if they are favoured with good timber land, almost invariably become shipbuilders, engage largely in commerce, and often embark on a policy of imperial aggression. The Phœnicians, the Athenians, the Venetians and the Portuguese could be quoted as examples. Together with this resulting circumstance, must also be associated the introduction of foreign elements which may act beneficially, or the reverse upon the character of the people.

Setting aside, however, the obvious effects of the nearness of the sea, there are other effects less conspicuous that must be considered. Possibilities of invasion or defence in time of war are greatly enlarged. The co-operation of a fleet is very important to the success of an attacking army. During the Persian Wars, Xerxes did not overlook this fact, but he failed to make of it sufficient account. Indeed, one of the preliminary causes of the failure of the Persians was that their fleet did not co-operate with the army at the beginning of the campaign. When again the Greeks invaded Asia, they also availed themselves of the co-operation of the fleet. Even Alexander, essentially a military leader, did not ignore the naval element in the struggle, as was shown by his equipment of the Greek navy for the siege of Tyre. Rome also, in order to invade Carthage, had to build a fleet, and in mediæval and modern history the navy has always figured in the same conspicuous way.

Nor is this surprising. For when the sea is made the basis of operations, it is impossible for the enemy to foresee the direc-

tion of attack, and very difficult safely to guard all the vulnerable points of ingress. Whereas, on land, the attack can generally be made only by certain roads and defiles. These circumstances probably account for the comparative success of invasions made by sea as compared with those made by land. England's invasions of France during the Hundred Years' War owed much of their success to these circumstances. Not only could the English land when and where they pleased and retreat on an emergency, but there were always means by which they could continue to receive necessary supplies. The successful invasion of Copenhagen by the English fleet during the Napoleonic Wars, was chiefly owing to the suddenness with which such an invasion could be made. Wolfe's successful attack upon Quebec depended mainly upon the fact that he could land when he chose, and thus take the enemy unawares. The eventful struggle of the Crimean War illustrated again the ease with which the belligerent forces can maintain a foothold in the enemy's country provided they take the sea as their basis. And last, but not least, there was the Spanish Peninsular War, and the final struggle between the English and Napoleon in Belgium, in both of which campaigns, the English successfully made the sea also their basis of operations. It would perhaps be safe to draw this generalisation, that wherever the attacking power has made use of the sea, in most cases the attack has proved successful. But conversely, attacks made only by land are attended by considerable danger and risk. Thus Hannibal made the fatal mistake of neglecting to secure the co-operation of the fleet during the Second Punic War, and this greatly accounted for his failure.

The sea, besides serving as a basis of operations, frequently serves as an obvious means for defence, but not so effectual, except when there is a question of defending only a limited range of coast territory. This was fairly evident during the Peloponnesian War. So long as Athens assumed the ag-

gressive, she was successful. But when she became merely a defending party, she became exposed to all sorts of surprises. A similar circumstance in modern history partly accounts for the defeat of the Spaniards at the hands of the English during the reign of Elizabeth, the Spanish fleet generally adopting purely defensive tactics. Of all countries, England might seem to be an exception to this rule, owing to the narrow range of her coast line. Yet England has been successfully taken by the Anglo-Saxons, the Normans, to some extent by the Danes, then by William of Orange, while her ships in the Medway were actually burnt by the Dutch. That Ireland also can be made a convenient attacking basis, has been illustrated by the presence of a French fleet under Admiral Hoche in the Irish harbours.

The neighbourhood of the sea, therefore, tends to make a nation act more on the aggressive than on the defensive. And even where there is an inclination to adopt a purely defensive policy, such a policy would often be successful only by first taking the initiative. This circumstance of itself must affect profoundly the character of a nation. Maritime nations, generally speaking, are expansive, ready to strike rather than to defend. On the other hand, nations that have hitherto been purely military often develop a strong naval policy when they wish to expand and aggrandise.

After the influence of the sea, there is the influence of the rivers that, in various ways, affect the course of history. Rivers, however, for this purpose must be of a certain size. The rivers of Greece, for example, being small, had little influence on Greek history. They acted neither as frontiers nor as means of communication. In Italy, the Tiber, by its shallow waters, had only a negative influence, in the words of one of the classical writers, "by keeping off undesirable visitors". But on the great Lombardian Plain, the river Po, by its depth and length, and numerous streams, had great influence in bringing

together the peoples of that Plain. Maps of Italy, during the mediæval periods, revealed the fact that Lombardy was literally intersected in all directions by a network of waterways which brought together its remotest parts. Even from the military point of view, the Po and its tributaries have figured largely in history. The Trebbia, as is well known, helped Hannibal in his first battle against the Romans. This stream acted as a protection to the flank of his army, and the Roman soldiers, after crossing the cold and swift waters, had become already indisposed for the fatigue of the battle. In modern times, the Ticino and the Adda fulfilled a similar useful function in the war between the Austrians and the French.

Travelling westwards, we find the rivers occupying a more and more important position in history. In the first place, they now begin to serve the purpose of natural frontiers. Both the Rhine and the Danube were considered by the Romans as important frontiers dividing the Roman Empire from the Germanic tribes. Hence, the line of fortresses that were erected along the course of these rivers. Such towns as Vienna, Maintz, Speyers, Cologne, were built on the sites of fortresses originally intended to defend these watery barriers. So useful indeed was the Rhine as a defensive frontier that, though the Romans frequently succeeded in going beyond it, they afterwards found it advisable to consider this river as an artificial as well as a natural frontier.

In Central Europe, rivers, besides acting as natural frontiers, have frequently occupied prominent positions in campaigns. During the Thirty Years' War, the districts along the Rhine became a convenient lever by which French influence could assert itself in German affairs. The same river was also used by Napoleon to protect his flank when the allied armies invaded France. Although, however, Napoleon knew how to neutralise the river in strategic movements, his army was twice in succession nearly completely shattered by the circumstance

of the river being used defensively against himself. This also happened in invading Russia where he found himself obliged to construct a bridge across the Beresina, while even before this, he had found himself in a similarly dangerous position, on the Danube at Lobau.

In England, the rivers were mainly instrumental in shaping the successive conquests of the island by the German tribes of the Anglo-Saxons and Jutes. The Humber especially, and the Thames enabled the marauding tribes to carry their incursions far inland. After these times, English rivers did not play a very important part in warfare—one exception, however, being at the battle of Towton, where the river Cock became a cause of disaster to the Lancastrian army.

In connection with rivers, we must not forget to mention the artificial waterways called canals. From earliest times, these also have wonderfully influenced the course of history. The canal constructed by Xerxes which connected Mount Athos with the mainland, the canal attempted across the Isthmus of Corinth by the Emperor Nero, the canal which in the times of Colbert was projected to connect the Mediterranean Sea with the western seaboard of France, and in later times, the Suez Canal, the Kiel Canal, and the canal constructed across the Isthmus of Panama, testified to the importance that these waterways had in the minds of statesmen.

It would indeed be scarcely possible to over-estimate the importance of these last-named Canals. The Suez Canal entailed the English occupation of Egypt, a temporary conflict with France, and a substantial part, if not the entirety, of English policy in the East. Germany again, by the construction of the Kiel Canal, made herself one of the foremost naval powers in Europe by doubling at one stroke the efficiency of her fleet. America again, by doing in Panama what Lesseps failed to accomplish, will have given herself a unique position

in the current of the world's progress, both as regards commerce and civilisation.

From the waterways of the world, we may now turn to consider another geographical feature, namely, the mountain ranges. Naturally, these have always acted more as barriers than as means of communication. The extent of their influence, however, in this regard, is mainly dependent upon their height. In Greece, the height and abruptness of the mountain ranges were for a long time instrumental in preventing the union of the different Greek peoples. In Italy, the Apennine ranges, owing to their slopes, were not such effectual barriers to inter-communication. On the other hand, the Alps, by their great height and position constitute a natural frontier, and, in the words of a famous diplomatist, make Italy a geographical unit. Again the Pyrenees in Spain also constitute a natural boundary, though occasionally, French occupation has gone beyond. In England the mountain ranges of Wales, owing to the security they offer, became for a long time the refuge of the dispossessed Britons, while for a similar reason, the Highlanders in Scotland, down to recent times, were able to maintain their own political life.

The successful efforts, however, of the Highlanders and of the Welsh were chiefly owing to the guerilla nature of the warfare which they forced upon their opponents. Mountain barriers are by no means an adequate safeguard against invasion, for, usually, there are some passes through which the enemy might descend and take the invaded territory unawares. Historians are still uncertain as to the whereabouts of the exact roads by which Hannibal descended into Italy. And the Romans themselves, especially since they were not living in days of electric communication, were unaware of Hannibal's intentions until the last moment. Even if they had known the actual project of invasion they would not have known until too late whether he would arrive near Milan or

near Turin. Napoleon knew how to take advantage of the same weakness in the defensive line of a mountain barrier, and thus could appear suddenly in the rear where he was not expected by the Austrians,—his crossing the Alps by the great St. Bernard enabling him to appear at Vald' Osta. Forming a wide generalisation, we may observe that mountains have frequently been more useful to the invader than to the invaded. Only under exceptional conditions, do they form real barriers, efficient to cut off nations from mutual intercourse.

We should expect that rising ground of any kind ought to prove important from a strategic point of view. How convenient, for example, were the hill-slopes from which the Athenians gained impetus when they descended upon the Persians! For defensive purposes, hills have been used by nearly all people, ancient and modern. The Arx or Acropolis was purposely situated on rising ground. The Gauls, under Vercingetorix, strongly encamped themselves on Mount Alesia. At the battle of Crecy, Edward and his reserves were posted on rising ground. At Hastings, the rising ground during the early part of the engagement had favoured the English. In modern times, the French at Waterloo lost great part of their artillery through a difficulty in climbing a small ascent, and it is also well known that the French in constructing their present iron frontier of defensive fortresses, have largely availed themselves of the natural earthworks of the Vosges.

Evidently, however, such general use of small hills cannot be said to have effected in any marked manner the trend of history. The advantages, therefore, to be gained therefrom, cannot be said to belong to any particular nation.

Something must now be said about geographical influences on the position and rise of great towns. Geographical conditions would chiefly influence the choice of a site of a new town. Athens, Rome, Old Sarum, Carcassonne, Durham, even London, were evidently chosen for their favourable defensive position,

being erected on high ground. Frequently, commercial advantages have determined the position of a town. The confluence of two rivers probably gave origin to Paris, Lyons and Maintz. Good harbours occasioned the rise of the towns of Ravenna, Aquileija, and in modern times, of Havre, Marseilles and Glasgow. Sometimes, the presence of important mineral advantages have given rise to great commercial cities, as for example, Preston and Wigan in Northern England. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that most of our commercial cities depend upon favourable geographical conditions. Such cities, in America, as Detroit, Buffalo, Chicago, Milwaukee, were deliberately built upon navigable waters of the great lakes. Minneapolis found a convenient site close to the great water-power of the Falls of St. Anthony. At the same time, however, other causes also occasionally operate. Scenery, medicinal springs, frequently occasion the rise of big towns.

From what has been said, it will have appeared fairly evident that geography has been an important though indirect factor in the progress of nations. Commercial industry, rise of new wants, capabilities for defence and offence, amount of intercourse with foreign nations are all greatly determined by geographical conditions. We may even go further, and say that the rate of a nation's development of character depends much upon her geographical situation. People, living in northern latitudes, develop far more slowly than those living in southerly latitudes. Hence, it not unfrequently happens that while northern nations are still in the period when power and dominion constitute the object of their ambition, those living in southerly latitudes have already reached the period when riches and material luxury are the sole objects of a nation's desire!

Obviously, under such circumstances, the latter fall an easy prey to invasion from the former. This was precisely the case when the decadent Roman Empire fell before the incursions of the young barbarian tribes, and when, in later times, the

Arabian kingdoms became subjugated by the Turks, as yet, comparatively young and hardy in their political growth.

Yet another instance might be adduced of the subtle psychological effects of climates when we consider how the sunny climes of Italy are responsible for the vivacity and light temperament of the Roman nations, while the stern climate of more northern regions greatly account for the solidity and massiveness of the Teuton. While some climates seem to produce feminine traits of national character, others produce masculine types. Then again, there is some amount of truth in the boast which Americans make regarding the electric bracing qualities of their climate. The strenuousness and enthusiasm of the American are largely the result of such peculiarities in his climate.

What the climate is, that the animal world also will be. And since the intellectual and moral life of man are closely linked with the animal part of his nature, it is evident that geography is a powerful though subtle element in forming the character of a nation.

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